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This thesis explored whether children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) learn the 
names of artefacts when abstracting information from the objects themselves (Studies 
One and Two: shape and function bias), a speaker (Study Three: gaze and pointing cues) 
or the environment (Study Four: arrow and light cues).  A final study assessed the relative 
weighting of conflicting speaker and environmental cues (Study Five).  Control groups of 
typically developing (TD) children and children with other developmental disorders (DD) 
were also included.  In order to tease apart whether word learning is delayed or deviant in 
ASD and if this extends to DD children, each study recruited participants with a wide 
range of receptive language abilities.  The participants were subdivided into ‘high verbal 
mental age’ (VMA) and ‘low VMA’ categories.  Children with ASD were found to be 
delayed in some aspects of language acquisition; specifically in showing a shape bias and 
learning words from eye gaze and pointing.  They failed to learn words from one type of 
associative cue (light), but learnt words from a directional arrow at the same age as their 
TD peers.  Furthermore, they showed a function bias at an earlier age than TD children.  
Interestingly, the DD cohort also showed substantial word learning deficits.  They were 
delayed learning words from eye gaze and deviant learning words using functional 
information and some types of social and associative cues.  Overall, this research 
contributes to our understanding of the pathways of language acquisition across typical 
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Chapter One: General Introduction 
 
1.1 General introduction to the thesis 
Typically Developing (TD) children’s vocabulary develops rapidly during the first 
few years of their life.  When overhearing speech, there may be both numerous possible 
referents for each individual novel word (Quine, 1960) and potentially a variety of novel 
words per utterance for children to decode (Monaghan & Mattock, 2012).  Take the 
seemingly simple example of hearing the object label ‘cup’ for the first time.  To decipher 
the meaning of the word, infants must determine that ‘cup’ does not refer to other novel 
objects or actions within their current viewpoint.  They must also establish that ‘cup’ 
names the object in its entirety rather than simply its handle or design and can be 
generalised from this particular object to others into the same object class.  Furthermore, 
there are the added difficulties of how infants interpret the novel word if they are not 
focused upon the cup or if the cup is not even physically present when the word is 
spoken.  These are just a few of the challenges children face when learning object labels.  
Yet TD children show remarkable skill at the task of linking a sound to a class of objects 
(e.g. Bloom, 2000; Quine, 1960).   
One way in which children acquire vocabulary is by using word learning 
constraints (e.g. Markman, 1989).  These are innate or learned biases, which constrain 
possible word meanings by highlighting attention towards one object or one aspect of an 
object, while restricting other artefacts as being the referent.  For example, children tend 
to believe that novel labels refer to the whole object rather than individual component 





together, such as a toy dog with a toy cat rather than bone (the taxonomic assumption) 
and assume that objects have only one name, thus new words must refer to new objects 
(mutual exclusivity).  Although there are occasional exceptions to these assumptions 
(sometimes new words do refer to an individual component of an object and some objects 
have more than one name), in general, word-learning constraints facilitate children’s 
language by narrowing the range of potential referents for the novel word.  Other word 
learning biases include the shape bias (assuming that objects with the same shape have 
the same name) and the function bias (assuming that objects performing the same 
function have the same name), which are the focus of Chapters Two (Shape Bias) and 
Three (Function Bias).   
Yet learning a new concrete noun does not rely only on the ability to generalise 
from, for example, the shape or function of objects.  TD children also learn words from 
social cues, such as the speaker gazing or pointing towards an object (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 
1993; Briganti & Cohen, 2011; Gliga & Csibra, 2009) and associative cues, such as cross-
situational consistency (e.g. Saffran, Aslin & Newport, 1996; Smith & Yu, 2008; Yu & 
Smith, 2007) and perceptual salience (e.g. Axelsson, Churchley & Horst, 2012).  
According to the social pragmatic account (e.g. Akhtar, Carpenter & Tomasello, 1998; 
Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Bloom, 2000; Briganti & Cohen, 2011; Gliga & Csibra, 2009; 
Tomasello & Akhtar, 1995; Tomasello & Barton, 1994) children learn words from 
understanding the referential intent of the speaker, assuming that people intend to name 
objects that they point or gaze towards.  The associative account (e.g. Monaghan & 





Landau, 1996; Suanda, Magwanya & Namy, 2014) argues instead that children learn 
words from processes of attention, memory and perception; as eye gaze and pointing 
highlight attention towards objects, children simply associate these gestures with the 
object they refer to, without any referential intent inference.  
Although these three processes (word learning constraints, social pragmatics and 
association) might be thought to work in competition with each other, hybrid theories 
such as the emergentist coalition model of word learning stress that a range of cues are 
important for helping children learn words (e.g. Golinkoff & Hirsh-Pasek, 2006; Hollich 
et al., 2000).  Rather than word learning being controlled by either social cues or 
association, the emergentist coalition model emphasises that social and associative cues 
interlink together to facilitate children’s word learning, along with other types of cue. For 
example, word learning biases such as the shape bias and the function bias enable 
children to generalise the label ‘ball’ to objects with the same circular shape, which share 
the function of bouncing or being thrown or kicked.  However, in addition to these 
generalisations, children may follow the speaker’s social cues, such as eye gaze and 
pointing to a nearby novel object as the speaker declares ‘it’s a ball!’  Furthermore, after 
repeatedly hearing the label ‘ball’ paired with the stimuli, using association helps the 
child maintain the word-object mapping over time.   
The emergentist coalition model stresses that children use various social, 
attentional, cognitive and linguistic processes for language acquisition.  Children have 
access to multiple cues and learn best when these cues interlink and when children have 





supported these two views.  When an adult looks at and labels a perceptually salient 
object, rather than a perceptually boring distractor, TD infants form correct word-object 
mappings from as early as ten-months-old.  From eighteen-months, children still form 
correct word-object mappings even when the speaker labels the perceptually boring 
object (Hollich, 2000).  It is also at this age that children form word object mappings to 
the object of the speaker’s focus, even if this differs from the object that the child 
themselves is fixated upon (Baldwin, 1991; 1993).   
Further, children utilise word learning constraints, social cues and associative cues 
at different developmental time points.  For example, TD infants learn words through 
association, while older children (18-24 months onwards) employ social cues (Baldwin, 
1991; 1993; Foudon et al., 2008; Hollich et al., 2000; Pruden, Hirsh-Pasek, Hennon & 
Golinkoff, 2006).  Therefore, it is important to investigate word learning biases, social 
cues and associative cues in order to build up an accurate and all-encompassing picture of 
how children learn words.     
These three approaches to word learning (constraints/biases, social pragmatics and 
association) emphasise different attributes as important for children’s language 
acquisition.  According to the emergentist coalition model, theories of word learning can 
be separated into those that support Quine’s (1960) approach to word learning (i.e. word 
learning constraints) and those that reject it (i.e. the social pragmatic and associative 
accounts).  When a speaker utters ‘gavangai’ as a rabbit scuttles part, according to the 
word learning constraints theory the child focuses on key attributes and restrict others, 





usually presumed that the speaker refers to the whole object, rather than individual 
components of the object, that each object has only one name and that objects possessing 
the same shape and performing the same function have the same name.  All of these 
heuristics help children determine the referent of the novel word.      
Word learning constraints focus on characteristics of the object for children’s 
word learning (i.e. the object as a whole, its shape, function etc.)  While this undoubtedly 
facilitates word learning for artefacts, it does not explain how children learn words for 
other types of noun or verbs and adjectives.  Furthermore, although aspects of the object 
are useful for naming, other factors are also important.  These include the speaker (which 
social cues emphasise) and the environment (which associative cues emphasise).  
According to the social pragmatic account, rather than children trying to work out what 
the speaker is naming, the speaker themselves tries to work out what the child is focused 
upon (Nelson, 1988) or is of relevance to the child (L. Bloom, 1993; 2000) and then 
names this.  According to the association account, the environment is important for word 
learning; children name objects by attending to cues which highlight attention towards 
specific artefacts, such as the object lighting up (Axelsson et al., 2008).   
Therefore, TD children form word-object mappings through an interaction 
between the object, speaker and environment.  Naming is facilitated by object 
characteristics such as familiarity (mutual exclusivity), component parts (whole object 
assumption), form (shape bias) and the role the object fulfils (function bias).  Naming is 
also aided by speaker characteristics, such as facial and emotional expression (e.g. 





Baldwin et al., 1996), prior knowledge (Akhtar et al., 1996; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003) 
eye gaze (Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, & Crowson, 1997; Houston-
Price, Plunkett & Duffy, 2006; Lee, Eskritt, Symons & Muir, 1998) and pointing 
(Briganti & Cohen, 2011; Gliga & Csibra, 2009; Paulus & Fikkert, 2014; Tomasello, 
Carpenter & Liszowski, 2007).  Finally, the environment helps naming; perceptual 
salience, cross-situational consistency and linking new words with cues such as arrows, 






Figure 1.1: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object 
environment interaction for word learning.  Children (listeners) learn words through 
characteristics of the speaker (such as pointing, gaze, head direction and language), object 
(such as context, size, texture, shape, function and colour) and environment (such as an 
arrow positioned towards the object, perceptual salience, the object lighting up and cross-









Although TD children learn words with relative ease, individuals with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have difficulties with language acquisition (e.g. Boucher, 
2012; Eigsti, de Marchena, Schuh, & Kelley, 2011; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990; 
Noterdaeme, Wriedt & Hohne, 2010; Peppe, McCann, Gibbon, O’Hare, & Rutherford, 
2007).  Children with ASD generally learn to speak later than TD children (De Giacomo 
& Fombonne, 1998; Howlin, 2003, Lord & Paul, 1997).  They also may show a restricted 
vocabulary and idiosyncratic speech (Brehme, 2014), such as echolalia (Grossi, Marcone, 
Cinquegrana & Gallucci, 2012; Rydel & Mirenda, 1994; Tager Flusberg & Calkins, 
1990) and have difficulties with the pragmatics of language (Lam &Yeung, 2012; 
Ozonoff & Miller, 1996).   
About 80% of children with ASD in special education cannot functionally 
communicate (Bondy & Frost, 1994) and approximately 30% of children with ASD are 
nonverbal at nine years of age (Anderson et al., 2007).  About a quarter of individuals 
with ASD remain functionally non-verbal (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz & Klin, 2004).  
However, the further three quarters of children with ASD do learn how to talk (Lord, Risi 
& Pickles, 2004).  This suggests that children with ASD are able to use some cues to 
facilitate word learning, like TD children.  It is also true that even some non-verbal 
children with ASD have adequate comprehension of speech, enabling them to partake in 
tasks involving receptive language, such as written and gestural communication, listening 
and understanding instructions and pointing towards pictures or objects.  However, there 





their expressive communication skills (Hudry et al., 2010; Ellis Weismer, Lord & Esler, 
2010).   
In addition to impaired language, children with ASD have difficulties with social 
pragmatics (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi & Brown, 1998; Osterling & Dawson, 
1994), including comprehending referential intent (e.g. D’Entremont & Yasbek, 2007; 
Hartley & Allen, 2014; Preissler & Carey, 2005; Prizant & Wetherby, 1987), problems 
with theory of mind, or an understanding that others’ viewpoints may differ from one’s 
own (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Colle, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006; Leslie & 
Frith, 1988; Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss & Dux, 2013), and social aloofness (Borden & 
Ollendick, 1994; Scheeren, Koot & Begeer, 2012; Wing & Gould, 1979).  These 
difficulties may be both caused by and contribute to language impairment.  With no or 
limited language it is hard for children with ASD to express their needs, wants and desires 
and to fully take part in social activities.  Without completely engaging in the social 
world, children are not exposed to as much language as is usual and have limited 
opportunity to develop their own linguistic skills.   
As mentioned by Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek (2006), according to the emergentist 
coalition model, children with ASD experience the dampening of one type of word 
learning cue; social pragmatics.  However, other information within the language system 
(including perceptual and attentional elements) compensate for the deficient social 
component.  Children with ASD may therefore rely on these other cues for word learning 
– particularly association – well after the usual infancy period, instead of becoming 





facilitate language acquisition.  Although this paper draws attention to this assumption, 
this has only been briefly explored once before (Hennon, 2003).  It was found that three-
year-old children with ASD behaved much like twelve-month-old TD children; forming 
word-object mappings towards perceptually salient objects, even when the speaker was 
gazing towards a different artefact.     
Therefore, the suggestion that children with ASD are not able to access social 
pragmatic word learning cues needs further investigation with other kinds of social cues 
and participants with a wider range of chronological age (CA) and verbal mental age 
(VMA) than Hennon (2003) previously investigated.  The studies included within this 
thesis investigate the emergentist coalition model with regards to ASD by exploring the 
three main processes the model identifies (word learning constraints, social pragmatics 
and association) within typical and atypical development.  The model provides a starting 
point for the basis of this thesis; seeing when and how these processes arise in relation to 
ASD.   
Despite findings that children with ASD have deficits in language and 
socialisation, it is important to note that most studies investigating word learning in ASD 
only test a specific age or VMA range of children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Jing & 
Fang, 2013; Norbury, Griffiths & Nation, 2010).  For example, Baron-Cohen et al., 
(1997) only looked at children with ASD who had a mean language expressive and 
receptive comprehension age of just over two.  Therefore, if this particular group of 
children do not show a skill, it is unclear whether this ability will eventually develop (i.e. 





even if the cohort of participants tested pass a particular task, it is possible that test 
success would not be achieved by children who are younger or have less advanced verbal 
abilities.  Thus, it is important to recruit children with ASD who have a range of ages and 
verbal capabilities. 
The present thesis explores whether children with ASD are delayed or deviant in 
five areas relating to word learning: the shape bias, the function bias, social cues, 
associative cues and conflicting social and associative cues.  Unlike TD two-year-olds, 
young children with ASD do not appear to show a shape bias (Hartley & Allen, 2014; 
Potrzeba, Fein & Naigles, 2015; Tek, Jaffery, Fein & Naigles, 2008).  The function bias 
has never been explored in ASD.  Children with ASD have difficulties with 
understanding social cues, such as eye gaze (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 
2005), although evidence suggests that they have a better understanding of associative 
cues, such as arrows (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant & Walker, 1995; 
Senju, Tojo, Dairoku, & Hasegawa, 2004).  Although association can help children learn 
how to speak, it is not always the most interesting or perceptually salient object being 
labelled.  Thus, the word learning process of a child relying purely on associative cues 
would be slow, difficult, frustrating and full of word-object mapping errors.  This could 
help explain some of the language acquisition deficits shown by individuals with ASD.   
Studying how children with ASD use word learning constraints, social cues and 
associative information sheds further light on theories of both typical and atypical child 
development.  Of course, it may be the case that children with ASD are poor at learning 





Therefore, in addition to exploring how children with ASD learn words relative to TD 
children, this thesis investigates word learning in children with other developmental 
disorders (DD), but who do not have ASD.  Word learning difficulties have also been 
found in this population (Franken, Lewis, & Malone, 2010; Rice, Warren, & Betz, 2005), 
although others argue that language impairment is specific to ASD (Menyuk, 1978; 
Rutter, 1978).   
To summarise, this thesis investigates word learning in TD children, children with 
ASD and children with DD.  The role of word learning biases (the shape bias and 
function bias), social cues (eye gaze and pointing) and associative cues (arrow and light) 
are all detailed.  The next few sections will explore in more detail the shape bias and the 
function bias in TD children, children with ASD and DD children.  Social and associative 
cues are described in the following sections.    
 
1.2. Word learning from the shape bias: TD children   
Word learning constraints and biases involve object characteristics, which help 
children eliminate potential referents of novel words.  The shape bias is one example of a 
word learning constraint, which refers to the assumption that objects with the same shape 
have the same name.  For example, when TD children form the word-object mapping 
‘spoon’ they generalise this label according to the objects’ spherical shape, rather than 
other perceptual features such as size (Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988), texture (Jones, 





As different exemplars of many common object categories tend to have the same 
shape, using the shape bias helps children quickly classify similarly shaped artefacts as 
being within the same class of object.  Children need only learn the word ‘spoon’ as 
applying to one instance of the category, instead of having to undergo the laborious 
process of having every new spoon labelled for them.  There are two competing theories 
regarding the process underlying children’s understanding of the shape bias: the shape-as-
cue (SAC) account and the associative-learning-account (ALA).  Chapter Two (Study 
One) specifically tests these two hypotheses and will explore their role in word learning.   
It has long been known that TD children form word-object mappings according to 
salient perceptual features such as shape (Brown, 1957; Clark, 1973).  Following these 
initial studies, the term ‘shape bias’ was coined by Landau et al., (1988), who presented 
two-year-olds, three-year-olds and adults with a novel object followed by seven test 
objects.  One test object was an identical replica of the novel object and the other six test 
objects differed from the novel object on one dimension; shape, colour or size.  Two 
objects differed on shape to different degrees (with the same texture and size), two 
objects differed on texture (with the same shape and size) and two objects differed on size 
(with the same shape and texture).   
In the ‘naming’ condition, the novel object was given a label (e.g. ‘this is a dax’).  
Following this, the participant was asked either whether each of the test objects was also a 
‘dax’ (the ‘yes or no’ task) or to select from pairs of objects presented which one was the 





merely shown to the child (e.g. ‘look at this’) before participants were asked which of the 
test objects ‘went with’ the novel object. 
Results across the experiments suggested that TD adults categorise objects 
according to shape in both lexical and non lexical tasks.  However, the children’s pattern 
of performance was less straightforward.  In a lexical condition (‘this is a dax, can you 
give me another dax’) children only rejected the objects which differed the most in terms 
of shape for the yes/no procedure.  For the forced choice procedure, they chose objects 
with texture changes instead of size changes but in all other analyses performed at 
chance.  In the non naming condition, same shaped objects were chosen more than same 
texture objects but not same size objects.  When the values were more extreme in 
subsequent experiments (e.g. bigger size changes, more salient textures and more extreme 
shape changes) children generalised by shape more strongly.  However, the shape bias 
was more lexically specific for the children than the adults, with children tending to 
generalise by shape only when exposed to a novel word and not in other contexts. 
Since Landau et al.’s (1988) work, the shape bias has been extensively studied by 
both the original authors themselves (e.g. Jones, 2003; Jones, Smith & Landau, 1991; 
Landau, Smith & Jones, 1992; 1998; Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996) and other researchers 
(e.g. Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; Hupp, 2008; Markson, Diesendruck & Bloom, 2008; 
Samuelson, Horst, Schutte & Dobbertin, 2008; Tek et al., 2008; Tek, Jaffery, Swensen, 
Fein & Naigles, 2012).  TD children employ a shape bias from approximately two-years-
old, suggesting that it is both caused by acquiring language (i.e. children learn while 





later facilitates the word learning process (by generalising objects according to shape, 
children learn to categorise them in this way) (Tek et al., 2008).  The shape bias appears 
to strengthen during children’s development, so that by adulthood individuals are more 
stringent in using shape to form word-object mappings (Horst & Twomey, 2013; Landau, 
et al., 1988).   
Although the shape bias often facilitates language acquisition, children are usually 
aware that shape is not always a reliable cue to object name.  Additional cues such as the 
context in which the object is named (Landau et al., 1992), the type of thing being named 
(Soja, Carey & Spelke, 1991) and other characteristics of the objects being labelled 
(Horst & Twomey, 2013; Jones, et al., 1991; Samuelson & Horst, 2007; Tek et al., 2012) 
can weaken or diminish children’s shape bias.  As well as perceptual cues, conflicting 
conceptual information, such as object function, can also override shape in children’s 
naming (e.g. Diesendruck, Markson & Bloom, 2003; Gentner, 1978; Merriman, Scott & 
Marzita, 1993).  This is further discussed in section 1.5 and in Chapter Three (Study 
Two).   
While other factors are also important for naming, the shape bias remains a good 
heuristic for enabling TD children to quickly and easily generalise object labels.  A shape 
bias deficit might be one factor contributing to why children with ASD find word learning 
difficult.  Due to their impairments with understanding referential intent, studying 
children with ASD also provides a good opportunity to establish if the shape bias is 
controlled by the SAC account, which relies upon referential intent (in which case, they 





associative processes (in which case, they would be predicted to possess it).  The next 
section will cover the shape bias in children with ASD. 
   
1.3. Word learning from the shape bias: Children with ASD 
While word learning constraints and biases have been extensively explored in 
relation to typical development (e.g. Au & Glusman, 1990; Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; 
Halberda, 2003; Horst, Samuelson, Kucker & McMurray, 2011; Hupp, 2008; Jaswal, 
2010; Landau et al., 1988; 1998; Markman, 1989; Samuelson & Horst, 2007; Tek et al., 
2012), with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Preissler & Carey, 2005; Tek et al., 2008; 
Williams, 2009), they have not been so thoroughly studied in relation to children with 
ASD.  However, investigating word learning constraints and biases in this population 
informs about the underlying mechanisms controlling them.  The shape bias might be 
considered difficult for children with ASD due to the categorisation it requires; different 
exemplars of the same type of object are classified together based on shape.  Some 
aspects of categorisation may be impaired for children with ASD, such as their 
organisation of semantic knowledge (Tek et al., 2008).  This is more fully discussed in 
Study One (Chapter Two). 
On the other hand, children with ASD have a preference for detailed, local 
processing (Frith, 1989; McGregor & Bean, 2012), excelling at tasks which require 
attention to small details such as block design and embedded figures tests (Happé & Frith, 
2010).  Thus, it may be expected that children with ASD easily notice details such as 





hypotheses about whether children with ASD generalise object labels according to shape.  
Their deficit in abstract category formation may lead to an impairment in this area.  
Alternatively, their focus on details may enable them to make shape-based word-object 
mappings easily.   
The shape bias has been investigated within the ASD literature four times before 
(Field, Allen & Lewis, in Press; Hartley & Allen, 2014; Potrzeba et al., in Press; Tek et 
al., 2008).  Field et al., (in Press) forms Chapter Two of this thesis, thus will not be 
discussed here.  Hartley and Allen (2014) found that children with ASD (mean VMA of 
3) generalised object labels for pictures according to shape but also colour, whereas TD 
children of the same VMA only generalised by shape.  Conversely, Tek et al., (2008) 
found that infants with ASD generalised according to shape rather than colour in both a 
name (‘point to the dax’) and no name (‘point to the same’) condition across four sessions 
of word learning activities.  More recently Potzreba et al (in Press) found that TD children 
looked longer at a shape match than colour match test object in a name condition than no 
name condition, although children with ASD looked equally long in both conditions.  If 
the shape bias is taken to be lexically specific, this suggests that TD children but not 
children with ASD possess the heuristic.  
However, no ASD literature has investigated age or receptive language 
differences in an explicit pointing shape bias task.  These differences are important to 
explore in terms of testing the delay vs. deviance hypothesis.  It might be, for example, 
that older children with ASD than those tested by Hartley and Allen (2014) only use 





labels.  Further, none of the previous research regarding the shape bias in ASD has 
included a subgroup of children with DD, meaning that it is unclear whether the findings 
are specific to ASD.  Chapter Two (Study One) aims to fill this gap, by investigating the 
shape bias in TD children, children with ASD and children with DD who have varied 
chronological ages (CA) and receptive language abilities.     
 
1.4. Word learning from the shape bias: DD children 
There is conflicting evidence regarding whether children with DD use word 
learning constraints and biases.  Children with intellectual disability show mutual 
exclusivity, or the assumption that each object only has one name (Wilkinson & Albert, 
2001; Wilkinson, 2005).  However, these children have difficulty with fast mapping, or 
learning labels for objects based on just a single exposure to the word, and are less able 
than TD children to maintain labels over time (Wilkinson, 2005).  The shape bias has 
only been investigated in relation to children who have language difficulties; specifically, 
late talkers (Jones, 2003) and children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI) 
(Collisson, Grela, Spaulding, Rueckl & Magnuson, 2015).  Neither group of children 
possessed the heuristic, which provides further support for the theory that the shape bias 
facilitates children’s language acquisition. 
The shape bias may be related to count noun vocabulary (e.g. Gershkoffe-Stowe 
& Smith, 2004; Graham & Diesendruck, 2010), with some studies suggesting that 
children need to know at least 50 words before showing a shape bias (Jones, 2003; Smith, 





unsurprising that late talkers do not show the heuristic, although the participants in Jones 
(2003) had all acquired over 50 count nouns.  Interestingly, half of the late talkers 
possessed a ‘texture bias’, or formed word-object mappings according to texture, rather 
than shape.  This implies that children with language delays might fixate on irrelevant 
object characteristics when learning words, which may contribute to their language delay. 
In addition to this, children with SLI performed more poorly than TD children on 
a simple paired visual association task, which involved remembering which symbols were 
previously paired together (Collison et al., 2015).  Performance on this task predicted 
shape bias performance, suggesting that visual memory is important for showing the 
heuristic.  Children with impairments such as developmental delay (Perna & Loughan, 
2012) and Williams Syndrome (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai & George, 2000) have 
difficulties with visual memory, perhaps indicating that these children would have a 
shape bias deficit.  However, to my knowledge, this has yet to be explored.   
 
1.5. Word learning from the function bias: TD children 
As summarised in the previous sections, shape is an important cue for word 
learning.  However, other object features, such as the function the object fulfils, are also 
helpful in enabling children to decipher the names of objects, categorising according to 
their functional properties and classifying them according to like kind.  Object function 
and object shape are intrinsically connected; same shaped objects often perform the same 





properties (Bloom, 2000; Landau et al., 1998).  For example, square objects cannot roll, 
while pointed objects would be uncomfortable to sit on (Landau et al., 1988).   
Even young TD children are aware of the relationship between shape and 
function, with 17-month-olds only showing a shape bias after being previously 
familiarised with an objects shape based function and three-year-olds generalising certain 
properties across objects according to similarity in shape (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003).  
As well as the shape bias aiding children’s understanding of function, there is evidence 
that when an object’s function is shape based, learning about this function helps infants 
establish a shape bias (Ware & Booth, 2010).  One group of 17-month-old participants 
learnt about the object’s shape-based function, such as scooping a substance into a round 
container, while another group of children did not receive this prior training.  When 
children were asked to find ‘another one’ from a shape, colour and texture match, the 
former group of participants showed a shape bias, although the latter group of children 
did not.   
Although function and shape often interlink, there are situations where they 
conflict; same shaped objects can possess different functions (e.g. oranges and footballs) 
and differently shaped objects can possess the same function (e.g. chairs).  It is also the 
case that objects used as containers, such as gloves and violin cases are the same shape as 
the artefacts they hold simply in order to store them.  When children are given an 
explanation for why similarly shaped objects are intended to be different kinds, the shape 
bias disappears (Diesendruck et al., 2003), suggesting that children understand that there 





showing a shape bias is particularly helpful with objects of the same basic level category 
(such as cups), but may not apply with subordinate (such as sippy cup) or superordinate 
(such as drinking utensil) categories, which can sometimes take on different forms from 
each other.  Thus, the shape bias does not always aid word learning and could actually 
hinder children’s deeper understanding of hierarchical object categorisation.  For 
example, using purely the shape bias as a word learning strategy, a child who knows the 
basic level category label ‘chair’ may neglect to extend this label to a beanbag chair as it 
is a different shape to the other category exemplars the child is used to associating with 
the label.   
On these occasions, possessing a function bias facilitates naming; chairs come in 
various different shapes but they all afford the function of providing a seat for someone to 
sit down upon.  Unlike shape, however, function is not usually an immediately obvious 
perceptual quality and could be considered a more higher-level property.  While the form 
of an object is instantly apparent, the function an object fulfils has to be directly observed 
or inferred.  Children easily see the round, circular shape of a ball, for instance, but have 
to either watch someone else use the ball or ‘try it out’ themselves before they realise that 
one of its functions is to bounce.   
Therefore the function bias may not be as intuitive for children to possess as the 
shape bias.  Thus, it may emerge later on in development than the shape bias does.  There 
is evidence both for and against function overriding shape in children’s name 
generalisations.  Some studies have found that children show a function bias rather than 





Kemler-Nelson, 1995), while others argue that children classify only by shape (e.g. 
Graham, Williams & Huber, 1999; Smith et al., 1996). 
Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, an early study exploring whether children 
and adults generalise objects by form or function found a U-shaped developmental curve 
(Gentner, 1978); both young children (two-five-year-olds) and adults named an object 
according to similarity in shape with a previously viewed artefact while older children 
(five-fifteen-years-old) named it according to similarity in function.  However, numerous 
later researchers, although agreeing that young children name objects according to their 
shape rather than function when the two are pitted together, argue that adults show a 
function bias (Graham et al., 1999; Imai, Gentner & Uchida; Kemler-Nelson, 
Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000; Landau et al., 1998; but see Golinkoff, Shuff-Bailey, 
Olguin & Ruan, 1995).  A possible explanation for Gentner’s (1978) conflicting results 
compared with other research could be that the shape match in her study shared not only 
shape but other perceptual features such as colour and texture in common with the 
original, while the function match shared no perceptual features.  In more recent studies, 
the shape match tends to match only on shape in order to tease apart attention to shape 
from other object properties, such as overall similarity.    
 Despite this general agreement that TD children do not show a function bias in 
early childhood but the function bias is present by adulthood, there is controversy 
regarding the exact developmental time point the function bias emerges. Categorising 
objects according to their function may occur later in children’s development than shape 





performing the same function and have more experience with the function objects are 
intended to fulfil.  For example, children may gradually realise that although many chairs 
have a dissimilar shape to each other, they are all designed to be sat upon.  Thus, children 
are unsurprised when both a beanbag chair and an armchair are labelled as ‘chairs’, 
assuming that they share this common function.    
As early as two-and-a-half years-old, children understand that objects are 
designed to fulfil a specific function (Casler & Kelemen, 2005).  Nevertheless, it is not 
until about preschool age that children become sensitive to design information (Kelemen, 
1999).  There is evidence suggesting that, while 3 and 4-year-olds form word-object 
mappings according to shape, by six-years-old children are more sensitive to object 
function when naming artefacts (Merriman et al., 1992; see also Matan & Carey, 2001, 
who found increased attention to function in 6-year-olds relative to 4-year-olds and 
Gathercole & Whitfield, 2001, who found that 9-year-olds but not 3-year-olds or 4-year-
olds extend labels for objects based on function).   
In Merriman et al., (1992), participants were presented with a novel object, which 
was given a name (e.g. ‘a dax!’) and its function was described and demonstrated.  A 
shape match (the same shape as the original but possessing a different function) and a 
function match (a different shape from the original but possessing the same function) 
were introduced and it was demonstrated that the function match performed the same role 
as the original object but the shape match did not.  Participants were then asked whether 
the shape match or function match was the other referent.  Children were also shown 





pencil) and the function of these objects (e.g. erasing) was demonstrated.  For both the 
novel and familiar objects, the six-year-olds named the test object according to its 
functional properties significantly more than the two younger groups, who did not differ 
from each other.   
Conversely, attention to object function has also been found in younger children 
(e.g. Casler & Keleman, 2005; 2006; Diesendruck et al., 2003; Gelman & Markman, 
1986; Kemler-Nelson et al., 1995).  Possible reasons for the conflicting findings include 
more complicated, realistic, familiar and specific stimuli in studies which find a function 
bias at earlier ages compared with studies which do not find a function bias until later in 
childhood (Bloom, 2000).  Furthermore, an understanding of referential intent might 
underlie function bias understanding (Diesendruck et al., 2003).  Diesendruck et al., 
(2003) claim that simply identifying and demonstrating an object’s possible function is 
not enough for children to override the shape bias.  However, when participants are also 
given a description and demonstration of how a same shaped object performs a different 
function and a differently shaped object performs the same function, TD children show a 
function bias rather than shape bias (see also Bloom, 2000, and Butler & Markman, 2012; 
2014 for more information about the importance of intended function).  
Although numerous studies have explored the function bias in TD children, it has 
never been investigated in participants with ASD.  Investigating the function bias within 
this population helps provide further information about their word learning and 
categorisation abilities.  The next section explores functional understanding in children 





1.6. Word learning from the function bias – Children with ASD 
Although the function bias has not been empirically explored in ASD, these 
children can categorise objects by function (Ungerer & Sigman, 1987).  There is also 
various evidence suggesting that some children with ASD partake in functional play, or 
interacting with an object as its function denotes, such as sweeping the floor with a toy 
broom (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Leslie, 1987).  However, other research has noted 
differences between the functional play of children with ASD compared with TD 
children.   
For example, some studies have found that children with ASD spend less time 
engaging in functional play than TD children and children with learning difficulties (e.g. 
Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1996; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984).  The functional play of TD 
children and children with Down Syndrome has also been found to be more complex than 
the functional play of children with ASD (Williams, Reddy & Costall, 2001).  
Furthermore, children with ASD have impairments with higher-level classification tasks.  
This includes selecting dot patterns according to a prototype (e.g. Church et al., 2010), 
classifying atypical members of a category (Gastgeb et al., 2006) and categorising 
according to prototypes, rather than rules (Klinger & Dawson, 2001).   
Therefore, there is conflicting information regarding functional understanding of 
objects in children with ASD.  Being able to categorise objects according to function and 
engage in functional play suggests some understanding of the role objects fulfil.  
However, the functional play of children with ASD is characteristically shorter in 





relative to TD children.  This, along with their difficulties with higher-level categorisation 
tasks (e.g. Church et al., 2010; Gastgeb et al., 2006; Klinger & Dawson, 2001) suggests 
impaired awareness of object function relative to their TD peers.  Chapter Three (Study 
Two) explores categorisation of objects and functional play in ASD in more detail.      
If children with ASD do show a function bias, this may inform word-learning 
interventions in children with ASD, suggesting that function should be emphasised.  
Furthermore, it might suggest that they learn words through conceptual rather than 
perceptual characteristics, such as the shape bias.  However, there is some evidence that 
children with ASD have difficulties with understanding conceptual information (e.g. 
Fyffe & Prior, 1978; Frith, 1969; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1967; Menyuk, 1970; Fay & 
Schuler, 1980; Wolff & Barlow, 1979) such as how verbal material is semantically 
related and using this knowledge to help them remember the material.  Ricks and Wing 
(1976) found that children with ASD have impairments with more abstract categorisation, 
such as generalisations that cannot be made based on perceptual characteristics.  
A function bias deficit might mean that children with ASD have trouble with 
object generalisation, such as subordinate and superordinate categories, which cannot be 
so easily classified according to perceptual characteristics such as shape.  This would 
suggest a very long-winded approach to word learning and a lower level understanding of 
function.  For example, children would not easily be able to label a beanbag chair as 
‘chair’, lacking the deeper understanding that this shares the characteristic of sitting down 
upon with other ‘chairs’.   Therefore, it is important to study the function bias in this 





1.7. Word learning from the function bias – DD children 
Past literature has also neglected to explore the function bias in DD children, 
meaning that investigating this heuristic is completely novel for both children with ASD 
and children with DD.  Children with intellectual disability categorise objects by function 
(Ungerer & Sigman, 1987) and children with Williams Syndrome are able to engage in 
colour categorisation (Farran, Cranwell, Alvarez & Franklin, 2013).  Further, Costanzo et 
al., (2013) found that both children with Williams Syndrome and children with Down 
Syndrome have intact verbal categorisation skills (as measured by the Category Fluency 
Test, Mantyla, Carelli & Forman, 2007).  This might be relevant to showing a function 
bias, as the heuristic involves classification of objects according to similarity in function.  
DD children also take part in functional play (Malone & Langone, 1998; Sigafoos, 
Roberts-Pennell, & Graves, 1999).   
Therefore, it might be expected, based on previous research suggesting some 
understanding of function and categorisation skills, that DD children show a function 
bias.  However, children with Williams Syndrome are impaired at visual categorisation 
(as measured by the Weigl Colour Form Test, Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) (Costanzo et 
al., 2013).  Furthermore, recall from section 1.4 that DD children have deficits 
maintaining labels over time (Wilkinson, 2005) and children with language difficulties do 
not show the shape bias (Collisson et al., 2015; Jones, 2003), perhaps suggesting that they 
also have a function bias deficit.  Whether or not children with DD show a function bias 





The past few sections have explored word learning from the shape bias and 
function bias, in TD children, children with ASD and DD children.  However children’s 
word learning depends on additional cues, such as social pragmatics and association.  
These will be explored within the next few sections.  
 
1.8. Word learning from associative and social cues: TD children  
As well as word learning constraints, children learn words from social pragmatics 
and associative cues.  Although word learning constraints emphasise the importance of 
the object, association emphasises the importance of the environment and social 
pragmatics emphasise the importance of the speaker.  The associative learning account 
proposes that children acquire language through ‘dumb attentional mechanisms’ (Smith et 
al., 1996), which help them notice perceptually salient objects within their environment 
and associate the novel label with the most exciting object (Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2000).   
According to this account of word learning, words are learnt best when they are 
explicitly labelled (Skinner, 1957; Smith, 2000).  Children may come to learn these object 
labels through a stimulus-response process, remembering which word corresponds to 
which object.  Through statistical co variation and regularities, children learn to associate 
‘X’ with the referent of ‘X’.  For example, repeatedly hearing the word ‘book’ paired with 
books leads to correctly mapping the word ‘book’ onto the object (e.g. Smith & Yu, 2008; 
Suanda, Mugwanya & Namy, 2014).  
The social pragmatic account (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baldwin & Moses, 1996; 





Tomasello & Barton, 1994), instead argues that children come to form word-object 
mappings through a process of discerning the referential intent of the speaker, rather than 
cross-situational statistics.  For example, upon observing a speaker looking at, pointing to 
and labelling a novel object as a ‘book’, an infant may come to learn the label ‘book’ 
through noticing the speaker’s social cues of eye gaze and pointing (Tomasello, 1999; 
2003).  The child assumes that the speaker intended to look at or point towards a specific 
object, therefore it is relevant and it must be that specific object being named.   
Proponents of association counter argue that rather than attributing children’s word-
object mappings to an understanding of the referential intent of the speaker, they can 
often be more accurately explained by attention, memory and perception (e.g. Samuelson 
& Smith, 1998; Smith et al., 1996).  For example, Samuelson and Smith (1998) disputed 
the previous judgment of Akhtar et al., (1996), who claimed that two-year-old children 
form word-object mappings according to which object is new for the speaker.  In Akhtar 
et al. (1996) (Study Two), the child and experimenter played with three novel objects 
together, then the child played with a fourth novel object while the experimenter was out 
of the room.  All objects were then placed inside a box.  When the experimenter returned, 
she looked inside the box and labelled one object.  The child assumed that the 
experimenter was referring to the object they had not previously seen.      
This would seem to suggest that children form word-object mappings according to 
the referential intent of the speaker – and not simply their own viewpoint.  However, 
according to Samuelson and Smith (1998), it is discourse novelty that is important for the 





Akhtar et al., (1996) was different from the context where they played with the other 
objects as the experimenter was not present.  Thus, the object came to be mapped onto the 
novel word through a process of memory, attention and association.  Samuelson and 
Smith (1998) further tested their theory by having the experimenter present while the 
child played with all four objects but by changing the context in which they played with 
the fourth object; at a table covered with a glittery blue tablecloth as opposed to on the 
floor.  Children formed word-object mappings towards the object that they played with in 
this different context, supporting Samuelson and Smith’s (1998) hypothesis.   
There is much evidence that TD children learn words from association during 
infancy, even at an earlier age than studied by Samuelson and Smith (1998) and Akhtar et 
al., (1996) (Foudon et al., 2008; Hollich et al., 2000).  Eight-month-old infants segment 
words from fluent speech when hearing a continuous stream of four novel words, which 
are repeated in randomised order (Saffran et al., 1996).  By 12-14 months, infants’ 
sensitivity to statistical regularities helps them learn word-object mappings (Smith & Yu, 
2008).  By eighteen-months old, toddlers are also able to form word-object mappings 
according to frequency of occurrence when a novel word is usually paired with one object 
but occasionally paired with another (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2009).  This is reflective 
of real life, where the speaker is not always looking at the object they are naming.  
It can be hard to disentangle social from associative cues.  For example, when 
learning the names of objects, children are more likely to retain the word-object mapping 
over time when their attention is directed towards the artefact by the experimenter’s 





referent (Horst & Samuelson, 2008).  One explanation for this is that children encoded the 
experimenter’s social pragmatic cues.  They may have interpreted the experimenter’s 
pointing by a process of referential intent or believed that the object must have been 
special to the experimenter in order for them to direct so much attention to it.  
Axelsson et al., (2012) argue, however, that children recall the word through a 
process of association.  They presented 24-month-olds with a target object and two 
distracters.  Following this, infants saw the target object illuminated only, both the target 
object illuminated and the distracter objects covered over to make them less salient, the 
distracter objects covered only or a pointing gesture towards the target object.  Although 
all four groups of infants formed the correct word-object mapping, only the first and 
second group maintained this over time.  This suggests that, while social cues such as 
pointing help children initially form correct word-object mappings, highlighting attention 
towards the target object – an associative cue - is more effective at helping children 
remember these words (Axelsson et al., 2012).   
 While this would provide evidence that children learn words through association, 
others argue that understanding referential intent is vital for children’s language 
acquisition.  For example, Diesendruck, Markson, Akhtar & Reudor (2004) disagreed 
with Samuelson and Smith’s (1998) theory that the participants in their study learnt words 
from memory, attention and association.  Diesendruck et al., (2004) suggested that the 
children assumed that the change in context (playing with the target object at a table, 
rather than on the floor) implied that the target object was in some way special to the 





the label.  Supporting this claim, their study found that children formed the word-object 
mapping to the target when the change in context was perceived as being intentional (the 
experimenter invited the child to play with the fourth object at a table, rather than on the 
floor) but not when the change in context was perceived as being accidental (the 
experimenter pretended to drop the fourth object and then decide to play with it at the 
table, as this was near where it landed) (Diesendruck et al., 2004).  
Further, social pragmatics help children to avoid word-object mapping errors.  For 
example, 18-20-month-old children do not form a word-object mapping when a speaker 
who is obviously uninvolved with the word-learning situation utters a novel label, such as 
someone speaking on the telephone (Baldwin et al., 1996; Bannard & Tomasello, 2012).  
Children also label ambiguous drawings differently according to the referential intent of 
the creator (Preissler & Bloom, 2008).  Participants followed an experimenter’s eye gaze 
towards one out of two novel objects while she produced an ambiguous drawing and later 
named the object she had gazed at as the referent of the drawing.  However, children 
chose the referent at chance between the two objects when the experimenter pretended to 
discover an identical drawing after she had directed her eye gaze towards the object, but 
without engaging in a drawing act.   
TD 14, 18 and 24-month-old children also only used an actor’s eye gaze and 
pointing as an indicator to where an object was hidden when it appeared intentional and 
not when it appeared accidental (e.g. when the actor pointed while pretending to be 
inspecting his watch) (Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005).  Further, twelve-month-old 





than when the experimenter knew where it was (Liszkowski, Carpenter & Tomasello, 
2008).  Taken together, these findings (Baldwin et al., 1996; Bannard & Tomasello, 2012; 
Behne et al., 2005; Liszkowski et al., 2008; Preissler & Boom, 2008) suggest that 
children understand eye gaze and pointing from a process of referential intent, not just 
perceptual salience.     
A further complication with the idea of word learning being purely associative is 
that, while this may help explain how children learn the names of nouns, it does not 
account so well for how children learn the meaning of verbs and adjectives, which are 
often less directly described (Bloom, 2000; Snedeker, 2008).  Although cross situational 
learning does aid children’s language acquisition, in more complicated word learning 
situations, social learning may help children learn words faster and more accurately 
(Belpaeme & Morse, 2012).  The evidence suggests that, while young TD children learn 
words by association (e.g. Foudon, 2008; Hollich et al., 2004), they learn words from 
social pragmatics from as early as eighteen-months-old (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 
Briganti & Cohen, 2011).  It is also from this age that infants use the ‘speaker’s direction 
of gaze’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), forming word-object mappings to the object of the 
speaker’s focus even when they themselves are attending to a different object from the 
speaker (Baldwin, 1991; 1993).  Sixteen-seventeen-month-old infants look at the object in 
the speaker’s focus but map the novel word to the object in their own focus, while 14-15 
month-olds look up to the speaker but choose objects at chance. 
In addition to gaze following, TD infants follow pointing from 9-12 months old 





object than a distractor novel object when the speaker points while naming it, although 
only the 18-month-olds form word-object mappings (Briganti & Cohen, 2011).  Taken 
together, the findings of Baldwin (1993) and Briganti and Cohen (2011) suggest that 
younger infants are aware of social cues (their failure to form the correct word-object 
mapping in the paradigms cannot be due to not having identified that the speaker is 
gazing or pointing at the object) but it is not until 18 months old that infants use these 
cues to help them learn words.   
Therefore, there is evidence both that TD children learn words from social cues 
(e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Briganti & Cohen, 2011; Gliga & Csibra, 2009; Graham, 
Nilsen, Collins & Olineck, 2010) and that they learn words from association (e.g. 
Axelsson et al., 2012; Saffran et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1996; Smith & Yu, 2008).  
However, some argue that only younger TD children utilise association in their word 
learning, with older children relying on social cues (e.g. Hollich et al., 2000) when the 
two are directly pitted against each other.  One way in which to further tease apart 
whether children’s language acquisition is controlled by social or associative cues is to 
directly pit the two together within the same paradigm, with a social cue occurring 
towards one object and an associative cue occurring towards the other.  There is evidence 
(Hollich, 2000; Moore, 1999; Moore et al., 1999) that TD two-year-olds form word-
object mappings according to the referential intent of the speaker (i.e. to an object the 
speaker gazes at and/or turns towards), rather than perceptual salience (i.e. a colourful or 





Taken together, the evidence suggests that more sophisticated social mechanisms 
than mere association are needed in order to extend and enrich children’s word learning.  
Gradually, children learn that it is not constantly the most exciting or salient object being 
labelled.  Further, some studies claim that two-year-olds use the perspective of the 
speaker to help them learn the names of new toys.  They choose the toy that is novel 
(Akhtar et al., 1996) or most interesting (Diesendruck et al., 2004) from the speaker’s 
perspective as the referent of a novel word, even if this is not new or exciting for the child 
themselves.   
Therefore, there is evidence that TD children learn words from both social 
pragmatics and association, but prioritise social cues over associative cues when the two 
conflict.  On the contrary, there is evidence that children with ASD learn words and infer 
a characters desire from association, rather than referential intent (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; Hennon, Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 2003).  Although this might occasionally 
facilitate word learning, in the main this could lead to frequent word-object mapping 
errors, as it is not always the most salient object being named.  This will all be discussed 
further in the next section.   
 
1.9. Word learning from associative and social cues: Children with ASD 
Children with ASD can learn words from association (Mayo & Eigsti, 2012; 
McGregor, Rost, Arens, Farris-Trimble & Stiles, 2013; Preissler, 2008).  School aged 
children and adolescents with ASD use the statistical regularities of a speech stream to 





Mayo and Eigsti (2012), participants listened to a 21-minute continuous stream of speech, 
previously used in Saffran et al., (1997).  Six combinations of syllables formed trisyllabic 
words, which had high internal transitional properties.   
After listening to the speech stream, children were tested to see if they could identify 
‘words’ compared with ‘non-words’.  They listened to ‘words’ (three syllables with high 
transitional properties) and ‘non-words’ (three syllables which had not previously 
occurred), followed by choosing the item which sounded most like the language they had 
heard.  Both TD children and children with ASD had a high degree of accuracy for 
identifying the ‘words’. 
Furthermore, children with ASD track cross-situational information such as earlier 
frequency of gaze cues towards a specific object to help them learn words (McGregor et 
al., 2013).  TD children and children with ASD viewed photographs of a woman with an 
object to her left, right and centre, at the same time as hearing a word.  For one type of 
trial (neutral unfamiliar), the objects and novel words were unfamiliar and the speaker 
gazed directly ahead, without looking at any of the objects.  Both TD children and 
children with ASD scored above chance detecting the target object for the neutral 
unfamiliar trials, by tracking cross-situational information (gaze cues and word-to-object 
co-occurences).  
The results of Mayo & Eigsti (2012) and McGregor et al., (2013) suggest that the 
language difficulties of children with ASD do not stem from impairments in detecting 
statistical covariance and association.  However, several factors need to be taken into 





the two studies were quite old.  The participants in Mayo and Eigsti (2012) had a mean 
age of thirteen years and verbal IQ, non-verbal IQ and full scale IQ of eleven, while the 
participants in McGregor et al., (2013) had a mean age of just over eleven (no mental age 
given, just standard scores).  It may be that younger children would struggle more at the 
task relative to chronological age (CA) and receptive age matched TD peers.  
It is also the case that the participants with ASD in both studies were mildly 
affected individuals; therefore it is unknown whether more severely autistic children 
would perform the same.  Finally, the artificial speech used by Mayo and Eigsti (2012) 
and the still photographs used by McGregor et al., (2013) were arguably less intricate 
than the language that children are bombarded with in daily life.  McGregor et al., (2013) 
also emphasise that the ability of the children with ASD to learn from statistical co-
variation was related to their language ability (although this effect was not found for the 
TD children), implying that learning in this way may be impaired in less verbal children 
with ASD.  Therefore, these findings indicate that older children and adolescents with 
ASD learn words from association but the results are not necessarily generalisable to the 
greater ASD population.    
Despite this evidence suggesting that children with ASD learn words through 
association, these individuals have much documented social difficulties (e.g Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Dawson, Toth, Abbot, Osterling & Munson, 1994; Frith, 1989; Osterling & 
Dawson, 1994; Wing, 1981).  During infancy, they smile and point less than TD children 
and often fail to respond to their own name (Osterling & Dawson, 1994).  Children with 





al., 1995; Carpenter, Pennington & Rogers, 2002; Charman, 2003; Riby, Hancock, Jones 
& Hanley, 2013) and even adults with ASD have difficulty following a speaker’s pointing 
to determine the focus of the speaker’s interest (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar & Cohen, 
2002).   
Furthermore, individuals with ASD fixate on the speaker’s mouth and peripheral 
details in the background when viewing a social situation, while TD people focus on the 
speaker’s face, eyes and the central part of the scene (Klin et al., 2002; Merin, Young, 
Ozonoff & Rogers, 2006; Norbury, Brock, Cragg, Einav, Griffiths & Nation, 2010; 
Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley & Piven, 2007).  Further, unlike their TD peers, children with 
ASD are not distracted by an irrelevant face distractor in a visual search task (Riby, 
Brown, Jones & Hanley, 2011).  This suggests abnormal processing of faces.   
As has been discussed earlier, while forming word-object mappings according to 
the more salient object may sometimes lead to the correct word-object mapping, the most 
exciting stimulus is not always the object being named.  TD children may realise this 
during infancy and employ social cues to help them learn words when social and 
associative cues conflict (e.g. Hollich et al., 2000; Moore et al., 1999).  By contrast, the 
reliance of older children with ASD in attending to associative information might lead to 
word-object mapping errors and word learning confusion (Foudon et al., 2008).   
There is some evidence that, like 16-17 month-old TD children, children with 
ASD use the listener’s direction of gaze after hearing the speaker’s utterance, forming 
word-object mappings according to the object of their own focus, rather than the 





1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005; Walton & Ingersoll, 2013, but see Luyster & Lord, 2009).  
For example, in Baron-Cohen et al., (1997), the experimenter and child were focusing on 
different objects.  The experimenter named the object within either their own or the 
child’s focus.  Children with ASD who had a mean verbal mental age (VMA) of two 
formed correct word-object mappings only when the speaker named the object that the 
child themselves was focused on.  In contrast, VMA matched TD children and children 
with intellectual disability formed correct word-object mappings in both conditions.   
This implies that, although children with ASD are able to form an associative 
mapping between the new word and a novel object, they fail to use the social cue of eye 
gaze to correctly infer which object is being named.  It has been suggested that children 
with ASD are often less likely to gaze at the speaker as the novel word is uttered 
(Preissler & Carey, 2005), which suggests that they might not even notice the speaker’s 
eye gaze.  However, other studies suggest that children with ASD do learn words from 
eye gaze (e.g. Bani Hani, Gonzalez Barrero & Nadig, 2012; Luyster & Lord, 2009; 
Mcgregor et al., 2013; Norbury et al., 2010).  This is more fully discussed in Study Three 
(Chapter Four).   
While using the speaker’s direction of gaze is a more effective word learning 
strategy than using the listener’s direction of gaze, word learning can still progress, albeit 
slowly, if only the latter method is employed (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).  In cases of 
follow-in labelling, where the listener is focused on the same object as the speaker, using 
either the speaker’s or the listener’s direction of gaze will lead to the correct word-object 





children clarify which object is being named.  For example, if a child using the listener’s 
direction of gaze hears the word ‘shoe’ for the first time when they are focused on a toy 
doll, they may originally make the incorrect mapping that the word ‘shoe’ refers to the 
doll.  However, later, the child may hear the word ‘shoe’ again, when no doll is in sight.  
Through repeated occasions of hearing the word ‘shoe’, the child may scan their memory 
to correctly associate the word with the only common object across the situations in 
which the word has been heard (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
 However, using the listener’s direction of gaze leads to more word-object 
mapping errors than using the speaker’s direction of gaze.  There are a few anecdotal 
examples within the literature about children with ASD making these kinds of errors.  
Baron-Cohen et al., (1997) mention a child with ASD who referred to his toy train as a 
‘sausage’, seemingly because his mother had told him to come and eat his sausage while 
he was looking at the toy train but she was looking at his plate of food.  They also note 
Kanner’s (1943) original article mentioned a boy with ASD who used the term ‘Peter 
Eater’ to talk about saucepans.  The boy’s mother had been reciting the song ‘Peter, Peter 
Pumpkin Eater’ to him just as she dropped the saucepan she was holding.  Presumably the 
loud noise the saucepan made as it fell to the floor caused the boy to look at the saucepan 
and hence the word-object mapping error occurred.  Nonetheless, if children with ASD 
are using the listener’s direction of gaze, there should be more evidence in the literature 
of these kinds of mapping errors than the two anecdotal examples provided above.  
 Children with ASD tend to find pointing easier to follow than gaze (Travis & 





as gazing at the target object helps children with ASD interpret the gaze (Akechi, 
Kikuchi, Tojo, Osanai & Hasegawa, 2013).  However, as has been previously discussed, 
the process by which children with ASD interpret pointing may be different from the 
referential intent processes used by TD children.  Pointing is visibly salient and therefore 
highlights attention (Lee et al., 1998; Parish-Morris, Hennon, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff & 
Tager Flusberg, 2007).  Thus, children with ASD may interpret pointing through 
association.  If this is the case, then it is not the pointing per se which is important; other 
perceptually salient cues such as observing an arrow positioned by an object or the object 
lighting up may also lead to a word-object mapping.  Therefore, if a speaker appears to be 
accidentally pointing at an object while it is obvious that they are focused elsewhere, TD 
children should infer that the pointing is coincidental.  By contrast, children with ASD 
should fail to notice that the speaker is preoccupied with something else and continue to 
choose the object the speaker is pointing to as the referent.  
As previously discussed within Section 1.8, one useful way of establishing whether 
children with ASD (as well as TD children and children with DD) learn words by social 
pragmatics or association is to directly pit the two together.  This has previously been 
done in studies of referential intent inference (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Pellicano & 
Rhodes, 2003; Rombough & Iarocci, 2013) by showing children an image of a character 
whose eye gaze is directed towards one of four sweets, at the same time as an arrow is 
directed towards another sweet.  It is generally found that TD children assume that the 





& Rhodes, 2003) but children with ASD want the sweet the arrow is positioned towards 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Rombough & Iarocci, 2012).   
Contrary to these findings, children with ASD have been found to follow eye gaze to 
the same extent as TD children in Posner-type cueing tasks (Sweetenham, Condie, 
Campbell, Milne & Coleman, 2003).  This includes when an arrow as well as eye gaze 
was used for the tasks (Kuhn et al., 2010).  Therefore, previous research is inconclusive.  
Hence Study Five (Chapter Six) more fully explores the effect of conflicting social and 
associative cues on word learning. 
 
1.10. Word learning from associative and social cues: DD children 
There is a lack of research regarding how children with DD learn words from 
associative cues.  However, one study modelled on Behne et al., (2005) suggests that, like 
TD children, children with Down Syndrome and Williams Syndrome use referential 
intent to understand a speaker’s eye gaze and pointing gestures (John & Mervis, 2010).  
When an actor appeared to be ‘intentionally’ gazing and pointing at one of two boxes, the 
children looked in the box the gesture had occurred towards to locate a hidden toy.  
However, when the actor appeared to be ‘accidentally’ gazing and pointing (for example, 
while pointing, looking down at their watch, as though distracted) the children chose each 
box equally often to look inside (John & Mervis, 2010).   
The evidence is mixed regarding understanding of social cues in children with DD.  
Some studies suggest that they understand referential intent (John & Mervis, 2010; 





greater extent than children with ASD (D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007).  In contrast, other 
research suggests that children with Williams Syndrome are impaired in both producing 
and following pointing gestures relative to mental age matched TD children (Laing et al., 
2002) and that children with moderate learning difficulties are actually worse than 
children with ASD at learning words after objects are ostensively labelled (Franken et al., 
2010).   
It is also the case that caregivers of children who have ASD or are intellectually 
handicapped are more likely than caregivers of TD children to try to elicit eye gaze 
during child-caregiver interactions (Kasari, Sigman, Mundy & Yirmiya, 1988).  A 
possible reason for this is that DD children, not just children with ASD, make less 
spontaneous eye contact than TD children, hence their caregivers need to encourage this 
more than in TD children.  Supporting this proposal, non-speaking infants at risk for 
having a DD showed a lack of understanding and use of gaze during a free play session 
with their caregivers (Arens, Cress & Marvin, 2005).  Furthermore, children with Down 
Syndrome showed fewer social referencing looks during semi-structured adult-child like 
interactions and an ambiguous situation than TD children (Kasari, Freeman, Mundy & 
Sigman, 1995). 
Therefore, the sparse available prior research is contradictory regarding word 
learning from social cues in DD children. More information about how children with DD 
understand social, associative and conflicting cues is given in Studies Three, Four and 






1.11. Is language delayed or deviant in ASD? 
As mentioned within section 1.1, previous studies have tended to conclude that 
children with ASD have a word learning deficit if they do not possess certain linguistic 
abilities at a specific age.  However, unless a varied CA and VMA range of children with 
ASD are studied, it is unknown whether or not children with ASD would eventually 
acquire skills they are claimed to lack, just at a later age than usual.  Thus, language 
acquisition may be delayed or deviant in ASD.   
If delayed, the word learning of children with ASD follows the same 
developmental trajectory as TD children, although the former group acquire language at a 
later age than the latter group.  If deviant, however, the language acquisition of children 
with ASD follows a different developmental trajectory from usual (see Figure Two).  For 
example, it might be that children with ASD need a higher level of language 
understanding than TD children to learn words from social cues, rather than association.  
Conversely, it is possible that they never develop this ability and always learn words from 
association.   
Supporting the delay hypothesis, Kanner’s (1943) original definition of autism 
noted delayed language acquisition as a symptom.  Although children with ASD do not 
generally speak their first words until three years old, compared with just 8-14 months old 
in TD children (Eigsti et al., 2011), many children with ASD do learn to speak eventually, 
again supporting the delay hypothesis.  Some children with ASD, although possessing 















Figure 2: Visual interpretation of the delay (left) vs. deviance (right) hypothesis.  
Within typical development (see the top row), TD children acquire a shape bias before 
they acquire a function bias, being able to use both heuristics by adulthood.  If the shape 
bias and function bias are delayed in ASD (see the second row) then they acquire the 
shape and function bias later than TD children.  Alternatively, it may be the case that the 
function bias (see third row), shape bias (see fourth row) or both (see fifth row) are 
deviant in ASD, in which case they never develop (or develop earlier than in TD 
children).  The understanding of social cues by children with ASD might also take place 
through a similar process of delay or deviance. 
 
Furthermore, some aspects of socialisation, such as following eye gaze (Leekam, 
Hunniset, & Moore, 1998), emotion recognition (Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari & Mundy, 
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Happé, 1995; Prior, Dahlstrom & Squires, 1990) are delayed in ASD, but develop in a 
typical fashion once present.  Perhaps children with ASD use different processes to 
achieve certain tasks from TD children and therefore require more sophisticated abilities, 
such as enhanced VMA (Happé, 1995) or cognitive skills (Yirmiya et al., 1992).  This 
may help them to explicitly ‘hack out’ solutions, in contrast to TD children’s intuitive 
reasoning, which might be more unconscious (Frith et al., 1991).   
Therefore, there is evidence that language is delayed in ASD.  However, other 
studies suggest it is deviant (e.g. Van meter, Fein, Waterhouse & Allen, 1997).  As stated 
in Van Meter et al., (1997), language deviance does not necessarily mean ‘language that 
never emerges’ but may also apply to differences within language relative to TD children.  
Uneven language development, such as intact or even advanced language production but 
delayed language comprehension would indicate a deviance in language overall as this 
differs from most children, with intact language production and comprehension.  
Furthermore, some children with ASD possess language oddities that are not seen in TD 
children.  These include echolalia (Grossi et al., 2013; Kanner, 1946) and idiosyncratic 
use of words (Eigsti, Bennetto & Dadlani, 2006; Lord & Paul, 1997; Tager-Flusberg & 
Calkins, 1990). 
Despite these differences, the word learning of children with ASD has a few 
similarities with the word learning of TD children.  For example, like their TD peers, 
children with ASD comprehend words (Charman, Drew, Baird & Baird, 2003; Swensen, 
Kelley, Fein & Naigles, 2007) and ‘wh’ questions, such as ‘what hit the book?’ 





like TD children, children with ASD have a default assumption that new words refer to 
nouns rather than adjectives (Swensen et al., 2007), are more likely to learn names of 
novel objects if these are labelled (Mcduffie, Yoder, & Stone, 2006) and show syntactic 
alignment, mirroring the language of a conversational partner (Allen, Haywood, 
Rajendran & Branigan, 2011).  Therefore, although delayed, some aspects of language 
follow the usual developmental trajectory in children with ASD relative to TD children.   
 
1.12. Contributions of this thesis to the literature 
Overall, this thesis attempts to make several novel contributions to the ASD and 
child language acquisition literature.  Firstly, each study investigates the delay vs. 
deviance hypothesis by including a broad CA and VMA range of children and splitting 
these into ‘high’ and ‘low’ receptive vocabulary subgroups.  Most previous studies have 
included just one overall group of children with ASD, of a similar CA or VMA (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Hartley & Allen, 2014; Luyster & Lord, 2009; Mayo & Eigsti, 
2012; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  This means that if any differences occur in ASD it is 
hard to establish whether eventually these differences disappear.  It is unwise to match the 
sample according to CA in ASD studies, as this population often has a lower mental age 
(MA) than CA. Thus the CA matched TD group often become an inadequate control 
group for the children with ASD.  Matching on MA is generally preferred (Hermelin & 
O’Connor, 1970) and many word learning studies match on measures of language ability 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Hartley & Allen, 2012; Luyster & Lord, 2009) such as 





If high VMA but not low VMA children with ASD show word learning skills on a 
par with low VMA TD children, this suggests a delay effect.  In contrast, if even high 
VMA children with ASD show impaired word learning relative to low VMA TD children, 
this suggests that language is deviant.  Note, however, that in the latter case it is not 
certain whether children with ASD will eventually acquire the skill.  For example, if 
investigating language acquisition in children with VMAs of three and six, even if the 
six-year-old children with ASD do not show the ability, they might eventually develop it, 
for example at nine-years, rather than six.  Nevertheless, including participants with a 
broader range of receptive vocabulary ability than previously studied and subcategorising 
these participants according to their VMA makes it more likely that any differences 
between high and low VMA children can be fully uncovered. 
Note that, if it is the case that children with ASD have word learning delays, the 
underlying mechanism controlling this is not certain.  It might be, for example, that 
possessing a higher VMA facilitates their language acquisition.  Alternatively, it is 
possible that factors such as increased life experience and years of interventions which 
emphasise word learning are contributing factors.  It could even be the case that children 
with ASD who have a higher VMA are better able to ‘hack out’ solutions to tasks via 
associative processes.   
This thesis includes an additional control group of participants with DD in every 
study.  Children with DD are frequently not included as an additional control group in 
studies of word learning in ASD, with numerous research paradigms only recruiting TD 





Jing & Fang, 2014; Luyster & Lord, 2009; Mcgregor et al., 2013; Norbury et al., 2010; 
Parish-Morris et al., 2007; Tek et al., 2008).  However, it is desirable to include control 
groups of TD and DD children; TD children to establish any differences relative to 
children with ASD on a task (Burack, Iarrocci, Bowler & Mottron, 2002) and DD 
children to help determine whether these difficulties are specific to ASD or simply the 
consequence of having any developmental disability (Burack et al., 2002; Tager Flusberg, 
1999).  The performance of the DD children is also interesting in its own right; as a 
population, they have been somewhat neglected within the research literature, therefore it 
is beneficial to explore their word learning performance. 
 
1.13. General Conclusions 
Three principal ways in which children learn words for objects; word learning 
biases, social pragmatics and association have been described.  Although these three 
processes may be thought of as distinct, the emergentist coalition model stresses that they 
interact together to facilitate language acquisition in TD children.  TD children also utilise 
different types of cues at different developmental time points, with infants relying on 
association, while older children employ social cues (e.g. Hollich, 2000).   
However, unlike TD children, individuals with ASD have been found to struggle 
to learn words from social cues (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005) 
and from some types of word learning constraints, such as the shape bias (e.g. Hartley & 
Allen, 2014; Portzeba et al., in press; Tek et al., 2008).  This means that they depend on a 





including other word learning constraints (e.g. mutual exclusivity, see Preissler & Carey, 
2005) and association (e.g. Hennon, 2003).  Their dependence on association for language 
acquisition extends past the age at which TD children learn words from this type of cue.   
The present thesis investigates how word learning biases, social cues and 
associative cues aid word learning for novel objects in TD children, children with ASD 
and children with other developmental disorders, but who do not have ASD (DD).  
Studies One and Two explore the shape bias (Study One) and the function bias (Study 
Two).  Studies Three, Four and Five investigate social cues (Study Three), associative 
cues (Study Four) and conflicting social and associative cues (Study Five).  For all 
studies, children are subdivided into ‘high VMA’ and ‘low VMA’ categories in order to 
investigate the delay vs. deviance hypotheses in ASD.  The studies within this thesis 
investigate the emergentist coalition model; themes embedded within the thesis are how 
characteristics of the object (Shape Bias and Function Bias), speaker (eye gaze and 
pointing) and environment (arrow and light) all help facilitate word learning and how 
word learning constraints, social cues and associative cues interlink to help children’s 
language acquisition.  
 Studies Three, Four and Five are also the first to thoroughly investigate the 
emergentist coalition model in relation to ASD, by establishing if children with the 
disorder show a similar pattern to that seen within typical development; first using 
association and then using social cues for word learning when the two conflict.  Previous 
research exploring this in ASD (Hennon, 2003) found that three-year-old children with 





speaker’s gaze) when the two conflict.  However, as previously discussed, TD children 
learn words from the social cue from eighteen-months-old.  This suggests that children 
with ASD learn words from association for longer than TD children when this is pitted 
against social pragmatics.  However, it does not inform whether older children with ASD 
would still form word-object mappings from association (i.e. word learning from social 
cues is deviant in ASD) or whether they would now form word-object mappings from 
social cues (in which case word learning from social cues is merely delayed).  
For all five studies, children have a VMA of two-years-old or above.  This was 
necessary in order for children to fully understand the tasks and complete the cognitive 
assessments.  However, within the case of typical development, this is over the age at 
which children start using social rather than associative cues for word learning when the 
two are directly pitted together, according to the emergentist coalition model (at 18-24 
months old).  Therefore, it would be hypothesised that both the low and high VMA TD 
children recruited as participants within this thesis would use social cues for word 
learning.   
However, as has already been discussed, unlike TD children of the same age, 
three-year-old children with ASD learnt words from the associative rather than social cue 
when the two conflicted (Hennon, 2003).  This suggests that it is acceptable to test the 
emergentist coalition model in ASD with older children than two-year-olds.  ASD often 
involves a delay in word learning (e.g. Eigsti et al., 2011; Kanner, 1943) and other aspects 
of social skills (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Frith et al., 1991; Happé, 1995; Leekam et al., 





the low VMA children with ASD to rely on association but the high VMA children with 





Chapter Two: Attentional learning helps language acquisition take shape for 
atypically developing children, not just children with ASD.1 
 







Figure 2.1: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object – environment interaction for 
word learning.  The next two chapters will focus on the ‘object’ aspects of the triad. 
 
The next two chapters explore the object aspect of the emergentist coalition 
model.  Both perceptual (shape bias) and conceptual (function bias) factors are 
investigated.  Specifically, this Chapter explores the shape bias (or assumption that 
                                                        
1 This chapter is based on Field et al., (in press).  Attentional learning helps language acquisition take shape 
for atypically developing children, not just children with Autism Spectrum Disorders.  Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders.  Minor changes have been made in order to help with consistency in terms 










objects with the same shape have the same name) and the following chapter explores the 
function bias (or assumption that objects with the same function have the same name). 
 
2.2. Introduction to the shape bias study 
          As mentioned within Section 1.2 of Chapter One, the shape bias helps children 
rapidly categorise objects as belonging to the same class, meaning that object labels can 
be quickly and easily generalised based on their characteristic shape.  TD children 
intuitively know that a big, shiny multi coloured beach ball, for example, has the same 
name as a small, rough, green tennis ball.  From as young as two years old, TD children 
generalise the word-object mapping ‘ball’ according to the circular shape of balls rather 
than other perceptual features such as size, texture (Landau et al., 1988) or colour 
(Baldwin, 1989).  It has been claimed (Hartley & Allen, 2014; Potrzeba et al., 2015; Tek 
et al., 2008) that children with ASD do not show a shape bias, which might help explain 
their word learning difficulties. 
There are two competing theories regarding how TD children are able to show a 
shape bias, which revolve around whether the heuristic is controlled by social (shape-as-
cue, or SAC, account) or associative (attentional-learning-account, or ALA) processes.  
The SAC account (e.g. Bloom, 2000) proposes that object shape provides a good 
indicator as to the referential intent of the object’s creator, who deliberately constructed 
the same kinds of objects to be of the same form.  According to the SAC account, 
children become sensitive to the shape of objects before they have acquired much 





asked whether similarly shaped objects are the ‘same’ or ‘like each other’.  Operation of 
the SAC account is guided by general intuitions about referential intent and therefore 
necessitates intact referential monitoring abilities.  This account suggests that the shape 
bias helps children rapidly acquire words, particularly count nouns (Graham & 
Diesendruck, 2010; Markson et al., 2008).   
By contrast, the ALA (e.g. Smith et al., 1996) proposes that the shape bias arises 
due to children simply learning to associate same shaped objects with the same name.  
This association develops through frequent co-occurrences between objects with specific 
shapes having specific labels.  Therefore, the shape bias is exclusive to naming without 
extending to non-lexical classification tasks (e.g. Landau et al., 1988; Smith et al., 1996; 
but see Samuelson & Smith, 2005).  According to the ALA, children have already 
acquired a considerable amount of language, particularly count nouns (50+), prior to 
showing the shape bias.  Indeed, this early noun vocabulary facilitates shape bias 
understanding (Samuelson, 2002; Smith et al., 2002; Tek et al., 2008).   
TD children show the shape bias more when the object is named (e.g. Imai et al., 
1994; Landau et al., 1988; Smith et al., 1996), which supports the ALA.  However, there 
is also evidence that TD children possess a shape bias in some non-lexical situations (e.g. 
Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003), such as when the test question is worded ‘pick another 
object like this’, rather than when the test question is worded ‘pick the object that goes 
together with this’ which supports the SAC account.  It has been suggested that the shape 
bias begins as a word learning strategy for TD children and then extends to other forms of 





difficulties inferring referential intent (D’Entremont &Yazbek, 2007; Preissler & Carey, 
2005; Prizant & Wetherby, 1987), the SAC account would hypothesise that they do not 
possess the shape bias.  Conversely, as children with ASD are able to learn words via 
association (Parish-Morris et al., 2007; Preissler, 2008), the ALA would hypothesise that 
they show a shape bias in naming activities.   
 However, abstracting commonality in shape involves both categorisation skills 
and the ability to attend to the global shape of objects.  These abilities are both impaired 
in ASD, given evidence for difficulties with prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 
2001) and a preference for local rather than global processing (e.g. Frith, 1989; Happé & 
Frith, 2006), unless explicitly instructed to attend to global properties (Koldewyn, Jiang, 
Weigelt & Kanwisher, 2013; Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 1999).  Individuals with ASD 
often show superior performance on activities requiring attention to detail, such as block 
design (Shah & Frith, 1993) and embedded figures tasks (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997).  
This latter behaviour is typically described as weak central coherence and would predict 
that children fixate on parts of objects rather than the object as a whole (but see Mottron, 
Burack, Iarocci, Belleville & Enns, 2003, who acknowledge that children with ASD have 
skills at embedded figures tests but claim that they also show typical global processing).  
This could contribute to a shape bias deficit, as well as difficulties with the whole 
object assumption (Markman, 1989) and word-object mapping errors.  For instance, 
focusing on the stem of an apple when the word ‘apple’ is overheard may cause children 
to map the word ‘apple’ only to the stem, instead of the global shape of the object.  Due 





may never acquire a shape bias.  An alternative possibility is that children with ASD 
simply have a shape bias delay, showing the heuristic only after explicitly learning certain 
rules.   
This argument is not new; many researchers have previously investigated delay or 
deviance accounts of word learning in ASD (e.g. Bartolucci, Pierce, Streiner & Eppel, 
1976; Eigsti & Bennetto, 2009; Howlin, 1984; Mitchell et al., 2006; Van Meter et al., 
1997).  A delay account would predict that children with ASD may eventually learn to 
use the shape bias heuristic, but not until they have more experience with objects (i.e. a 
higher chronological age, or CA) and/or superior receptive language (i.e. a higher verbal 
mental age, or VMA) than is usual.  If the shape bias is deviant, however, children with 
ASD may never use the familiar form of an object to facilitate their word learning.  To 
investigate these hypotheses, it is necessary to include a group of children with wide 
variability in language skills, specifically to test whether the shape bias emerges at a later 
point in development.   
Three studies to date (Hartley & Allen, 2014; Potrzeba et al., 2015; Tek et al., 
2008) have investigated the use of the shape bias in children with ASD.  Tek et al., (2008) 
compared the performance of 14 children with ASD and 15 TD children during four 
different developmental time points over a year-long period.  At the initial session, the 
TD children had a mean CA of 20.5 months and the children with ASD had a mean CA of 
33.2 months.  Both implicit (Intermodal Preferential Looking, or IPL) and explicit 
(pointing) measures were used to track performance in a name and no name condition.  In 





look at or point to the ‘zup’ from one similarly shaped and one similarly coloured object 
in the test trials.  The ‘no name’ trials followed a similar procedure but children were just 
told ‘look at this’ and were then required to either look at or point towards ‘the same’ 
during the test trials.  In the IPL trials, the TD group looked longer at the shape match in 
name trials (but equally long at both objects in no name trials) from 24 months old, 
although the children with ASD showed no preference for the shape match across all four 
sessions in either condition.   
More recently, a longitudinal study of a larger and more heterogeneous sample of 
children with ASD replicated this finding with TD children from as young as 20 months, 
although children with ASD did not look longer at the shape match in the name than no 
name trials even with a mean CA of four-and-a-half (Potrzeba et al., 2015).  Tek et al’s 
(2008) pointing trials showed a different pattern of results; here, both groups selected the 
shape match more often than the colour match, but in both conditions.  The authors 
concluded that the shape bias was not present in the children with ASD, due to their 
failure in the IPL trials and lack of discernible difference between the name and no name 
conditions in the pointing task.  One perplexing possibility is that both the ASD and TD 
groups seem to be operating via the SAC account in the pointing trials, as they showed a 
general preference for shape across lexical and non-lexical situations.   
Additional evidence for a difference in using shape as a cue for lexical extension 
in ASD was recently provided by Hartley and Allen (2014), in a study about pictorial 
reference.  Children with ASD with a verbal mental age (VMA) of 3 were able to extend 





However, they also extended labels to stimuli that shared the same shape or colour.  Thus, 
Hartley and Allen (2014) proposed that the children with ASD showed a ‘fundamental 
misunderstanding of the rules that govern symbolic word-picture-object relations’ (p. 
2069), and suggest that they were unable to use shape correctly to constrain lexical 
generalisation.   
 
2.3. Description of the present study 
The current study extends the past research carried out on the shape bias.  First, 
older children than those previously recruited by Tek et al., (2008) are included in the 
sample, considering that Tek et al., (2008) left open the possibility that the children in 
their study may simply have been too young to consistently use the shape bias for word 
learning.  As the shape bias is considered to be completely developed in TD children by 
2-years-old (Jones, 2003; Landau et al., 1988; Tek et al., 2008) children with a VMA 
above 2 participate in the present experiment.  To investigate the delay vs. deviance 
hypothesis, each group is split into a ‘high VMA’ and ‘low VMA’ category based on the 
median VMA of the sample, as measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale-Second 
Edition (BPVS) (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997).    
A second aim of this study is to investigate the shape bias not only in children 
with ASD, but in children with developmental disorders (DD) excluding ASD, because 
word learning difficulties have also been documented in this population (e.g. Franken et 
al., 2010; Rice et al., 2005).  Interestingly, ‘late talkers’, or children who are delayed in 





mappings according to texture (Jones, 2003).  Thus, it is important to establish whether 
children with other developmental difficulties also have a shape bias deficit, and this can 
furthermore reveal whether any deficits or differences are autism-specific, or are instead a 
result of cognitive delay. 
Finally, I aim to test whether the shape bias can be explained by the SAC account 
or ALA across our three populations (TD, ASD and DD).  This study is based on the 
pointing task of Tek et al., (2008), as the effects for the IPL task have already been 
replicated (Potrzeba et al., 2015), the pointing task is more age appropriate for the 
children in my sample than the IPL task, and because the results obtained in that 
condition require further investigation and leave open the possibility that the SAC 
account drives the shape bias in explicit tasks.  To avoid potential bias between 
conditions, a between subjects design is adopted.  Across four trials, a novel object is 
presented and either named (e.g. ‘this is a dax!’) or described (‘this is nice’).  As ‘late 
talkers’ sometimes generalise words to objects of the same texture (Jones, 2003), I add a 
texture match to the test array, which also consists of a shape match and a colour match.  
Children are simply asked to give the experimenter the other ‘dax’ (name condition) or 
the other ‘one’ (no name condition).   
If the shape bias is controlled by the SAC account, TD children and children with 
DD are predicted to select the shape match in both the name and no name condition, but 
children with ASD are not predicted to select the shape match in either condition.  
However, given Tek et al.’s (2008) results in the pointing task, an alternative possibility is 





explained by the ALA, all groups of children are expected to select the shape match in the 
name condition but not the no name condition.  However, due to the difficulties children 
with ASD experience with categorisation and global processing they might not select the 
shape match in either condition.  If the shape bias is delayed in ASD, high VMA children 
with ASD are hypothesised to show the shape bias, although low VMA children with 
ASD are not.  If the shape bias is deviant in ASD, both high and low VMA children with 
ASD are hypothesised to have a shape bias deficit.   
Overall, this study adds to the growing literature investigating categorisation 
impairment (Gastgeb et al., 2006; Gastgeb, Wilkinson, Minshew & Strauss, 2011; Klinger 
& Dawson, 2001) and lexical biases (Hartley & Allen, 2014; Preissler & Carey, 2005; 
Tek et al., 2008) in ASD.  It helps uncover whether the underlying mechanisms 
controlling the shape bias are social (SAC) or associative (ALA).  The aim is to inform 
theories of word acquisition and provide evidence for the developmental trajectory of the 




 Participants were recruited from three mainstream schools and six day nurseries 
(TD children), fourteen specialist schools, one ASD unit within a mainstream school, two 
parental support groups and word of mouth (children with ASD and children with DD) 
and tested in North West England.  Ethical permission had been granted from Lancaster 





parents. Demographic details for participants are provided in Table 1, which shows the 
children’s mean chronological age (CA), verbal mental age (VMA) (as measured by the 
BPVS), Raven’s raw score (maximum = 36) and scores on two questionnaire scales 
which were given to the children’s teachers (on the CARS, a score of 30+ is the cut-off 
point for ASD, on the SCQ, a score of 15+ is the cut-off point for ASD).  
One-hundred-and-ninety-nine children were recruited for this study, although 27 
participants were excluded from the final sample, leaving a total of 172 children (66 TD, 
62 ASD, 44 DD).  Reasons for excluding children were non-compliance (N = 13; 1 TD, 7 
ASD, 5 DD), parental interference (1 TD child), refusal to complete the BPVS (N = 9; 1 
TD child, 4 ASD children and 4 DD children), having an undetermined VMA as it did not 
reach the minimum age on the BPVS (1 DD child)2 and not having received an official 
diagnosis of their disorder and/or parental concerns that the child may also have 
undiagnosed ASD (N = 3, all DD).  One hundred and thirteen participants were male (35 
TD, 52 ASD, 26 DD) and 59 were female (31 TD, 10 ASD, 18 DD).  There were 88 
children in the name condition and 84 in the no name condition.  
 
 
                                                        
2 Two low VMA children with ASD also had a raw score on the BPVS below the basal start point of 2.33.  
However, as both children were very close to this start point, they were conservatively assigned VMA’s of 
2.25 and 2.00 based upon their raw score.  For example, the child who was assigned a VMA of 2.25 had a 
raw score of 14 on the BPVS, where a raw score of 15 equates to a VMA of 2.33.  As the shape bias is 
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 All children with ASD had received a clinical diagnosis of autism by a qualified 
educational or clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised: Lord, Rutter, 
DiLavore & Risi, 2002; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) and expert clinical judgment.3 
The children with DD had various conditions, including learning difficulties, Down 
Syndrome and rarer chromosomal disorders.  Participants were grouped according to their 
diagnostic category.  In order to investigate the delay vs. deviance hypothesis, they were 
then further subcategorised within their diagnostic category according to the median 
VMA of the sample (Table 1), totalling six groups: TD-low VMA, TD-high VMA, ASD-
low VMA, ASD-high VMA, DD-low VMA and DD-high VMA. 
  
2.4.2. Design 
     Although Tek et al., (2008) used a within subjects design, the present study employed a 
between subjects design.  It was anticipated that if each child took part in both the name 
and the no name condition, their responses to one trial type might bias their responses to 
                                                        
3 With two exceptions, all of the DD children had also received a formal diagnosis of their disorder.  The 
data were not excluded from the study from the two DD-low VMA children who had not been officially 
diagnosed with any DD because, in addition to attending a specialist school, their VMA (3.67 and 3.75 
respectively) was considerably younger than their CA (10.75 and 10.83 respectively).  The possibility that 
these children had undiagnosed ASD was ruled out by both children scoring below the clinical threshold for 






the other.  Which condition children were allocated to (name or no name) was 
counterbalanced.   
 
2.4.3. Cognitive Tests  
Children’s VMA was determined by administering the BPVS.  Their nonverbal 
reasoning was assessed by administering Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
2003), which has a minimum raw score of 0 and a maximum of 36.  See Tables 2 and 3 
for the VMA’s (p values obtained from conducting a one-way ANOVA).  The three 
groups had equivalent VMA’s.  The TD-high VMA children had an older VMA than the 
DD-high VMA children, although ASD-high VMA and DD-high VMA were VMA 
matched, as were ASD-high VMA and TD-high VMA.  There were no within group 




VMA p values for the three groups of participants.  The three groups were matched in 

























VMA p values for the participants split by VMA.  This group comparison was carried out 













2.4.4. CARS and SCQ 
The Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schloper, Reichler & Rochen 
Renner, 1988) and the lifetime version of the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Rutter, Bailey, Berument, Lord & Pickles, 2003) were completed for the majority of 
children (CARS: 39 TD, 48 ASD, 29 DD.  SCQ: 34 TD, 51 ASD, 32 DD) by their parent 
or teacher to confirm or rule out ASD. Scores on the CARS range from 15-60, with scores 
of 30 or above in the ASD range.  Scores on the SCQ range from 0 – 39, with scores of 
15 or above in the ASD range.  The vast majority of children scored according to their 
diagnosis on at least one of the questionnaires, with only 9 children (7 ASD, 2 DD) not 













TD   Low VMA    - <.001*** >.999 <.001*** .95 <.001*** 
        High VMA  - - <..001*** .64 <.001*** .27 
ASD Low VMA 
        High VMA 
DD  Low VMA            





























scoring according to their diagnosis on either questionnaire.  As removing these children 
from the analyses led to almost identical results, and considering that they had all been 




A total of sixteen objects were presented to the children across four trials (see 
Figure 3). Fourteen out of the sixteen stimuli had been modified from household 
equipment (e.g. covering a bowl scraper with pink tissue paper, see Figure 3), thus would 
not have been seen by any of the children before.  The two remaining stimuli consisted of 
unusual kitchen equipment, which children were very unlikely to be familiar with (the 
lemon juicer included in Figure 1 and a utensil hook).  No child volunteered a name for 
any of the stimuli. Thus, the objects were highly likely to be novel to the children.   
At the beginning of each trial, children were shown a novel object, which was 
either named (name condition) or described as being ‘nice’ (no name condition).  
Participants were then presented with three test objects per trial: one shape match, one 
colour match and one texture match. 
 





Figure 3: Example object set.  The novel object is a sink stopper covered in orange tissue 
paper, the shape match test object is a sink stopper covered in blue cotton, the colour 
match test object is an orange lemon squeezer and the texture match test object is a bowl 
scraper covered with pink tissue paper. 
 
2.4.6. Procedure 
2.4.6.1. Test Trials 
Participants completed the experimental and background measures in a quiet area 
of their school, day nursery, parental support group or Lancaster University.  Task order 
was counterbalanced.  In some cases, the child’s parent or a member of staff at their 
school or nursery was also present in the room.  Adults in attendance were instructed 
simply to watch the study and avoid intervening in any way.  
The experimenter presented the novel object.  In the name condition, she said ‘see 
this one?  This is a dax (parlu/wug/gazzer).  It’s a dax’.  In the no name condition, she 
said ‘see this one?  This is nice.  It’s nice.’  The experimenter then placed the novel object 




on the table.  Following this, she showed the child the three test objects, which she laid on 
the table.  These were placed directly in front of the child, with the original object still in 
view, behind the test objects.  The positioning of the three test objects (left, centre or 
right), the order that the four object sets were shown and, for the name condition, the 
word uttered to refer to the novel object, were all counterbalanced.   
In the name condition, the experimenter asked ‘can you give me the other dax?’  
In the no name condition, she asked ‘can you give me the other one?’  Only intentional 
responses (purposefully giving or sliding an object towards the experimenter, clearly 
pointing towards an object or providing an unambiguous description of the object) were 
scored (see Preissler & Carey, 2004).  Six children (2 TD, 2 ASD, 2 DD) completed only 
three out of the four trials and two children (1 TD, 1 ASD) completed only two out of the 
four trials, due to non-compliance.  
 
2.4.6.2. Favourite object control trials 
After an unrelated task (e.g. the BPVS or Raven’s), the child was presented with 
the test objects again and asked to give the experimenter their favourite one.  The objects 
were presented one set at a time in the same sequential order and position as they had 
appeared during the experimental phase.  The experimenter asked the child ‘can you give 
me your favourite one?  Which is the one that you like the best?’  These trials took place 
in order to see if the test objects chosen for each set were of relatively equal saliency, thus 
chance performance was expected.  If for some reason children were more attracted to 
some objects than others, the favourite object trials helped establish whether children 
were simply picking the object they were most attracted to during the test trials. 




2.5. Results  
2.5.1. SAC vs. ALA 
If the SAC account is correct, the TD and DD children would be expected to 
select the shape match test object in both conditions but the children with ASD would not 
be expected to select the shape match more than the other two test objects in either 
condition.  If the ALA is correct, all three groups of children are expected to select the 
shape match in the name condition but not in the no name condition.  Alternatively, due 
to children with ASD having categorisation impairments and a preference for local 
processing, children with ASD may not select the shape match in either condition.   
Children’s shape match choices were summed over trials from 0 (did not choose 
the shape match on any trial) to 1 (chose the shape match on every trial) and then 
converted into proportions.  Proportions were used instead of frequencies, as a small 
minority of children did not complete all trials.  Table 4 shows the proportion of times 
children selected the shape match test object in the name and no name condition.   
 One-sample t-tests were run for the three groups of children to establish if 
participants chose the shape match test object as the referent above a chance level of .33.  
All three groups of children selected the shape match in the name condition (TD, t(32) = 
7.14, p <.001, d = 1.23: ASD, t(31) = 5.84, p <.001, d = 1.03: DD, t(22) = 5.38, p <.001, d 
= 1.12), although in the no name condition, only the TD children (t(32) = 6.29, p <.001, d 
= 1.09) selected the shape match.  A 3 (Group) × 2 (Condition) between subjects 
ANOVA compared the proportion of shape match choices for the three groups of 
children.  There were significant main effects of Group (F(2) = 6.20, p = .003, ηp2 = .07) 




and Condition (F(1) = 21.61, p <.001, ηp2 = .12) and a significant interaction (F(2) = 
3.17, p = .044, ηp2 =.04) (see Figure 4). 
Post hoc tests (Tukey Kramer) confirmed that the TD children chose the shape 
match more than both the ASD (p = .014) and DD (p = .011) participants.  Examining the 
children’s mean proportion of shape bias responses for the name (TD = .76, ASD = .70, 
DD = .71) and no name (TD = .70, ASD = .41, DD = .35) condition suggests that the two 
clinical groups selected the shape match more in the name than no name condition, 
supporting the ALA.  However, the TD children selected the shape match in both the 
name and no name condition, supporting the SAC account.  This pattern of responses was 
confirmed by performing three one-way ANOVAs (TD, F(64) = .61, p = .439: ASD, 
F(60) = 13.49, p = .001, ηp2 = .18: DD, F(42) = 11.62, p = .001, ηp2 = .22) (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: 
Mean proportion of shape match, colour match and texture match responses (SD) for 





* p <.05 higher than chance (.33)
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2.5.2. Relation between shape bias performance, CA, VMA and Raven’s 
For TD children in the no name condition and children with ASD in the name 
condition, selecting the shape match test object was positively correlated with both CA 
(TD: r(33) = .35, p = .045.  ASD: r(32) = .35, p = .049) and VMA (TD: r(33) = .43, p = 
.012.  ASD: r(32) = .51, p = .003).  Raven’s score was also positively correlated with 
shape match responses for the TD children in the no name condition (r(31) = .40, p = 
.026).  Selecting the shape match was also positively correlated with VMA (r(21) = .47, p 
= .031) and Raven’s (r(17) = .56, p = .021) for DD children in the no name condition.  
When partial correlations controlling for CA were performed, VMA and shape match 
responses remained significant for the ASD and DD groups (ASD, name: r(29) = .42, p = 
.018.  DD, no name: r(18) = .62, p = .003) and Raven’s remained significant for the DD 
children (r(14) = .66, p = .005).   
A stepwise linear regression analysis entering CA, VMA and Raven’s score as 
predictor variables was performed separately for the three groups (TD, Adj R2=.07, 
F(1,53) = 5.16, p = .027: ASD, Adj R2=.08, F(1) = 5.61, p = .022: DD, Adj R2=.19, F(1) 
= 9.06, p = .005).  Only VMA significantly predicted shape match responses for all 
groups (TD: β=.298, p = .027; ASD: β=.309, p = .022; DD: β=.464, p = .005).  Thus, the 
correlation and regression analyses provide converging evidence that VMA is related to 








2.5.3. Delay vs. Deviance 
From the aforementioned results, it would appear that TD children select the 
shape match in both conditions, supporting the SAC account, but children with ASD and 
with DD only select the shape match in the name condition, supporting the ALA.   
However, the overall median VMA of the sample is 4.6 (TD, median VMA = 4.29: ASD, 
median VMA = 4.91: DD, median VMA = 4.42), whereas TD children show the shape 
bias from as early as two years old (Landau et al., 1988).  There is no way of establishing 
from the above data whether children with ASD show a shape bias in the name condition 
at the usual developmental time point or whether the shape bias is delayed in ASD.   
Hence, each group was split into ‘low VMA’ (<4.6) and ‘high VMA’ (>4.6) 
subcategories to test the delay vs. deviance hypotheses. 
One sample t-tests showed that both TD groups chose the shape match above 
chance levels (.33) in both conditions (TD-low VMA: name, t(16) = 3.91, p = .001, d = 
.95.  No name, t(17) = 3.40, p = .003, d = .80.  TD-high VMA: name, t(15) = 6.69, p = 
<.001, d = 1.67.  No name, t(14) = 6.17, p = <.001, d = 1.59).  The ASD-high VMA 
children and both DD groups selected the shape match in the name condition (ASD-high 
VMA: t(17) = 10.02, p = <.001, d = 2.36: DD-high VMA, t(11) = 6.04, p = <.001, d = 
1.74: DD-low VMA, t(10) = 2.33, p = .042, d = .70)4.  All other results were not 
                                                        
4 If the more stringent Bonferroni correction is applied, using the alpha value of .008 for three groups and 
.004 for six groups, the results for seventeen of the eighteen comparisons remain significant, the only 





significant.  A 3 (Group; TD, ASD, DD) × 2 (VMA; low vs. high) × 2 (Condition; name 
vs. no name) factorial ANCOVA was carried out, using CA and Ravens score as 
continuous covariates, in case either of these factors had an influence on shape bias 
responses.  There were main effects of Group (F(2) = 3.83, p= .024, ηp2 = .06), VMA 
(F(1) = 9.95, p= .002, ηp2 = .07) and Condition (F(1) = 27.18, p <.001, ηp2 = .17) and an 
interaction between Group and Condition (F(2) = 3.27, p = .041, ηp2 = .05).  Neither CA 
nor Ravens had an impact on children’s shape match choices.   
Pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustments) showed that the TD children 
chose the shape match test object more than the children with ASD (p = .028).  High-
VMA children chose the shape match test object more than the low-VMA children (p = 
.002).  All three groups and two VMA ranges of children chose the shape match more in 
the name than no name condition (p <.001).  An independent samples t-test showed that 
the TD children did not differ in terms of shape match responses between the two 
conditions, but the children with ASD (t(56.15) = 3.71, p <.001) and DD (t(42) = 3.41, p 
= .001) chose the shape match more in the name than no name condition.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
criticism against correcting for multiple t-tests on the grounds that this procedure inflates the risk of type 11 
errors  (e.g. Nakagagawa, 2004; Rothman, 1990) or is simply not necessary (Perneger, 1998).  
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Mean proportion of shape match, colour match and texture match responses (SD) for six 
groups of participants 
* p <.05 higher than chance (.33).   
 
2.5.4. Favourite object control trials  
The shape match test object was never chosen as the favourite object above 
chance levels for any of the groups (all p >.05), suggesting that children were not drawn 
to the shape match in the test trials due to salience or a simple preference. 
 
2.6. Discussion 
 This study investigated whether TD children, children with ASD and DD children 
show a shape bias for word learning, in both a naming (‘it’s a dax!’) and non-naming 
(‘it’s nice’) context.  I explored whether the SAC or ALA account underpins shape bias 
 TD ASD DD 
 Low VMA High VMA Low VMA High VMA Low VMA High VMA 
Shape      Name      .69 (.38)* .84 (.30)* .48 (.39) .88 (.23)* .58 (.36)* .83 (.29)* 
                No Name  .60 (.33)* .82 (.31)* .34 (.16) .47 (.31) .20 (.22) .50 (.46) 
Colour     Name 
                No Name 



















               No Name .08 (.15) .10 (.26)  .32 (.23) .25 (.27) .30 (.25) .23 (.22) 




performance across all groups, which allowed me to probe for autism-specific 
differences.  Additionally, splitting each group into younger and older subcategories 
helped establish whether the shape bias is present at the usual developmental time point 
for children with ASD, or is delayed.  The results suggest that the shape bias is controlled 
by the ALA for children with ASD and DD but the SAC account for TD children.  
Furthermore, the shape bias is delayed in ASD.  The results are discussed for the three 
groups individually, then I relate children’s overall performance to the findings of Tek et 
al., (2008).    
With regards to typical development, participants of low and high VMA selected 
the shape match as the referent in both conditions, which is consistent with several earlier 
studies that show that children categorise by shape in both lexical and non-lexical 
contexts (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; Graham & Diesendruck, 2010).  Crucially, these 
results are also consistent with Tek et al.’s (2008) pointing task, in which TD children 
chose the shape match rather than colour match in both naming and non-naming 
conditions using an explicit measure.  Conversely, others argue that the shape bias is 
specific to naming in young children (e.g. Imai et al., 1994; Landau et al., 1988; Smith et 
al., 1996).  One possible reason for these conflicting findings may be due to variation in 
the way the test question is phrased.  Children are more likely to choose the shape match 
in non-lexical situations if category membership (e.g. ‘pick another object like this’) 
rather than perceptual categorisation (e.g. ‘pick the object that goes together with this’) is 




highlighted, as the former emphasises that the objects are of the same kind and therefore 
should be classified together (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003).   
It is also the case that the low VMA TD group in the no name condition of the 
present study were just over 3-and-a-half years old, whereas TD children first start to 
show a lexical shape bias from as early as 2-years-old (Landau et al., 1988).  Previous 
research (Baldwin, 1989; Landau et al., 1988) suggests that the shape bias strengthens 
during development.  TD individuals may originally only show a shape bias in the name 
condition, at 2, prior to also showing it in the no name condition, by 3-and-a-half 
(Baldwin, 1989, but see Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003).  The fact that the proportion of 
shape bias responses was positively correlated with both CA and VMA for the TD 
children in the no name condition is a further indication that older TD children are more 
likely than younger TD children to show a non-lexical shape bias.   
Unlike both groups of TD children, participants with ASD only displayed a shape 
bias when the object was named, indicating that the heuristic is controlled by a process of 
attentional learning and not referential intent for children with ASD.  This is consistent 
with past research suggesting that children with ASD learn words from association (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Norbury et al., 2010; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005) 
and have difficulty monitoring referential intent (D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; Preissler 
& Carey, 2005; Prizant & Wetherby, 1987).  The shape bias was also delayed for 
participants with ASD; when the groups were split by VMA only the high VMA children 
showed a shape bias, supporting previous research suggesting that individuals with ASD 




have delays in aspects of language acquisition (e.g. Bartolucci et al., 1976; Boucher, 
2012; Charman, Drew, Baird & Baird, 2003; Eigsti & Bennetto, 2009; Eigsti et al., 2011). 
One possibility for the shape bias delay in ASD is that it is due to weak central 
coherence (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006); young children with ASD may focus more 
on individual parts of objects than on the object as a whole, leading them to mis-map new 
labels to parts of objects, neglecting the overall object shape.  As children with ASD can 
attend to global properties of objects when they are explicitly told to do so (Koldewyn et 
al., 2013; Plaisted et al., 1999), direct instruction may facilitate shape bias understanding 
in ASD.  Future work should investigate this hypothesis. 
A further possibility for the shape bias delay in ASD is that these children apply 
different processes to achieve success in cognitive tests (e.g. Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; 
Frith et al., 1991; Happé, 1995; Yirmiya et al., 1992).  For example, children with ASD 
may use explicit verbal mediation and logic to pass false belief tasks, therefore requiring 
an older VMA than TD children (Happé, 1995).  Furthermore, intelligence is positively 
correlated with performance in empathy and conservation tasks for children with ASD, 
but not for TD children (Yirmiya et al., 1992).  Having a higher VMA, better cognitive 
skills and experience of intervention programmes such as Applied Behavioural Analysis 
(ABA; Lovaas, 1987) may all help children with ASD explicitly ‘hack out’ solutions to 
problems.  These children may rote learn certain rules in order to facilitate category 
formation, instead of extracting a common prototype (Klinger & Dawson, 2001).  This is 




in contrast to TD children’s intuitive reasoning, which may be more automatic (Frith et 
al., 1991).   
Although it is not surprising that children with ASD show a shape bias through 
attentional processes, rather than referential intent, the results for the DD children are 
somewhat unexpected.  When the DD group is considered as a whole, the pattern of 
results is virtually identical to the ASD group, in that shape is used to constrain lexical, 
but not non-lexical generalisation.  This is the traditional interpretation of what it means 
to have a ‘shape bias’ (i.e. it only surfaces in naming situations), and supports ALA based 
accounts.  Of particular interest is that, although the proportion of shape based responses 
in the naming condition increases between the low VMA and high VMA group with DD, 
it is still present in the former group.  This suggests that the delay seen in the ASD group 
is autism-specific.   
Nevertheless, the DD children’s pattern of performance differs from what I found 
in the TD group, who also used shape for generalisation in the non-naming condition.  
One possibility is that the unique life experiences that the atypically developing groups 
have, as a direct consequence of their developmental difficulties, contribute to their 
different route of language acquisition (Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith, 2001; Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 2012).  It is also possible that children with DD have lower intention 
monitoring skills than the TD group, and thus do not use shape as a cue to discerning 
referential intent in pragmatic situations.  However, as an independent measure of 
intention monitoring abilities was not administered to the children in the present study, 




this claim is simply speculative rather than evidence-based.  Future work should include a 
separate test of intention reading skills.   
Although the results show a differential pattern of performance across conditions 
and groups, they also identify a core commonality in the use of the shape bias.  
Specifically, the evidence indicates that VMA is related to, and uniquely predicts, shape 
match performance, not just for children with ASD, but for all three groups of children.  
This suggests that it is not simply maturation or increased experience with objects that 
drives the use of the shape bias, but instead language comprehension (as measured here at 
a somewhat general level by the BPVS).  This supports earlier studies that have found 
that the absence of a shape bias has been linked to possessing a limited vocabulary (e.g. 
Jones, 2003; Smith et al., 2002), and identifies one common foundation for word 
acquisition across typical and atypical development.   
Overall, the results of this study support Hartley and Allen (2014), who found that 
children with ASD who had a similar VMA to the younger ASD group in our study 
generalised object labels according to colour as well as shape.  However, the results are in 
slight contrast to Tek et al., (2008), who found that both TD infants and infants with ASD 
tended to select the shape match in both a naming and non-naming condition in their 
pointing paradigm.  Despite this, in their intermodal preferential looking (IPL) task, the 
TD children showed a looking preference for the shape match in the name trials compared 
with the no name trials, although the children with ASD did not.  The authors claim that 
their participants with ASD did not show a shape bias as it is specific to word learning.  




However, by this definition, the TD participants also failed to show a shape bias for the 
pointing task; for three out of the four testing sessions they selected the shape match for 
both the name and no name trials.   
There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy in findings between this 
study and Tek et al., (2008).  They only used a colour match distractor test object, while I 
included a texture as well as colour match, decreasing the possibility of children picking 
the shape match purely due to chance.  I also ruled out simple preference for the test 
objects in the control trials, which found that participants did not choose the shape match 
as their favourite object above chance levels.   
As Tek et al., (2008) did not include a favourite object control task, it may have 
been the case that (unlike the present study) children with ASD picked the shape match as 
they found it salient.  Tek et al., (2008) consider this possibility, but stress that this 
explanation does not account for why the children with ASD performed at chance on the 
IPL task, which used the same objects as the pointing paradigm.  The wording of the test 
question was also different in the no name condition of Tek et al., (2008) (‘point to the 
same’) from this study (‘give me the other one’), although this does not explain the 
differing performance between our younger group with ASD in the name condition and 
those in Tek et al., (2008).   
 Perhaps crucially, Tek et al., (2008) employed a within rather than between 
subjects design.  If children completed the IPL task prior to the pointing task, by the time 
of the pointing task, they would have experienced repeated exposure to the objects.  




Research (e.g. Smith et al., 2002; Ware & Booth, 2010) suggests that the shape bias can 
be facilitated in TD children as young as 17 months old through repeated training.  
Perhaps the children with ASD’s exposure to the novel object and shape match over 
multiple trials in Tek et al., (2008) heightened their attention towards shape and 
facilitated the selection of the shape match.  Consequently, the performance of the 
children with ASD in Tek et al., (2008) may simply reflect a learnt response over multiple 
trials, rather than a strong shape bias. 
The sample was also different in Tek et al., (2008) from my study.  Firstly, Tek et 
al., (2008) recruited younger participants.  However, it seems unlikely that toddlers with 
ASD select the shape match in both a name and no name context, lose this ability later on 
in development and then regain it a few years later, but only when the object is named.  
Secondly, Tek et al., (2008) admit that they obtained small effect sizes.  In contrast, the 
effect sizes reported here are primarily medium to large across group and chance 
comparisons.  Therefore, I can be reasonably confident that these effects were reliable.   
Of course, this study was not without its limitations.  Although including the DD 
participants extends past research investigating the shape bias in ASD (Hartley & Allen, 
2014; Tek et al., 2008), the fact that the DD children experienced such a wide variety of 
types of disabilities means that it is difficult to make inferences about how children with 
specific disorders would respond.  Future research investigating the shape bias in atypical 
populations should aim to recruit groups of children with particular disorders, such as a 
whole cohort of children with Down syndrome or a whole cohort of children with 




intellectual disability in order to tease apart whether children with specific disorders show 
a shape bias deficit.   
Furthermore, a longitudinal study similar to that employed by Tek et al., (2008) 
may perhaps have been preferable to simply testing the children once.  Longitudinal 
research would have enabled tracking children’s behaviour over time, possibly allowing 
one to pinpoint the exact period at which the shape bias occurs in ASD.  Given the 
division of the children into ‘low VMA’ and ‘high VMA’ subgroups, it can be concluded 
that the shape bias in ASD develops at some point between the VMA of three and six, but 
the exact age of onset remains undetermined.  
In conclusion, by studying children with ASD, who have referential intent 
difficulties, this research was the first to pit the SAC account directly against the ALA.  
Interestingly, although low VMA children with ASD do not possess the shape bias, high 
VMA children with ASD do show the heuristic, when the object is named.  This study 
also highlights the importance of recruiting an additional control group of DD children 
within ASD research.  Previous work has largely overlooked the shape bias in relation to 
DD children (although see Jones, 2003).  This research suggests that DD children select 
the shape match at the usual developmental time point when the object is named but, 
unlike TD children, do not select the shape match in a non-naming context.   
Critically, the SAC account and ALA both seem to underlie the shape bias, but for 
different populations.  The data presented here support the SAC account for TD children, 
as they showed a shape bias in both the name and no name condition and the ALA for 




children with ASD and DD, as they only showed a shape bias in the name condition.  
This is more fully explored in the General Discussion.  Future research should examine 
whether this is a robust finding.  If so, its implications for the emergence and organisation 
of word learning in the three populations should be explored, in terms of both a 
theoretical account of the different routes to word learning and for intervention programs 
for language training in each of these groups. 
  




Chapter Three: Are children with Autism Spectrum Disorder initially attuned to 
object function rather than shape for word learning?5 
 
3.1. Introduction to the function bias  
As well as object shape, TD children use object function (the ‘function bias’, 
Gentner, 1978) as a basis for lexical extension to other category members.  As mentioned 
in Sections 1.2 and 1.5 of Chapter One, although generally a useful heuristic, there are 
occasions where the shape bias could actually hinder word learning.  An orange and a 
basketball are both spherical but different types of objects, while a beanbag chair may be 
round and an armchair may be larger and squarer shaped, despite being the same type of 
object.  What unifies objects is not simply perceptual similarity, but the shared role they 
fulfil (Bloom, 2004; Keleman, 1999).  Thus, a bias that constrains word-object mappings 
according to similarity in function can be adaptive (‘function bias’).  An unfamiliar object 
is called a ‘ball’ not just because of its appearance, but also because of its role: to bounce, 
kick or be thrown.      
                                                        
5 This chapter is based on Field, Allen, & Lewis (in Press).  Are children with autism spectrum disorder 
initially attuned to object function rather than shape for word learning?  Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders.  Minor changes have been made in order to help with consistency in terms of the 
structure and flow of the thesis.   
 




 TD children have been found to show a function bias when object shape and 
function conflict.  When a novel object is named and its function is clearly described and 
demonstrated, children extend the label to a differently shaped object that shares the same 
function, rather than to a similarly shaped one with a separate function (e.g. Diesendruck 
et al., 2003; Merriman et al., 1993).  This attention to function strengthens with 
chronological age (CA) in typical development, and may also be dependent on an 
individual’s non-verbal skills or language ability.  Specifically, children have to notice 
both that different objects share the same function, and that these objects also tend to 
share the same name, which may respectively recruit both these abilities.  The role of 
language and non-verbal skills can be directly addressed by comparing performance of 
TD children to children who have different developmental trajectories in terms of these 
skills, particularly children with Autism Spectrum Disorder.   
 Although four studies have directly addressed the absence of (see Hartley & Allen, 
2014; Potrzeba et al., in press; Tek et al., 2008), or delay in acquiring (see Field et al., in 
press – Study One in this thesis), a shape bias in ASD, to my knowledge no research to 
date has investigated the function bias in this population.  Thus, the current study aims to 
fill this gap in the literature.  There are reasons to believe that children with ASD might 
show differences with respect to understanding object function.  For instance, abundant 
evidence suggests that children with ASD often demonstrate idiosyncratic, stereotyped 
and restricted artefact use (Ozonoff et al., 2008; Wulff, 1985).  This may include 
repetitively spinning objects or trickling sand and water between their fingers, lining 




objects up in rows or piling objects on top of each other, and spinning, rotating, rolling, 
mouthing and banging artefacts (Leekam, Prior, & Uljarevic, 2011; Ozonoff et al., 2008; 
Williams, Costall, & Reddy, 1999).  These unusual responses to objects may hinder 
children’s discovery of the artefact’s proper function (Loveland, 1991; Williams et al., 
1999).   
 As children with ASD have weak central coherence and a preference for component 
parts rather than the object gestalt (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006), they might be so 
fixated on manipulating the parts of objects that they fail to comprehend the overall role 
that objects fulfil.  For example, repeatedly spinning the wheels on a toy car may distract 
the child from the car’s true function of driving.  The function bias also involves 
attending to and remembering the function of new artefacts and comparing this 
information to previously stored knowledge about object functions.  This may be difficult 
for children with ASD because of impairments with prototype formation (Klinger & 
Dawson, 2001) and categorisation (Gastgeb et al., 2006; 2011).   
 Therefore, it is possible that children with ASD have a function bias delay (develop 
the function bias later than TD individuals) or deviance (fail to develop the function bias 
at all).  Children with ASD exhibit delay or deviance in other areas of language 
acquisition (e.g. Bartolucci et al., 1976; Eigsti & Bennetto, 2009; Howlin, 1984; Mitchell 
et al., 2006; Van Meter, Fein et al., 1997) and, as Study One demonstrated, are delayed 
showing a shape bias (Field et al., in press).  In order to establish if ASD involves a 




function bias delay or deviance, testing a cohort of children with wide variation in 
language ability is necessary.   
 Despite some studies suggesting a function bias deficit in ASD, other evidence 
suggests children with ASD might show a function bias.  For instance, they show other 
word learning constraints and biases, such as mutual exclusivity (Preissler & Carey, 
2005) and the noun bias (Swensen et al., 2007).  They also classify objects by function to 
the same extent as their TD peers (Tager-Flusberg, 1985; Ungerer & Sigman, 1987).  In 
Tager-Flusberg (1985), children viewed a test picture (e.g. a car) then a picture from the 
same category (e.g. a bus) and a distractor picture from a different category (e.g. an item 
of clothing).  The children with ASD were able to correctly categorise not only 
perceptually similar objects (such as different types of dogs) but also functionally but not 
perceptually related objects (such as different types of furniture) into their correct 
category.  Ungerer and Sigman (1987) also found that children with ASD categorised 
objects according to functional similarity (e.g. different animals, fruits, vehicles and 
furniture) as well as the more perceptually salient characteristics of colour and form.  This 
suggests that children with ASD have some understanding that the same type of objects 
have the same function.    
 Children with ASD also partake in functional play (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Leslie, 
1987; Libby, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 1998; Ungerer & Sigman, 1981), such as 
brushing one’s hair with a toy brush, holding a telephone to one’s ear and sweeping the 
floor with a toy broom.  Functional play helps children name things, learn how to use 




objects appropriately and make associations between the roles of different artefacts 
(Mastrangelo, 2009).  Being able to classify objects by function and take part in 
functional play suggests that children with ASD have a basic level of understanding about 
the role objects fulfil. 
Therefore, there is conflicting evidence regarding functional understanding in 
children with ASD.  To examine whether any differences which may emerge in terms of 
showing the function bias in ASD relative to TD children are simply a result of cognitive 
delay, rather than ASD per se, it is necessary to also examine the function bias in children 
with other developmental disorders (DD).  Like children with ASD, children with DD 
categorise objects by the function they fulfil (Ungerer & Sigman, 1987) and engage in 
functional play (Malone & Langone, 1998; Sigafoos et al., 1999), suggesting they have 
some functional understanding.   
However, there is mixed evidence for the use of word learning constraints in this 
population.  Some children with DD show a shape bias in naming contexts  (Field et al., 
in press) and use mutual exclusivity for novel word learning (Wilkinson & Albert, 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2005).  Other studies report that children who are ‘late talkers’ have a shape 
bias deficit (Jones, 2003), and children with intellectual disability have difficulty with fast 
mapping and are less able than TD children to maintain labels when tested 1-3 days later 
(Wilkinson, 2005).  Thus, testing children with DD can inform theories of language 
acquisition in this population, as well as elucidate whether potential differences in ASD 
stem from cognitive delay. 




3.2. Description of the function bias study 
To investigate the function bias, this task was based on Diesendruck et al., (2003), 
who found that three-year-old TD children form word-object mappings by function rather 
than shape, but only when object function is explicitly described and demonstrated.  In 
the ‘label + intended function’ condition, participants were presented with a novel object, 
which was labelled and its function was clearly articulated and demonstrated to the 
children.  For example, the experimenter stated ‘this is a wug and it can hold coins’ and 
then poured some coins into the object.  The function of the novel object and the two test 
objects were also described and demonstrated (i.e. it was made explicitly clear to the 
children that the shape match was the same shape as the novel object but performed a 
different function, while the function match was a different shape but performed the same 
function).  When asked to give the experimenter the other ‘wug’, the children chose the 
function match test object. 
Although the procedure of this study was the same as Diesendruck et al., (2003), I 
recruited a large sample of participants of varying ages, due to the controversy within the 
TD literature regarding the precise age of function bias onset.  It is generally agreed that 
by adulthood TD individuals show a function bias rather than shape bias when shape and 
function conflict (Graham et al., 1999; Jones, 1998; Landau et al., 1998), however it is 
unknown at what age this ability appears.  Although Diesendruck et al., (2003) claim that 
TD children show a function bias at 3-years-old (see also Kemler-Nelson et al., 2000, 
who found a function bias in 4-year-old children and Kemler-Nelson, Russell, Duke, & 




Jones, 2000 who found a function bias in 2-year-olds), others argue that the function bias 
does not develop until age 6 (Merriman et al., 1993) or even later (Gathercole & 
Whitfield, 2001).   
In order to explore the role of age in function bias understanding, each group of 
participants was split into two subgroups.  Due to the disparity between the chronological 
and mental ages of the two clinical groups, the median verbal mental age (VMA) of the 
sample (4.6) as measured by receptive vocabulary was used, resulting in ‘high VMA’ and 
‘low VMA’ subsets of each participant type.  The three low-VMA groups had a mean 
VMA of 3-years-old and the three high-VMA children had a mean VMA of 6-years old.  
This was consistent with the chronological ages (CA’s) of the TD group, but the ASD and 
DD groups were predictably older chronologically due to cognitive and linguistic 
impairment.  These age ranges were selected to map onto the debate within typical 
development regarding the age of onset of the function bias.  
 It is hypothesised that TD and DD children with a higher VMA will override the 
shape bias in favour of a function bias.  Given the conflicting evidence regarding the age 
of function bias onset, it is possible that the low VMA TD and DD children will also 
show a function bias (Diesendruck et al., 2003).  Alternatively, this may not develop until 
they have reached a higher level of receptive understanding (Merriman et al., 1993).  
Children with ASD are hypothesised to show a function bias deficit, due to their 
idiosyncratic object use.  However, as children with ASD categorise objects by function 
and engage in functional play, an alternative possibility is that they show a function bias.  





3.3.1. Participants  
A total of one-hundred-and-forty-two children were recruited.  However, eighteen 
children were excluded from the analysis, leaving one-hundred and twenty-four children 
in the final sample.  Reasons for excluding children were non-compliance (N = 10, 6 
ASD, 4 DD), refusal to complete the BPVS (N = 4, 3 ASD, 1 DD), having a VMA below 
the minimum age of 2.33 on the BPVS (1 DD child) 6 and not having received an official 
diagnosis of their disorder and/or parental concerns that the child may also have 
undiagnosed ASD (N = 3, all DD).  The participants were recruited from four mainstream 
and 12 specialist schools, one ASD class within a mainstream school, two parental 
support groups and three day nurseries across the North West of England and from a 
database of parents who had previously expressed an interest in their children 
participating in psychology research at Lancaster University.   
There was some overlap between the participants who also took part in Study 
One, with 113 participants taking part in both studies.  The order in which children took 
part in Studies One and Two was counterbalanced, with at least 48 hours in between the 
two testing sessions.  A 3 (Group; TD, ASD, DD) × 2 (Order; shape bias first, function 
                                                        
6     One child with ASD had a raw score on the BPVS slightly below the basal start point of 2.33.  
However, as he scored 14 on the BPVS, where a raw score of 15 equates to a VMA of 2.33, this child was 
conservatively assigned a VMA of 2.25 based upon his raw score. 




bias first) between subjects ANOVA found that there were no order effects for either the 
shape bias or function bias study.   
Participants were matched according to the group means.  Although when 
included as a whole sample, the DD children had a slightly lower VMA than the other 
two groups, a one-way ANOVA showed that this was not significant.  When the groups 
were subdivided by VMA, the three high VMA groups all had a VMA of six and the three 
low VMA groups all had a VMA of three, thus they were well matched (see Table 6).  
The DD children had various conditions, primarily intellectual disability and rare 
chromosomal disorders.  With two exceptions, all of the DD children had also received a 
formal diagnosis of their disorder.  The data from the remaining two DD children were 
not excluded from the study because, in addition to attending a specialist school, their 
VMA (3.67 and 3.75 respectively) was considerably younger than their CA (10.75 and 
10.83 respectively).  The possibility that these children had undiagnosed ASD was ruled 
out by both children scoring below the clinical threshold for ASD on both the CARS and 
SCQ questionnaires.   
The participants were VMA matched.  The children’s mean CA, VMA and 
Raven’s score (maximum = 36) are given in Table 6.  The Tables also depict scores on 
two questionnaire scales which were given to the children’s teachers (on the CARS, a 
score of 30+ is the cut-off point for ASD, on the SCQ, a score of 15+ is the cut-off point 
for ASD).    
 




Table 6  















Lancaster University granted ethical permission for the research to take place.  
Written informed consent was obtained from children’s parent or guardian.  In order to 
investigate if only high VMA children show a function bias, and to establish if the 
function bias is delayed in ASD, the three groups were further divided according to the 
median VMA of the sample (4.6) into ‘high VMA’ and ‘low VMA’ subcategories.  
 TD ASD DD 
 Low 
VMA 

































































































A mixed factorial design was employed; Group (TD, ASD, DD) was between 
subjects and type of trial was within subjects and counterbalanced.   
 
3.3.3. Cognitive Tests  
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Second Edition (BPVS-II; Dunn et al., 
1997) was administered to determine children’s VMA.  The Raven’s (Raven, 2003) was 
administered to determine children’s nonverbal reasoning abilities.   
 
3.3.4. Clinical Diagnoses 
All children with ASD had received a clinical diagnosis of autism by a qualified 
educational or clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised: Lord, Rutter et 
al., 2002; Lord, et al., 1994) and expert clinical judgment.  For most children, the CARS 
(Schloper et al., 1988) and the lifetime version of the SCQ (Rutter et al., 2003) were also 
completed by a parent or teacher (CARS: 21 TD, 46 ASD, 19 DD.  SCQ: 19 TD, 46 
ASD, 22 DD).  Scores on the CARS range from 15-60, with scores of 30+ in the ASD 
range.  Scores on the SCQ range from 0 – 39, with scores of 15+ in the ASD range.  The 
vast majority of children scored according to their diagnosis on the scales with just four 
children (3 ASD, 1 DD) not scoring according to their diagnosis on either questionnaire.  




As excluding these children from the analyses yielded almost identical results, these 
participants were included in the final sample. 
 
3.3.5. Materials  
A total of twelve objects were presented to the children across four trials (see 
Figure 6 for an example object set).  The functions of the objects largely followed those 
used by Diesendruck et al., (2003).  However, there were some minor adaptions, in order 
to make the study more culturally relevant.  For example, the function of ‘cutting clay’ 
was changed to ‘cutting playdough’.     
Diesendruck et al., (2003) included within their study several objects where the 
name would already be familiar to the children (e.g. a solid wooden block, a rectangular 
box and a piece of wood), alongside more novel items (e.g. hanger-like shapes made out 
of pipe cleaner and wire, a round disk made out of felt).  In line with this, some of my 
objects were more familiar to the children than others, although the objects were used to 
perform functions that they were not typically associated with.  No child in my study 
volunteered a name for any of the stimuli.   





Fig. 6.  Example object set.  The novel object (centre) is a silver sandpaper covered soap 
dish, with the function of cutting playdough.  The function match test 
object (left) is a cutter and the shape match test object (right) is a soap dish 
covered with blue towel (mopping up water). 
 
3.3.6. Procedure  
Participants completed the task individually in a quiet place within their setting.  
The methodology followed Diesendruck et al., (2003), replicating their dialogue when 
introducing the novel object, function match and shape match.  The experimenter 
presented the novel object and stated ‘this is a jop (cheem/kiv/glire) and it was made for 
cutting playdough (holding coins/dusting/making music).  See how it cuts playdough 
(holds coins/dusts/makes music)’.  The experimenter then demonstrated this function, by 
producing some playdough and cutting it with the object (pouring a selection of coins into 
the object/moving the object around on the table in a dusting motion/banging a 
highlighter against the object to make a sound) and then placed it upon the table.  




Introducing the function match test object, the experimenter said ‘see this one?  It 
can cut playdough because it was made for cutting playdough.’  The experimenter 
demonstrated this function, by cutting the playdough, then continued ‘see, it doesn’t look 
like this one [pointing to the original], they have a different shape.  It can cut playdough 
because it was made for cutting playdough.’  The experimenter demonstrated this 
function for a second time.  Introducing the shape match test object, the experimenter said 
‘see this one?  It can’t cut playdough because it was made for mopping up water 
(sticking/hanging hair ties/holding paperclips)’.  The experimenter demonstrated this 
function, by pouring a tiny amount of water onto the table and mopping it up, then 
continued ‘See, it looks like this one [pointing to the original], they are the same shape.  It 
can’t cut playdough because it was made for mopping up water’ [demonstrating this 
function for the second time].  Following this, the experimenter picked up the novel 
object and said ‘remember I told you that this is a jop and it was made for cutting 
playdough.  One of these [pointing to the test objects] is also a jop.  Which one of these is 
a jop?’  The word uttered to refer to the novel object, the order that the test objects were 
presented, the order that the function match and shape match were introduced and the 
positioning of the test objects on the table (left or right) were all counterbalanced.  
 
3.4. Results  
Following Diesendruck et al., (2003), participants were initially classed as 
‘function biased’ (selected the function match for three or four trials), ‘shape biased’ 




(selected the shape match for three or four trials) or ‘not biased’ (selected the function 
match and shape match for two trials each) (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7:  
Percentage of children who were function biased, shape biased and not biased for six 
groups 
*** p <.001 ** p <.01 
 
Chi Square Goodness of Fit analyses showed that the TD children (23/44) and 
children with ASD (24/51), but not children with DD (7/28), were function biased at a 
rate above chance (TD, (χ2(2, N = 44) = 10.64, p = .005, w = .49: ASD, χ2(2, N = 51) = 
8.50, p = .014, w = .41).  To compare and contrast delay vs. deviance hypotheses, ‘high 
VMA’ and ‘low VMA’ subcategories were created for each group according to the 
median VMA of the combined sample, which was 4.6 years old (see Figure 7).7  
                                                        
7     The same results were obtained for all analyses when the groups were split by their individual median 
VMA’s, which were all very close to the overall median (TD 4.67, ASD 4.91, DD 3.71). 
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 Fig. 7. Mean proportion of function match responses per six groups and condition (with 
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 The high VMA TD children (17/22) and low VMA children with ASD (14/22) 
were function biased (TD high VMA, χ2(2, N = 22) = 22.49, p <.001, w = 1.01: ASD low 
VMA, χ2(2, N = 22) = 10.78, p = .005, w = .70), although all other groups performed at 
chance (see Figure 7).   
As well as conducting the analyses according to Diesendruck et al.’s (2003) 
scoring procedure, I explored the proportion of function bias responses across the four 
trials, for ‘high VMA’ and ‘low VMA’ participants.  To rule out possible mediating 
effects of CA or general non-verbal ability, CA and non-verbal mental age (NVMA; as 
measured by the Raven’s) were included in the analysis as covariates.  A 2 (VMA; ‘high’ 
or ‘low’) × 3 (Group: TD, ASD, DD) ANCOVA including CA and NVMA as continuous 
covariates revealed no main effects of Group, VMA, CA or NVMA but an interaction 
between VMA and Group (F(2) =5.99, p = .003,  ηp2 = .11).   
To unpack this interaction, individual independent samples t-tests were 
performed, comparing the high VMA and low VMA subcategories of each group.  These 
found that the two DD groups did not differ from each other in terms of function match 
responses (DD low VMA M = .44, SD = .25. DD high VMA M = .45, SD = .37) although 
there were differences between the high VMA (M = .78, SD = .36) and low VMA (M = 
.45, SD = .30) TD children (t(43) = -3.31, p = .002, d = -1.00) and between the high VMA 
(M = .48, SD = .33) and low VMA (M = .67, SD = .29) children with ASD (t(49) = 2.10, 
p = .041, d = .61).  The function bias was present in the high VMA TD children, but the 
low VMA ASD participants.   




During the review process for the paper upon which this chapter is based, one 
referee pointed out that the use of a median split, while common, is open to criticism on 
statistical grounds (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & Rucker, 2002; McClelland et al., 
2015).  I therefore explored VMA as a continuous measure (with the help of Gareth 
Ridall, Department of Mathematics, Lancaster University).  A robust linear regression 
using the mass library from the R package confirmed the strong positive relationship 
between VMA and function bias responses for the TD children and found a weaker 
negative relationship between VMA and function bias responses for the children with 
ASD (see Figure 8).  Furthermore, a linear mixed effects model using Group (TD, ASD, 
DD) as a fixed factor and BPVS score as a continuous variable found a Group × VMA 
interaction (F(27,32) = 1.90, p = .041, ηp2 = .62).  This confirmed our findings using the 
median split analyses.   
To check the validity of this interesting group difference, two further checks were 
carried out on the data.  Firstly, I wanted to establish if children’s object selection differed 
across object sets, as the novel objects for the ‘holding coins’ (green bowl) and ‘making 
music’ (jelly mould) trials might have been more familiar to the children than the novel 
objects for the ‘dusting’ (duster) and ‘cutting playdough’ (playdough cutter) trials.  
Despite this replicating Diesendruck et al., (2003), which contained a mixture of familiar 
and unfamiliar stimuli, I wanted to ensure that children were responding the same for the 
‘familiar’ and ‘novel’ object sets. A paired samples t-test found no significant differences 




between children’s responses for the two ‘novel’ compared with the two ‘familiar’ object 
sets for any of the three groups.   
 
Fig. 8. Scatterplots of VMA by function bias responses for each of the three groups. 
 
As an additional precaution, I investigated if children’s responses were consistent 
across all object sets.  Children’s responses were categorised for each trial separately as 
‘shape match’ or ‘function match’.  A Friedman test confirmed that there were no 
significant differences in terms of children’s responses per object set for any of the three 
groups.   




Relation between function bias and background measures 
The final analyses explored the relation between background cognitive measures 
(CA, VMA, NVMA) and function bias performance across the four trials (see Table 8).  
Pearson’s correlation analyses revealed that the proportion of function match choices was 
positively related to CA (r(45) = .39, p = .008) and VMA (r (45) = .37, p = .012) for the 
TD children, but VMA was no longer significant in partial correlations controlling for 
CA.  None of the correlations were significant for the ASD or DD groups.  A linear 
regression analysis using CA, VMA and Raven’s score as predictor variables found that 
CA marginally predicted performance for the TD children (Adj R2=.11, F(3,38) = 2.75, 
β=.08, p = .056).  No other significant effects were obtained for the clinical groups, even 
when they were split into high and low VMA. 
 
Table 8  





















*p <.05.   **p <.01 
 
   





Function plays an important role in children’s artefact categorisation.  However, 
there is debate within the TD literature regarding the age of function bias onset.  
Furthermore, the function bias has never before been explored in atypically developing 
participants, such as children with ASD.  This study suggests that some TD children and 
children with ASD show a function bias.  Although this effect is driven by the high VMA 
children within typical development, it appears to be driven by the low VMA children 
within ASD.  Thus, children with ASD may have a different route to word learning; 
forming word-object mappings by function to begin with and then shape.  This is in direct 
contrast to TD children, who form word-object mappings by shape to begin with and then 
function.   
The use of the function bias emerges at a later age in TD children than some 
research suggests (e.g. Diesendruck et al., 2003), and I will explore this effect first.  The 
results for the DD children reveal a fundamental difficulty with function understanding 
and inform us about the role of cognitive delay in ASD.  The DD findings will be 
explored before looking specifically how function might facilitate language acquisition in 
children with ASD.   
These findings depart from Diesendruck et al., (2003), who found that three-year-
old TD children show a function bias.  This ability was not found until the TD cohort had 
a mean VMA of six and CA just below this age, even though I used identical instructions, 
albeit with some adapted stimuli.  However, these findings support other studies 




suggesting that TD children do not show a function bias with a CA of three-years-old 
(e.g. Graham et al., 1999; Imai et al., 1994;; Tomikowa & Dodd, 1980). Specifically, 
Merriman et al. (1993) found that children did not use function as a cue for word learning 
until age six, which is consistent with our results.  Furthermore, Matan and Carey (2001) 
found that six-year-olds and adults could categorise objects according to the function they 
were originally intended to fulfil, but four-year-olds could not. 
    Diesendruck et al.’s (2003) paradigm contained a great deal of verbal instruction, 
and children had to retain the pairings between objects and corresponding function in 
working memory.  I chose to remain faithful to the procedure, although future work 
should consider adapting task instructions to minimise the verbal component, as it is 
possible that the extent of dialogue was difficult for the low VMA TD children.  The 
likely conclusion here is that the function bias is truly slow to emerge across typical 
development given the focus that is known to occur on shape and other features of a 
perceptual array (e.g. Horst & Twomey, 2013; Landau et al., 1988; Landau et al., 1992; 
Tek et al., 2012). 
DD children did not use function for word-object mapping irrespective of their 
VMA.  It is possible that the language used within the procedure was too complex for 
both groups of DD participants.  Although the high VMA DD children were matched on 
receptive vocabulary as measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scales (2nd Edition; 
Dunn et al., 1997) with the high VMA TD children, who succeeded at the task, it is worth 
noting that VMA was only measured using the BPVS.  Past studies within the ASD 




literature have also used the BPVS as a measure of VMA (e.g. Allen & Chambers, 2011; 
Hartley & Allen, 2014; Lee & Hobson, 2006; Leekam, et al., 1998).   
However, grouping participants by the arbitrary value of median VMA does not 
represent absolute ability levels.  The BPVS only measures single word receptive 
vocabulary, thus it is unknown if the groups were matched on skills such as pragmatic 
language, grammar and expressive vocabulary.  It might be the case, for example, that the 
DD high VMA children had inferior pragmatic language understanding compared to the 
TD high VMA children, which facilitated function bias understanding in the latter group.  
Future research should aim to measure additional aspects of language than simply 
receptive language comprehension, in order to tease apart whether other skills are 
facilitating function bias understanding in the TD high VMA children, relative to the DD 
high VMA children.   
A further possibility is that the DD children show a fundamental impairment in 
understanding what objects were made for.  Although children with intellectual 
impairment are able to sort objects into categories (Ungerer & Sigman, 1987), they 
actually perform worse than TD children and children with ASD for superordinate level 
category matching, particularly for artifactual classification (Tager-Flusberg, 1985).  This 
may pervade other areas of language development, including categorisation and play.  
Thus, clinical and educational programmes should account for this potential problem.  It 
is also conceivable that differences in information processing abilities amongst 
individuals with DD (Sperber & McCauley, 1984), which we did not directly measure, 




underlie the difficulty the DD groups had with understanding the task.  There is evidence 
that individuals with intellectual impairment do not spontaneously abstract relations 
between pairs of objects (see Paöur, 1992), and have specific difficulties in working 
memory (Numminen, Service, & Ruoppila, 2002).  
The results of the DD group implicate cognitive delay as the primary source of 
function bias failure, and based upon the cognitive abilities of the ASD sample, it would 
also be expected to find impairment across the board in this group.  However, some of the 
children with ASD were able to pass this task; paradoxically, the group with the lower 
VMA were the ones to exhibit success.  At first glance, it appears surprising that children 
with ASD succeed at a word-learning task only passed by TD children with an older 
VMA.  However, repeatedly emphasising and clearly demonstrating the object’s function 
may have facilitated function bias understanding in the low VMA children with ASD, 
who might have been more likely to learn through multiple pairings of object and 
function (Preissler, 2008).  It was observed that these children often attended to and 
repeated the experimenter’s actions as she demonstrated the object’s function, which 
seemed to help them understand the task more.   
Several other reasons might help explain this puzzling finding.  First, children 
with a lower VMA engage in functional play (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Jarrold, Jillchrist & 
Bender, 1993; Libby et al., 1998), which necessitates understanding of an object’s true or 
intended function (i.e. flying a toy helicopter in the air).  Functional play has been less 
fully explored in children with ASD who have a higher VMA.  These children may 




engage in symbolic play more than functional play, and thus focus less on the intended 
role of an object and more on abstract properties.  Supporting this claim, children with 
ASD with higher levels of language comprehension show greater levels of symbolic play 
skills (Ungerer & Sigman, 1981).  A further explanation is that the higher VMA children 
with ASD may prioritise other word learning strategies when discerning the appropriate 
referent in the current paradigm.  The shape bias, for instance, is a commonly used word 
learning constraint that is delayed in children with ASD who display a similar cognitive 
profile to participants in the current study (Field et al., in press, see Study One).  The 
children with higher VMA may therefore focus upon shape as the most relevant cue in 
any word-learning situation.  Although there was no shift towards shape based naming in 
the current paradigm, it is possible that the heavy task demands and repetition of 
functional information meant that children were trying to rectify a propensity for utilising 
shape with the functional information provided, and were ultimately confused.  Using a 
more traditional word generalisation task in which an object is simply named (as in Field 
et al., see Study One) could reveal a prioritisation of shape as the most relevant feature. 
Another potential explanation is that these findings reflect a specific strength in 
ASD during a critical early period of development.  Shah & Frith (1983) identified ‘islets 
of ability’ in ASD in terms of relative strengths in block design tasks.  It may be the case 
that during the earlier stages of language acquisition, children with ASD are focusing 
heavily upon the features of objects, and given the rigorous nature and reinforcement of 
some early intervention programs (Anderson, Avery, Dipietro, Edwards, & Christian, 




1987; Lovaas, 1987; Vernon, Koegel, Dauterman, & Stolen, 2012), are also paying 
special attention to an adult’s instruction.   
One area of caution is that although VMA, as predicted, is positively correlated 
with function bias performance for the TD children, there was not a significant correlation 
between VMA and function bias performance in children with ASD.  However, as 
expected, this correlation was negative, which was further illustrated with the robust 
regression scatterplots and justified with the linear mixed effects analysis.  One 
possibility for the lack of correlation between VMA and function bias responses for the 
ASD subgroup is that children with ASD of different ages receive different types of 
instruction.  For example, the early stages of intervention programs might be more 
centred around getting children to attend to objects, whereas later stages might focus 
more on attending to people.  Further work is needed both to replicate our findings and 
explore the emergence of functional understanding for word learning in children with 
ASD. 
Clearly something is emerging in the difference between low and high VMA ASD 
groups, but this appears to be a categorical rather than linear relation.  In typical 
development, the correlation between VMA and function bias disappears when CA is 
controlled for, suggesting that CA mediates the use of function.  Thus, I may have 
identified two different processes by which the use of functional information emerges: a 
linear development in TD compared to a sudden shift in ASD.  The idea of a stage-like 
transition in cognitive skills is not new (Piaget, 1928) and further work is needed to both 




replicate my findings and explore the emergence of functional understanding for word 
learning in children with ASD. 
Of course, there are limitations to this work.  Although I did not find differences 
between trials that incorporated completely novel objects relative to those that retained 
some familiarity, future work should utilise a uniform set of stimuli.  It would also be 
advantageous to test more verbally able children with ASD, to generalise these findings 
across the spectrum and determine whether the function bias is present in individuals 
whose CA is on a par with their VMA.  Furthermore, my DD group included a wide 
variety of conditions, and future research should aim to explore the function bias in a 
more homogeneous sample, such as a whole cohort of children with Down Syndrome or a 
whole cohort of children with intellectual disabilities.  This will help tease apart whether 
subgroups of DD children show the function bias or a function bias deficit is widespread 
among DD children.  Despite these limitations, this study was the first to investigate the 
function bias in atypically developing children and provides a basis for further work 
exploring the role of functional information vs. shape-based generalisations across 
development.  
 
3.6. Evaluating these studies in relation to the emergentist coalition model 
Studies One and Two have investigated the role of the object for children’s word 
learning, specifically the shape bias and function bias.  Taken together, the results of 
Studies One and Two suggest that TD children use both the shape bias and, at a later age, 




the function bias to help them generalise names of objects.  This supports past research 
(e.g. Landau et al., 1988; Merriman et al., 2003) and the claims of the emergentist 
coalition model (see also Markman, 1989) that TD children use word-learning 
constraints, among other cues, to facilitate their language acquisition.  Further, these 
results have extended the emergentist coalition theory to include atypically developing 
children.  Study One extended past research (Hartley & Allen, 2014; Tek et al., 2008) by 
including a more varied CA and VMA range of children with ASD and a DD control 
group.  Study Two was the first to explore the function bias in children with ASD and 
DD.   
Like TD children, children with ASD use word-learning constraints.  However, 
these emerge according to a different developmental process from TD children; children 
with ASD are delayed showing the shape bias and deviant showing the function bias.  
Unexpectedly, however, this deviance relates to showing a function bias earlier than TD 
children and then seemingly losing this ability, rather than never showing a function bias 
at all.  Surprisingly, DD children were also deviant showing a function bias but in a 
different way from children with ASD; neither the low nor high VMA cohort showed the 
heuristic.  These results suggest that the function bias develops earlier than typical in 
children with ASD but might never develop in DD children.  The General Discussion will 
explore the results of Studies One and Two in more depth.     
As stated within Chapter One, word learning is achieved by an interaction 
between the object, speaker and environment.  The last two chapters have focused 




primarily on the role the object plays within children’s word learning; specifically 
perceptual (i.e. shape) and conceptual (i.e. function) factors.  As the same types of object 
often possess the same shape, the shape bias is a more useful characteristic than 
classifying objects according to colour, texture, size or other perceptual attributes.  
Children also rely on cues which are more conceptual to help them learn words, such as 
the function bias, categorising objects according to the role they fulfil.  This is 
particularly helpful for facilitating children’s language acquisition when the same kind of 
object possesses a different shape, as is often the case with subordinate and superordinate 
categories.   
Although word-learning constraints such as the shape bias and function bias are 
important for children’s language acquisition, children also use other types of cues to help 
them learn words.  Indeed, while word-learning constraints emphasise characteristics of 
the object itself (e.g. shape and function), others argue that the speaker is of vital 
importance; children learn words from social cues produced by the speaker, such as eye 
gaze and pointing.  Others stress the importance of environmental cues, which highlight 
attention towards the object, such as an arrow positioned towards the object or object 
illumination.  The next three studies investigate the effect of social cues (Study Three), 
associative cues (Study Four) and conflicting social and associative cues (Study Five) on 
children’s word learning.  This begins with the effect of the speaker gazing and pointing 
at the target object as they name it, which is explored in the next chapter.   
  




Chapter Four: Word learning from social cues across atypical development:  
Pathways of delay or deviance? 





Figure 4.1: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object-  
environment interaction for word learning.  Study Three will focus on the ‘speaker’, 
Study Four will focus on the ‘environment’ and Study Five will focus on both the 
‘speaker’ and ‘environment’ aspects of the triad. 
 
While the previous two studies have explored the effect of the object (i.e. the 
shape bias and function bias) on children’s word learning, the next three studies explore 
the effect of the speaker (Study Three), environment (Study Four) and interaction 








eye gaze and pointing towards an object helps children learn words, the next study 
investigates how children learn words from an arrow positioned towards an object and the 
object lighting up and Study Five investigates whether children prioritise one cue over 
another when a social cue occurs towards one object and an associative cue occurs 
towards the other (e.g. the speaker looks at one object at the same time as there is an 
arrow positioned towards the other). 
As discussed within Chapter One, the emergentist coalition model stresses that 
different types of cue interlink to help children learn words and that children manifest 
these cues at different developmental time points.  It predicts that TD infants learn words 
from association but they prioritise social over associative cues from 18-24 months 
(Hollich et al., 2000).  As the TD children included within this research all have a CA and 
VMA of two or above, they are all predicted to learn words from social cues within this 
study and to prioritise social cues over association in Study Five.  However, for Study 
Four they were expected to choose the object suggested by the associative cue, being able 
to learn via simple associative principles in the absence of any conflicting social 
pragmatic information.   
Although the TD children are predicted to use social pragmatics for word 
learning, children with ASD show word learning delays relative to their TD peers (e.g. 
Eigsti et al., 2011).  They were also delayed showing a shape bias.  Therefore, they are 
predicted to learn words from association, rather than referential intent for a longer 
developmental time point than TD children.  If word learning from social cues is delayed 




in ASD, the high VMA children with ASD are predicted to learn words from the social 
cues in Study Three, but not the low VMA children with ASD.  In contrast, if word 
learning from social cues is deviant in ASD, both high and low VMA children with the 
disorder are predicted to perform at chance. 
Originally, the same hypotheses that were made for the TD children were made 
for the children with DD.  However, the results of the previous two studies suggest that 
DD children, as well as children with ASD, have difficulties learning words.  Along with 
the ASD cohort, DD children did not choose the shape match test object in the no name 
condition in Study One.  They also showed a function bias deviance in Study Two, with 
neither the high nor low VMA subcategory choosing the function match.  Therefore, DD 
children are also predicted to have difficulties learning words from Studies Three, Four 
and Five.  If the DD children exhibit word-learning deficits for all studies, this suggests a 
global impairment in language acquisition for these children. 
Taken together, Studies Three, Four and Five aim to explore how children learn 
words from social cues and association.  The emergentist coalition model is extended to 
include children with ASD and DD.  Atypically developing populations have been under 
researched within the emergentist coalition model, with a few exceptions.  For example, 
Baron-Cohen et al., (1997) found that two-year-old children with ASD form word-object 
mappings according to the object within their own focus, rather than the speaker’s.  
Further, Hennon (2003) found that three-year-old children with ASD form word-object 
mappings towards a perceptually salient object, even if the speaker is gazing at another 




artefact.  These studies build on this research, to investigate children’s word learning 
from a wider variety of cues (eye gaze, pointing, arrows and object illumination) and 
include an additional control group of DD children.   
 




Figure 4.2: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object environment interaction 
for word learning.  This study will focus on the ‘speaker’ aspect of the triad. 
 
Even from infancy, TD children are very sociable.  They prefer to look at faces 
rather than other objects from birth (Fantz, 1963; Johnson & Morton, 1991), follow the 
head direction of others from just six-months-old (D’Entremont, Hains & Muir, 1997) 
and show sensitivity to consistency in terms of people’s emotions and actions (e.g. happy 








Westermann, 2013).  From around eighteen-months-old, cues such as eye gaze and 
pointing become important social signals for children’s word learning (Baldwin, 1991; 
1993; Baldwin & Moses, 2006; Baron-Cohen, 1994; Beier & Spelke, 2012; D’Entremont 
et al., 1997; Kleinke, 1986; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Tomasello, 1999; Trevarthen, 
2004).  When witnessing a speaker utter a novel label (e.g. ‘a blicket!’) who is 
simultaneously gazing or pointing towards one of several novel objects, a child can 
discern the referent of that novel label by a process of referential intent, assuming that the 
speaker intends to refer to the object they are gazing or pointing towards (e.g. Baldwin, 
1991; 1993; Bloom, 2000; Briganit & Cohen, 2011; Houston-Price et al., 2006; Yale & 
Mundy, 1998).   
In contrast to TD children, some studies suggest that children with ASD do not 
automatically scan the face and eyes when an actor is viewing an object (Riby et al., 
2013) and fail to learn words from eye gaze (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Preissler & Carey, 
2005).  This extends to children at risk for developing ASD (Gliga, Elsabbagh, Hudry, 
Charman & Johnson, 2012). Conversely, recent studies provide evidence to suggest that 
children with ASD can attend to (Gillespie-Smith, Doherty-Sneddon, Hancock & Riby, 
2014) and form word-object mappings from (e.g. Bani Hani et al., 2012; Bean Ellawadi & 
McGregor, 2015; Luyster & Lord, 2009; Mcgregor et al., 2013; Norbury et al., 2010) eye 
gaze, as can adults with ASD (Aldaqre, Paulus & Sodian, in press).  
One possibility for these conflicting results, as suggested by Luyster and Lord 
(2009), is that children with ASD now have greater exposure to word learning 




interventions, which emphasise the importance of language development (e.g. Rogers, 
2006).  Furthermore, children with ASD have been found to be better able to form word-
object mappings from eye gaze when they are presented with multiple trials, rather than 
just one trial (Bean Ellawadi & McGregor, 2015).  Another explanation is that the 
variation between studies reflects differences in terms of children’s age and language 
ability.  The participants recruited in Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) had mean expressive and 
receptive language ages of two and the participants in Preissler and Carey (2005) had a 
mean comprehension vocabulary of 23 months.  In contrast, participants in Akechi et al., 
(2011) had a mean verbal mental age (VMA) of eight and participants in Norbury et al., 
(2010) had a mean VMA of seven.   
Thus, it might be the case that children with ASD learn words from gaze, but only 
when they have a higher VMA than TD children, suggesting that word learning via this 
social cue is delayed rather than deviant in ASD.  Supporting this proposal, attention to 
eyes is positively correlated with socio-communicative skills in children with ASD 
(Gillespie-Smith et al., 2014).  In order to test whether verbal ability facilitates word 
learning from gaze, it is necessary to recruit participants of different levels of VMA.  It is 
also important to explore children’s CA to help tease apart if any differences observed in 
children with ASD relative to TD children are due to variation in age and/or language 
ability.  My first research hypothesis tests the distinction between delay and deviance in 
children with ASD.  If word learning from social cues is deviant in ASD it may never 
occur, if it is delayed it occurs, but at a later stage than observed in TD children.   




 Although the evidence regarding whether children with ASD learn words from 
gaze is conflicting, they can use other social cues to learn words, specifically pointing 
(e.g. Akechi et al., 2013; Travis & Sigman, 2001).  However, the process by which 
children with ASD use and interpret pointing might be through association, simply 
pairing stimuli in the environment, rather than referential intent (e.g. Samuelson & Smith, 
1998).  They are able to point to request an object (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Mundy, 1995).  
Yet, unlike TD children (Baron-Cohen, 1989) or children with developmental (Mundy, 
Sigman & Kasari, 1994) or language delays (Landry & Loveland, 1988; Loveland & 
Laundry, 1986), they do not point to share enjoyment or interest in an object with 
someone else.  This suggests that children with ASD may use pointing simply in order to 
get their needs met, and lack an understanding of its broader social context. 
In contrast, TD children point at things not only because they want them but also 
to influence people’s mental states and promote joint attention (Tomasello et al., 2007).  
From as young as nine-months-old, infants understand the communicative nature of 
pointing, looking longer when a recipient picks up a different object than the one an actor 
has previously pointed to.  However, they do not show this effect when the recipient has 
not previously viewed the actor pointing or used a fist instead of a point towards the 
object (Krehm, Onishi & Voulou-Manos, 2014).  This indicates both that infants 
understand pointing from the perspective of another and that referential intent underlies 
their comprehension of pointing; other perceptually salient gestures or props do not have 
the same effect (see also Hala & Russell, 2001).   




Furthermore, 1-2 year-old TD infants chose the correct container for a hidden toy 
when the experimenter ostensively gazed (repeatedly turned her head from the container 
back to the child) or both gazed and pointed (Behne et al., 2005).  However, when the 
gaze was ‘absent minded’ (glancing at the container with a distracted facial expression) 
and the point was ‘distracted’ (looking at her hand instead of the child) children chose at 
chance between the target and distractor container, suggesting that referential intent 
underlies TD children’s understanding of pointing.  However, little is known about the 
distinction between these scenarios in children with ASD, and thus my second hypothesis 
addresses this question by comparing different pointing and gaze cues.  Specifically, as 
well as presenting gaze and pointing cues singularly, one type of trial couples the two 
cues, to establish if the combination of two social cues has an effect on children’s word 
learning.  Furthermore, this study employs two different types of pointing trials; pointing 
direct, where the speaker looks straight ahead and pointing incidental, where the speaker 
looks off into the distance, as though momentarily distracted (See Section 4.3).   
In order to establish whether any differences in word learning from social cues are 
specific to ASD it is necessary to also study children with other developmental disorders 
(DD), just as it was with the shape and function bias in Studies One and Two.  Evidence 
is mixed regarding understanding of social cues in these children.  One study (John & 
Mervis, 2010) replicated the findings of Behne et al., (2005) with children with DD (in 
this case, Williams Syndrome and Down Syndrome).  Other research suggests that 
children with developmental language delay show significantly more pointing when 




requesting something than children with ASD (Landry & Loveland, 1988; Loveland & 
Landry, 1986).  In contrast, other studies have found that children at risk for having DD 
have impairments understanding eye gaze (Arens et al., 2005) and DD children have 
difficulties understanding pointing (Laing et al., 2002).  This raises the question of 
whether difficulties processing social cues by children with ASD stem from their autism 
or general cognitive impairment. My third research aim concerns this difference. 
One must encode the word-referent links, independent of any environmental or 
social cues, in order to learn words.  For example, infants notice object positioning 
(Canfield & Haith, 1991; Johnson & Tucker, 1996), and learn words for stimuli with 
predictable rather than varied locations (Benitez & Smith, 2012).  TD infants prioritise 
goal directed action over consistency of object location (Moore, 1999; Woodward, 1998; 
Woodward & Guajardo, 2002).  Woodward’s classic study shows that after originally 
viewing a hand grasping at a toy, infants looked longer when the hand later reached in the 
same location for a different toy than when the hand reached in a different location for the 
same toy (Woodward, 1998).  This is useful as location is generally unimportant for 
naming.  A ball is a ball, for example, if it rolls from the left to the right of the floor and a 
chair does not suddenly become a ball if it moves from one position to another.   
Context may play a different role for atypically developing children, who may 
instead encode more superficial properties such as the consistency between the location 
and the object.  Such associative learning would predict word learning errors (see Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997).  My fourth hypothesis examines the role of spatio-temporal location 




for word learning in atypical development by manipulating the final location of a target 
stimulus.  For half of the trials, the target and distractor object are presented in the same 
position as previously shown, for the other half of the trials, the position of the objects 
reverses (so the object originally on the left of the screen now appears on the right and the 
object originally on the right of the screen now appears on the left).  It is hypothesised 
that the TD and DD children form ‘word-to-object’ mappings, performing above chance 
for both the same and reversed position trials.  However, the children with ASD are 
predicted to form ‘word-to-location’ mappings, only performing above chance for the 
same position trials.      
 
4.3. Description of the present study 
This study investigated word learning from social cues (specifically, eye gaze and 
pointing) in TD children, children with ASD and those with DD.  Participants were 
shown a video of a speaker uttering a novel word for one out of two objects at the same 
time as gazing and/or pointing at it.   In order to explore my first hypothesis (delay vs. 
deviance), participants were split into ‘low’ and ‘high’ VMA subgroups according to the 
median VMA of the sample.   To address my second research question regarding the 
referential nature of pointing, we incorporated trials in which the speaker directed his 
gaze ahead (Direct Pointing) or away from the point (Incidental Pointing).  I also 
compared pointing to gaze cues, to explore the relative impact of these skills on word 
learning.   




Based upon the possibility that only older and more verbally able children with 
ASD learn words from gaze (e.g. Luyster & Lord, 2009; Mcgregor et al., 2013; Norbury 
et al., 2010), children with ASD are predicted to show a unique delay in forming word-
object mappings from this cue.  I predict that children with ASD will be able to learn 
from pointing, but they will be unable to distinguish between Direct vs. Incidental 
Pointing.  I also expect that all groups will benefit from the conjunction of gaze with 
pointing.  Indeed, children with ASD have been found to learn words from eye gaze when 
this co-occurs with other cues (Akechi et al., 2011; Akechi et al., 2013; Parish-Morris et 
al., 2007).  Inclusion of a DD control group will allow me to tease apart the effects of 
cognitive delay vs. ASD, which is my third aim.  If deficits in using social cues are 
specific to ASD, then the performance of the DD group should mirror the TD counterpart.  
However, if any social deficits arise due to general cognitive impairment, I expect no 
difference between our two atypical groups.  
With respect to my fourth and final aim, I hypothesise that children with ASD will 
find word learning particularly difficult when the spatio-temporal position of an object 
changes.   Given that individuals with DD have also been shown to learn via associative 
properties of stimuli (Remington, 1996), I expect to see deterioration in performance 
when the object changes location between encoding and test trials in both atypical 
populations, but not in TD controls.  Overall, this study will attempt to elucidate the 
relative effects of different social cues on word learning in typical and atypical 
development, and identity whether any differences are specific to ASD. 




4.4. Method  
4.4.1. Participants  
Children were recruited from eight specialist schools (participants with ASD and 
DD), one ASD unit within a mainstream school (participants with ASD) two mainstream 
schools and two day nurseries (TD children) and tested in North West England.  
Lancaster University granted ethical permission to carry out the research.  The children’s 
parents gave informed consent for their child to participate.  A total of 78 children took 
part in the study (TD, N = 30: ASD, N = 27: DD, N = 21).  Fifty-five participants were 
male (18 TD, 23 ASD, 14 DD) and 23 were female (12 TD, 4 ASD, 7 DD).  An 
additional five children were excluded from the study for non-compliance and/or 
insufficient cognitive ability to be able to understand the tasks.    
All children with ASD and DD had received a clinical diagnosis by a qualified 
educational or clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (e.g. Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised: Lord et al., 
2002; Lord et al., 1994) and expert clinical judgment.  The children with DD had various 
developmental disabilities, the majority having learning difficulties or developmental 
delay, sometimes alongside other conditions, such as Down syndrome or rarer 
chromosomal disorders.  Participants were grouped as TD, ASD or DD.  In order to 
establish if word learning from social cues is delayed in ASD, the groups were then 
further subcategorised according to the median VMA of the sample (4.87) (Table 9), into 
three ‘low VMA’ and three ‘high VMA’ groups.  




Table 9  
Participant demographic details  
 
 
    
 
        
4.4.2. Design 
A 3 (Group; TD, ASD, DD) × 4 (Trial Type; Eye Gaze, Direct Pointing, 
Inconsistent Pointing and Eye Gaze + Pointing) × 2 (Object Position; Same vs. Reversed) 
Mixed Factorial design was employed.  
 
 TD ASD DD 
 Low 
VMA 
































































































4.4.3. Cognitive Tests  
Children were administered the British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Second Edition 
(BPVS-II; Dunn et al., 1997) in order to ascertain their VMA.  Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (Raven’s; Raven, 2003) was also given in order to ascertain their non-verbal 
reasoning ability (minimum raw score of 0 and maximum of 36).  The three groups had 
equivalent VMA’s (all p >.05).  The low and high VMA groups were all matched to each 
other in term of language ability. 
 
4.4.4. CARS and SCQ scales  
For the majority of children, a parent or teacher completed the CARS (Schloper et 
al., 1988) (17 TD, 20 ASD, 14 DD) and the lifetime version of the SCQ (Rutter et al., 
2003) (17 TD, 18 ASD, 15 DD) to confirm or rule out ASD.  Scores on the CARS range 
from 15-60, with scores of 30 or above in the ASD range.  Scores on the SCQ range from 
0 – 39, with scores of 15 or above in the ASD range.  Almost all of the children scored 
according to their diagnostic category on at least one of the questionnaires, with only one 
child (ASD) not scoring according to their diagnosis on either scale.  However, he had 
been officially diagnosed with ASD, and removing him from the analyses led to almost 








4.4.5. Materials  
The video (see Figure 9 for an example eye gaze + pointing trial) was created 
which showed a speaker seated at a table covered with a white tablecloth.  The novel 
objects were later superimposed onto the video, using iMovie, with one novel object to 
the speaker’s left and one novel object to the speaker’s right.  A powerpoint presentation 
of the two objects side by side, with a white background, was then shown.  For half of the 
trials, the objects appeared in the same spatial location as shown on the previous video, 
while for the remaining half of the trials, the position of the objects had reversed.  The 
videos were edited and transfered onto a 1090×1080 laptop computer.   
 
Fig. 9. Example image of an eye gaze + pointing trial  




4.4.6. Procedure  
Participants completed the experimental and background measures in a quiet area 
of their school or day nursery.  Task order was counterbalanced.  In some cases, the 
child’s parent or a member of teaching staff was also present in the room.  These adults 
were instructed to simply watch the study and avoid intervening in any way.  Participants 
viewed one of four videos, each containing eight trials but a different task order.   
For the first three seconds of the video, the speaker looked directly ahead, with his 
arms by his side.  After three seconds, the speaker uttered ‘There’s a modi (fep/peri/ 
zav/toma/riff/tog/neem)’, at the same time as producing a social cue.  For two trials, he 
directed his eye gaze towards the target object, for two trials he ‘directly pointed’ at the 
target object (keeping his eye gaze directed straight ahead), for two trials he ‘incidentially 
pointed’ (gazing off into the distance in the opposite direction of the point) at the target 
object and for two trials he directed both his eye gaze and direct pointing at the target 
object.   
The speaker then stated, for instance, ‘it’s a modi!’  Following this, he stopped 
gazing and/or pointing at the object.  His gaze returned to the centre of the screen and/or 
his hands returned by his side.   
The child then viewed a still image powerpoint presentation of the two objects 
side by side, with a white background.  For half of the trials, the objects appeared in the 
same spatial location as shown on the previous video, while for the remaining half of the 
trials, the position of the objects had reversed. The experimenter asked the child to ‘show 




me a modi’.  Correct responses were classed as a correct point or verbal description.  
Once the child had provided their response, the experimenter moved the video on to the 
next trial.   
Due to technical issues, one child with ASD and one child with DD did not 
complete the reversed direct pointing trial and one child with ASD did not complete the 
reversed pointing inconsistent trial.   
The order the novel words were spoken, the position of the target object (left or 
right of the speaker) and the object chosen to be the target and distracter were all 
counterbalanced, although the same two objects were always paired together.  Thus, for 
counterbalancing purposes, four different videos were created.   
 
4.5. Results    
Children’s responses were summed over trials and converted into proportions, as 
three children failed to complete all trials.  For all analyses, each group was subdivided 
into ‘high’ and ‘low’ VMA to test the delay vs. deviance hypothesis and results for each 
cue were compared to a chance level of .50 for each trial.  I also compared group and 
level of VMA for each cue type using ANOVA.  Results for all four trial types are 
depicted in Figure 10 (entire sample; TD, ASD and DD).  Table 10 depicts results for the 
high and low VMA groups. 
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Table 10  













*p <.05.   **p <.01***p <.001. 
 
4.5.1. Eye Gaze 
First, I compared performance for each group against chance using one-sample-t-
tests.8  Both groups of TD children (TD low-VMA, t(18) = 6.25, p <.001, d = 1.42: TD 
                                                        
8 We acknowledge that, if the more stringent Bonferroni correction is applied, using the value of .004 for 
each of the separate family of six comparisons, the results for four out of the 27 total significant 
comparisons become non-significant.  However, we did not do this following recent criticism against 
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high-VMA t(10) = 2.63, p = .025, d = .79) chose the target object.  However, only the 
high VMA children with ASD (t(16) = 5.61, p <.001, d = 1.36) and DD (t(10) = 5.16, p 
<.001, d = 1.57) did so (see Table 10).  This suggests that word learning from eye gaze is 
delayed in ASD and DD.  In order to further investigate this possibility, a 2 (VMA; High 
vs. Low) × 3 (Group; TD, ASD, DD) ANOVA was carried out.  This revealed a 
significant main effect of VMA  (F(1, 72) = 5.67, p = .002, ηp2 = .07).  The high VMA 
children (M = .85, SD = .28) chose the target object more than the low VMA children (M 
= .71, SD = .36).  I also found a borderline significant interaction (F(2, 72) = 3.07, p = 
.052, ηp2 = .08).  To unpack the interaction, I conducted independent t-tests, which 
showed that children with ASD with a higher VMA performed significantly better than 
those with a lower VMA (t(1) = 2.64, p=.014) (see Table 10). 
 
4.5.2. Pointing direct 
 One sample t-tests against chance showed that the TD-low VMA (t(18) = 5.72, p 
<.001, d = 1.32) and TD-high VMA (t(10) = 5.73, p = .004, d = 1.13) participants selected 
the target object, as did ASD-high VMA children (t(16) = 10.95, p <.001, d = 2.59).  The 
results also approached significance for the ASD-low VMA group (t(9) = 2.24, p = .052, 
d = .71) although neither DD low nor DD high-VMA participants chose the target object.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
correcting for multiple t-tests on the grounds that this procedure inflates the risk of type 11 errors  (e.g. 
Nakagagawa, 2004; Rothman, 1990) or is simply not necessary (Perneger, 1998).  




In order to further investigate this deviance for the DD children, a 2 (VMA) × 3 (Group) 
ANOVA was performed.  This revealed a main effect of Group (F(1, 72) = 4.56, p = .014, 
ηp2 = .11).  Tukey Kramer tests showed that the children with DD performed significantly 
lower than both ASD (p=.014) and TD groups (p=.007). 
 
4.5.3. Pointing incidental 
Contrary to predictions, both groups of TD (low VMA, t(18) = 4.61, p <.001, d = 
1.07.  High VMA, t(10) = 5.16, p <.001, d = 1.57) and DD (low VMA, t(9) = 4.58, p = 
.001, d = 1.46.  High VMA, t(10) = 3.46, p = .006, d = 1.04) children chose the target 
object.  As predicted, both groups of children with ASD chose the target object (low 
VMA, t(9) = 4.58, p = .001, d = 1.46.  High VMA, t(16) = 8.64, p <.001, d = 2.05) (see 
Table 10).  However, the ANOVA by VMA and Group showed no differences.   
 
4.5.4. Eye gaze and pointing 
One sample t-tests showed that the DD-high VMA participants performed at 
chance, although all other subcategories chose the target object (TD-low VMA, t(18) = 
12.37, p <.001, d = 2.81.  TD-high VMA, t(10) = 5.16, p <.001, d = 1.57: ASD-low 
VMA, t(9) = 9.00, p <.001, d = 2.81: ASD-high VMA, t(16) = 5.61, p <.001, d = 1.36: 
DD-low VMA, t(9) = 4.58, p = .001, d = 1.46) (see Table 10).  To test for overall Group 
or VMA differences, an ANOVA was conducted, which revealed main effects for both 
Group (F(2,72) = 5.18, p =.008, ηp2 = .13) and VMA (F(1,72) = 6.41, p = .014, ηp2 = 




.08).  The high VMA children chose the target object less often than the low VMA 
children (p <.001).  Tukey tests showed that the DD children chose the target object less 
often than the TD children (p = .007) and children with ASD (p = .005).   
 
4.5.5. Same position and Reversed position trials 
As there was only a single trial of each type within each cue, the trial types were 
collapsed for this analysis, with the exception of the ‘pointing incidental’ trials, which 
were omitted.  This was because there was no ‘correct’ answer for this trial type, with TD 
and DD children expected to perform at chance.  One-sample-t-tests showed that both 
groups of TD children (TD-low VMA, t(18) = 13.11, p <.001, d = 2.00, TD-high VMA 
t(10) = 4.19, p = .002, d = 1.25) and children with ASD (ASD low-VMA: t(9) = 6.56, p 
<.001, d = 2.00.  ASD high-VMA: t(16) = 9.16, p <.001, d = 2.21) and the DD-high 
VMA (t(10) = 3.06, p = .012, d = .94) children chose the target object when the objects 
were in the same position (see Table 11).  Both groups of TD children (TD-low VMA 
t(18) = 6.32, p <.001, d = 1.48.  TD-high VMA, t(10) = 4.52, p <.001, d = 1.39) and the 
ASD-high VMA children also chose the target (t(16) = 7.68, p <.001, d = 1.90) for the 









Table 11  
Mean proportion of times (SD) children chose the target object for the same and reversed 
position trials for six groups 
*p <.05.   **p <.01***p <.001. 
  
A 2 (Object Position; Same vs. Reversed) × 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) mixed 
ANOVA revealed an effect of Object Position (F(1, 72) = 11.32, p = .001, ηp2 = .14).  
Children were more likely to choose the target object for the same (M = .86, SD = .25) 
than reversed (M = .76, SD = .28) position trials.  There was no main effect of group, and 
no interaction. 
 
4.5.6. Correlations between object position, CA, VMA and NVMA  
In order to see if word learning from social cues was related to children’s CA and 
NVMA, children were assigned a total proportion of correct responses for all trials 
combined, except for the pointing incidental cue, as there were no ‘correct’ answers for 
these trials.  
 TD ASD DD 
 Low VMA High VMA Low VMA High VMA Low VMA High VMA 
Same  .93 (.14)*** .85 (.28)** .86 (.18)*** .92 (.19)*** .70 (.40) .79 (.31)* 
Reversed .84 (.23)*** .82 (.23)*** .65 (.32) .88 (.20)*** .63 (.33) .59 (.31) 




As children may have differed in terms of their responses to the same and reversed 
position trials, this analysis was carried out for the same and reversed position trials 
separately.  Thus, children were given a score out of 3, which was converted into a 
proportion for separate correlations for same and reversed position trials.   
For the reversed position trials, the proportion of correct responses was positively 
correlated with Raven’s score for the DD children (r(20) = .53, p = .017).  No other 
correlations were significant for any groups (see Table 12). 
 
Table 12: 
Correlations between proportion of correct responses and CA, VMA and NVMA for same 














































This study investigated the use of social cues, specifically eye gaze and pointing 
across typical and atypical development.  The main findings indicate that 1) typical and 
atypical children weighted the distinct social cues in different ways, 2) children with ASD 
were delayed learning words from eye gaze 3) surprisingly, children with DD were also 
delayed learning words from eye gaze and were deviant learning words from pointing, 
and 4) object position affected all three groups.  I discuss these findings in turn to provide 
an integrative account of the role of communicative intent for word learning across 
atypical and typical development. 
Across all groups, there are intriguing comparisons between trials.  Children 
performed well but were not at ceiling in the condition where gaze and pointing were 
synchronous.  Indeed, there was no advantage in this condition over either the pointing 
alone or gaze (without pointing).  This suggests that the one social cue is sufficient, given 
that in the pointing condition the experimenter is looking directly into the camera and in 
the gaze condition, the speaker is not providing any gestural information.   
Perhaps even more surprising is the finding that incidental pointing is an equally 
proficient cue as direct pointing, with all three subgroups of children choosing the target 
object above chance for the incidental pointing trials.  This was hypothesised for the 
children with ASD, who were predicted to not understand that the pointing was 
unintentional.  However, this result is unexpected for the TD children and children with 




DD, as previous research has found that these two groups of children ignore pointing and 
gaze gestures when they appear accidental (Behne et al., 2005; John & Mervis, 2010).   
This raises two possibilities: first, children may pick up on the pragmatic cues of a 
point, even when the speaker is looking away, and this extends even to children with 
ASD.  This is consistent with the more pragmatic accounts of pointing (e.g. Tomasello et 
al., 2007).  Alternatively, the pointing in this (and indeed other conditions) could prompt 
learning through associative connections (e.g. Samuelson & Smith, 1998).  To test these 
alternative hypotheses, further studies need to present children with a range of pragmatic 
vs. associative cues.   Nevertheless, this study shows that across conditions, typically 
developing children and their matched peers with ASD appear to respond similarly to a 
range of attentional cues. 
I did find differences in terms of the developmental trajectory of the use of the 
cues, in that only the children with ASD with a higher VMA were successful using gaze 
and pointing.  These results are consistent with reports showing that younger (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005) but not older children (Akechi et al., 2011; 
Norbury et al., 2010) with ASD have difficulties learning words from eye gaze.  It is 
worth noting, however, that the low VMA group had a mean VMA of almost 4 years, 
which is much greater than the age at which one would expect successful use of these 
strategies for word learning in typical development.  It is also possible that high VMA 
children with ASD have increased experience with word learning interventions, which 
focus specifically on joint attention (Prizant et al., 2002; Mundy et al., 1990).  




When gaze and pointing were coupled, the performance of the children with ASD 
mirrored the TD group.  Akechi et al (2013) showed that a point in combination with a 
gaze cue increased word-learning performance in ASD.  They leave open the question of 
whether pointing increases the salience of the speaker’s referential intent or whether 
instead children hone in on the point, to the exclusion of gaze.  In our study, we measured 
pointing when the actor gazed into the camera, therefore providing no gaze information 
and a direct test of these hypotheses.  We found that the older VMA children with ASD 
were successful, but results from the younger group only approached significance.  
Children with ASD were able to use a pointing cue when this was decoupled from gaze, 
but results only approached significance for the lower VMA subset.  
A potential reason as to why the results for the low VMA children with ASD only 
approached significance for the direct pointing but was significant for the incidental 
pointing is that children with ASD have an aversion to being looked at and looking at 
others faces (e.g. Dalton et al., 2005; Hanley et al., 2014; Hutt & Ounsted, 1966).  The 
only trials where the speaker looked towards the child as the object was named occurred 
for the direct pointing; for the gaze and gaze coupled with pointing trials he looked 
towards the object and for the pointing incidental condition he looked off into the 
distance.  Gaze aversion could be a contributing factor for why the children with ASD 
performed above chance for the pointing incidental but not pointing direct trials; in the 
pointing incidental condition the speaker was not looking at them, therefore they may 




have been able to concentrate more fully on the task, rather than avoiding the speaker’s 
eye gaze.    
Perhaps more surprising was that the DD children were so impaired at forming 
word-object mappings from social cues.  It is especially unexpected that they performed 
worse than the children with ASD for the pointing direct cue, given previous findings that 
DD children show a better understanding of pointing than children with ASD (Landry & 
Loveland, 1988; Loveland & Landry, 1986) and children with Down Syndrome and 
Williams Syndrome attribute communicative intent to gazing and pointing gestures (John 
& Mervis, 2010).   However, the results of this study support Arens et al., (2005), who 
found a limited understanding of gaze in infants at risk for DD and Laing et al., (2002) 
who found that children with Williams Syndrome were impaired following pointing.   
Several factors may contribute to the DD children’s difficulty with using social 
cues to form word-object mappings.  Perhaps children with DD are using different 
processes from TD children – and even children with ASD – to learn words.  Supporting 
this claim, Raven’s score was positively correlated with proportion of correct responses 
for the pointing consistent trials for the DD children only.  This seems to be driven by the 
reversed position trials, as the DD children’s performance on the same position trials was 
not correlated with the Raven’s.  Choosing the correct object for the reversed position 
trials may be related to spatial ability, as DD children possess poor spatial skills 
(Swanson, 1993).  




In addition to poor spatial skills, slow processing speed might contribute to the 
poor performance of the DD participants.  Slow processing speed is common in DD 
children, having been found to be present in children with Down Syndrome (Silverman, 
2007), specific language impairment (Miller, Kail, Leonard, & Tomblin, 2001), fetal 
alcohol syndrome (Burden, Jacobson & Jacobson, 2005) and who were born pre-term 
(Mulder, Pitchford & Marlow, 2011).  The DD participants in this study might have spent 
a longer length of time trying to make sense of the visual scene, which moved on too 
quickly for them to fully process.   
Slow processing speed may have particularly affected the pointing trials, as the 
speaker looked directly ahead while pointing.  If the DD children were fixated on the 
speaker’s face, expecting him to look at the object as he spoke, they may not have noticed 
his pointing gesture.  For the pointing inconsistent trials, the DD children may have 
noticed that the speaker’s face was fixating into the distance, without providing any social 
information and so were able to switch their own gaze to the speaker’s point more easily 
than in the pointing condition.  However, note that I did not include any measures of 
processing speed in this study, therefore this claim requires empirical testing.    
It is also the case that the DD children included in this study were very 
heterogeneous in terms of their disorder.  Children with different conditions sometimes 
show differing performance in tasks involving understanding social cues (John & Mervis, 
2005).  Thus, it is possible that a deficit in understanding pointing is not universal in DD 
children, but only occurs in certain DD’s.  Therefore, future work should aim to include a 




measure of processing speed and investigate understanding of eye gaze and pointing in 
groups of children with specific conditions, such as a whole cohort with intellectual 
disability or a whole cohort with Down Syndrome.  The heterogeneity of our sample 
might also explain why the lower VMA children could utilise synchronous gaze and 
pointing cues, but the higher VMA children were clearly at chance for these trials.  At the 
same time, the higher VMA children could follow gaze alone.  One further explanation of 
these findings is that children with DD may find it difficult to discern the meaning of and 
process two simultaneous cues (Kovattana & Kraemer, 1974) 
Although both groups of TD children learnt words from both the same and 
reversed position trials, only the high VMA children with ASD did so for the reversed 
position trials.  Like eye gaze, word learning from reversed position trials appears to be 
delayed in ASD.  This critical result suggests that, unlike TD children, children with ASD 
originally map words simply to spatial location, instead of taking into account higher-
level object properties such as the specific and unique appearance of the object.  This may 
help explain why children with ASD initially find it difficult to form and retain word-
object mappings.  This is not specific to ASD and may be an effect of more general 
cognitive delay, as children with DD were also unable to form word-object mappings 
from the reversed position trials.  
 In summary, this study has found that TD children learn words from both eye gaze 
and pointing.  Supporting past research, children with ASD learn words from pointing but 
have a delay learning words from eye gaze.  Children with DD also have a delay learning 




words from eye gaze, but an assumed deviance learning words from pointing.  Therefore, 
these findings suggest that DD children actually have more difficulty word learning from 
social cues than children with ASD and highlight the importance of including an 
additional control group of DD children in ASD research.  
The results for the TD children support the emergentist coalition model, which 
predicts that TD children learn words from social cues from two-years-old.  Surprisingly, 
however, the TD children also learnt words from the incidental pointing.  As previously 
discussed, this could be because they were learning words through association or because 
they assumed that the pointing must be intentional.  Studies Four (associative cues) and 
Five (conflicting cues) help explore in more detail whether TD children are associative, as 
well as social, word learners or whether they simply inferred referential intent from both 
types of pointing.  As the high VMA children with ASD learnt words from the gaze and 
pointing direct cue but the low VMA children with ASD did not, these results suggest 
that, like TD children, different cues are important at different developmental time points 
for children with ASD.  The findings also suggest a delay effect for word learning from 
social cues in ASD.  Study Four establishes whether the low VMA children with ASD 
rely on association rather than social cues for word learning, as the emergentist coalition 
model would predict.   
  




Chapter Five: Dumb associative mechanisms?  Are some associative cues stronger 
than others? 







Figure 5.1: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object – environment  
interaction for word learning.  This chapter will focus on the ‘environment’  
aspect of the triad. 
 
Study Three has established that, as expected, both high and low VMA TD 
children learnt words from social cues but only the high VMA children with ASD learnt 
words from the speaker’s gaze and pointing when the cues were presented singularly.  
These findings support the delay account of word learning with regards to children with 









support past research, which has found that TD children learn words from social cues 
from 18-24 months old (e.g. Hollich et al., 2000).   
In order to further investigate language acquisition in ASD, the current study 
explored how children learn words from associative cues, specifically an arrow and light, 
to see if one or both is/are sufficient cues, if they provide differential access to word 
learning and if word learning from these cues varies according to group (TD, ASD or 
DD).  For example, it might be the case that one cohort of children learn words from the 
arrow but not light, although the other two groups learn words from both type of cue.  
This may suggest that the cues differ in how they highlight attention. 
Although it is important to study word learning from referential intent, other 
factors also facilitate language acquisition.  Indeed, children cannot acquire words solely 
through cues such as eye gaze, as an estimated 30-50% of the time the speaker is not 
looking at the object they are naming (Bloom, 2000).  According to the associative 
learning account (e.g. Axelsson et al., 2012; McMurray, Horst, & Samuelson, 2012; 
Saffran et al., 1996; Samuelson & Smith, 1998; Smith et al., 1996), when a speaker utters 
a novel word, the child associates the word with the referent based on relative frequency 
and similarity with previously stored objects.  This theory stresses that children learn 
words not through referential intent but instead by ‘dumb associative mechanisms’, such 
as memory and attention (Samuelson & Smith, 1998; Smith et al., 1996).   
 Importantly, however, it might not be the case that any cue which highlights 
attention towards an object facilitates children’s word-object mappings.  Children may 




weigh some indicators more heavily than others.  Two of the studies discussed within the 
previous chapter; Woodward (1998) and Krehm et al., (2014) provide evidence for this, 
albeit in goal inference rather than word learning paradigms.   
 Woodward (1998) showed infants a scene in which an agent’s hands reach in 
either the same or a different location for a toy that has been moved.  In a habituation 
paradigm, infants looked longer when the hand reached in the same location for a 
different toy than in a different location for the same toy.  This effect was not found when 
inanimate objects, such as rods, were used (Woodward, 1998).  Similarly, Krehm et al., 
(2014) found that infants look longer when a recipient picks up a different object from the 
one an actor has previously pointed to, but this effect is not found when the actor uses a 
fist instead of a point.   
 Taken together, these studies (Krehm et al., 2014; Woodward, 1998) suggest that 
children do not place equal weighting on all cues within goal inference paradigms, 
recognising that only humans have goals.  In Woodward et al., (1998), the children do not 
expect non-human agents to reach for the same toy; therefore an associative cue is not 
sufficient in this scenario.  In Krehm et al., (2014), the participants knew that a fist is not 
a socially conventional cue to indicate an object, thus they were not surprised when the 
recipient picked up a different object in this context.  However, further research is 
needed, in order to establish if the findings that children attend to some types of 
associative sign more than others extend to word learning paradigms, older participants 
than the infants previously tested and atypically developing children. 




 Just as cues from the speaker can facilitate goal inference, specific cues within the 
environment are also important in facilitating word-object mappings.  Signs act as 
physical markers, which give a direct indication as to what is being referred to (Syal & 
Jindal, 2007).  Peirce (1931) identified three kinds of sign; icon, index and symbol.  
Iconic signs possess a resemblance of the thing they portray, such as a picture of a face.  
Index signs are correlated to the thing that they represent, such as tears indicating sadness.  
Symbols involve using something to represent something else (DeLoache, 2004).  The 
thing being referred to is connected with the thing doing the referring only by a somewhat 
arbitrary convention (Bruner, 1966; Peirce, 1931). 
 Of the three types of sign identified by Peirce (1931), word learning primarily 
takes place through attending to symbols, although there are occasions where iconic or 
index cues are involved in language acquisition.  Onomatopoeic words, for example, act 
as icons.  Further, someone may utter ‘book’ in the presence of a book, in which case it 
serves as an index cue, as the word correlates with seeing the object.  According to the 
association account, children learn words from cues such as eye gaze and pointing not 
due to referential intent, but because they act as directives towards the object being 
named.   
 Perceptually salient stimuli may also act as directives between the signifier (e.g. 
an arrow) and the signified (e.g. novel object) (see Figure 11).  Although this relationship 
could be considered dyadic, consisting only of the relationship between the cue and object 
(Saussure, 1983), importantly, someone needs to interpret these signs as relevant to word 




learning; otherwise they are meaningless (Peirce, 1931).  Therefore, a triadic relationship 
takes place, between the signifier, signified and person interpreting the sign (see Figure 
11).  Figure 11 can be read in two ways.  If the person is the child, s/he has to link the 
signifier (arrow) with the signified (starry object).  In that sense the relationship between 
the two need only be an associational one.   
 Alternatively, Figure 11 can also depict what the child sees on the screen in 
studies 3-5.  The child views a human agent, presumably with referential intent, naming 
the novel object.  The arrow in Figure 11 coincides with this utterance, thus the arrow 
may not be purely associational in its link with the object.  Indeed, an adult observer 
might infer that the agent is helping them to signal which of the two objects is being 
identified.   
 I will return to this issue in the discussion (section 5.5.).  For now, I will assume 
that the child need only link the label, the signifier and the signified.  Furthermore, 
importantly, this paradigm only works if the speaker’s naming is perceived as being 
intentional, as in Studies 3-5; the same effect is not found when the voice is disembodied 
from the word learning situation, such as someone speaking on the telephone (Baldwin et 












SIGNIFIER    SIGNIFIED 
Figure 11: Visual interpretation of how associative cues can facilitate word 
learning.  

Word learning from perceptual salience and cross-situational consistency may 
help explain how children with ASD are able to acquire language.  These children have 
difficulties inferring referential intent (D’Entremont & Yasbek, 2007; Prizant & 
Wetherby, 1987) and forming word-object mappings from social cues (e.g. Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  Study Three showed that they are delayed forming 
word-object mappings from a speaker’s gaze and, to a lesser extent, pointing.   
Despite difficulties learning words from social cues, research suggests that 
children with ASD form word-object mappings from statistical input (Mayo & Eigsti, 
2012).  Furthermore, they respond to arrows in reflective orienting paradigms (Rombough 
& Iarocci, 2013; Senju et al., 2004; Vlamings et al., 2005), which measure participants’ 




tendency to look towards a location after it has been cued (correctly or incorrectly) by a 
stimulus such as an arrow or direction of the interlocutor’s eye gaze. As has been stated 
earlier, children with ASD may even use an arrow, rather than eye gaze, to infer a 
character’s goals and desires (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995).  If simple perceptual salience 
facilitates language acquisition in children with ASD, then it would be predicted that any 
cue drawing attention to a target object would cause children to form word-object 
mappings towards this object.   
However, other than arrows, the question of whether associative signs facilitate 
word learning in children with ASD has been largely overlooked.  One study which 
contrasted an objects’ perceptual salience with a speaker’s eye gaze (Hennon, 2003) will 
be described in the next chapter because it more directly relates to association conflicting 
with social cues.  The role association per se plays in facilitating word learning in 
children with ASD has previously been explored in both intervention programs, such as 
Applied Behavioural Analysis or ABA (Lovaas, 1987) and past literature on ASD (e.g. 
Parrish-Morris et al., 1997; Preissler, 2008; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  The present study 
aimed to extend these earlier studies by investigating different associative indicators (i.e. 
an arrow and a light), which has not been so fully explored within the ASD literature.   
There has been some research exploring word learning from associative cues – 
other than arrows - in TD children.  These include object illumination (Axelsson et al., 
2012), object motion (Houston-Price, Plunkett & Duffy, 2006; Moore et al., 1999) and 
perceptual salience (Hollich et al., 2000).  Axelsson et al., (2012) investigated children’s 




word learning and retention in four contexts; a target object was illuminated, a target 
object was illuminated and two distractor objects were covered over, the distractor objects 
were covered over, the experimenter pointed at a target object.   
Children formed word-object mappings and maintained these over time from 
object illumination when presented alone and when presented alongside the covering over 
of the distractor objects.  However, children formed word-object mappings but did not 
maintain these over time when the distractor objects were covered over alone and when 
the experimenter pointed at a target object.  This suggests that, while both pointing and 
object illumination help TD children initially form word-object mappings, they are more 
likely to remember the names of target objects when they are highlighted by object 
illumination, rather than pointing.  Hence, in some cases association may facilitate 
children’s word retention more than social cues.   
Although it is surprising that the participants did not maintain word-object 
mappings from pointing in Axelsson et al., (2012), note that the children formed word-
object mappings from all four cue types, suggesting that both pointing and object 
illumination helps children learn words, although only object illumination facilitated 
children remembering these word-object mappings over time.  Further, the children 
included in Axelsson et al., (2012) were relatively young (24-months-old).  Therefore, 
they may only just have been at the stage where they utilise social cues for word learning 
(e.g. Hollich et al., 2000; Moore, Angelopoulos & Bennett, 1999), still relying primarily 




on association for retention.  It is possible that older children than the participants in 
Axelsson et al., (2012) would maintain the word-object mapping from the pointing cue.   
Axelsson et al. (2012) only recruited TD children as participants, thus it is 
unknown whether object illumination would facilitate word learning in children with 
ASD and DD.  Further, although they included a condition where the salience of the 
distractors were dampened, they did not explore the effect of conflicting salience towards 
different targets, such as object illumination towards one object at the same time as an 
arrow is positioned towards the other.  It is important to investigate contrasting 
associative cues in order to establish if children weigh one type of cue more heavily for 
word learning than another.   
If this is the case, this would suggest that it is not association per se that is 
facilitating children’s word object-mappings but something specific about certain 
indicators.  For example, TD children might learn words more easily from positioning an 
arrow towards an object than simply making an object perceptually salient, due to 
awareness that objects that are exciting to look at are not necessarily the objects being 
named.  Alternatively, children might learn words from associative cues equally, 
suggesting that ‘dumb associationist mechanisms’ facilitate word-object mappings.   
Individuals with ASD might be particularly likely to learn words from one type of 
associative cue but not others.  As previously discussed, past research has tended to focus 
on arrows in this population, finding that they attend strongly to this cue (e.g. Baron-
Cohen et al., 1995; Rombough & Iarocci, 2013; Vlamings et al, 2005).  It is possible that 




there is something about arrows per se which children with ASD are attracted to and the 
same effect would not be found with other associative cues.  Children with ASD tend to 
have unimpaired spatial skills (e.g. Frith, 1989; Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & 
Frith, 1993) and arrows are commonly used to signal directional information.  Thus 
arrows may provide good spatial reference for children with ASD.   
Furthermore, arrows are conventional, frequently seen within society and possess 
a strong spatial meaning (Hommel, Pratt, Colzato & Godijn, 2001).  The physical 
appearance of an arrow bears some resemblance to the physical appearance of a pointing 
gesture.  Therefore, presenting an arrow cue parallels the more human scenario of 
pointing.  Of course, this may apply to all groups, but they need to be compared to 
explore the issue further.  
The present paradigm explores the effect of two types of associative cue – 
positioning an arrow by the object and the object lighting up - on the word learning of TD 
children, children with ASD and DD children.  I chose to investigate arrows as a baseline, 
as these are commonly explored within the literature.  However, past studies have tended 
to focus on reflective orienting (e.g. Senju et al., 2004) and inferring a character’s goals 
and desires (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1995), thus this study extends this to word learning.  
As discussed within the previous paragraph, arrows are also a common directional cue 
and thus would be easily recognisable and familiar to the children.  Furthermore, the 
arrow used within this study provides a parallel to the direct pointing, which was explored 
in Study Three. 




I also chose to extend the work of Axelsson et al., (2012) by investigating object 
illumination.  This provides a ‘softer’ form of associative cue from the arrow.  The light is 
non-directional but ‘on’ the object, whereas the arrow is purely directional.  The stimuli 
are illustrated in Figure 12 within the methodology section and consist of a red arrow 
which is slightly curved to reduce perceptual salience, with a patch or red (exactly the 
same colour) which encircles the object for the same time as the arrow.  This way I was 
able to compare the salience of the two comparable stimuli.  The colour of the arrow is 
also consistent with Baron-Cohen et al., (1997), who used a red arrow in their paradigm. 
   
5.2. Description of the present study 
This study investigates word learning from associative cues and whether 
children’s word learning is facilitated more from one type of cue than another.  As with 
Study Three (see Chapter 4), children are shown a video of a speaker and two objects, 
with the speaker uttering a novel word to refer to one of the objects (e.g. ‘there’s a kela’), 
as a cue is produced.  The objects are then shown, side by side, and the children select the 
‘kela’.  As in Study Three, for half of the trials the objects are positioned in the same 
location as in the earlier video, while for the remaining half of the trials, the objects are in 
reversed position.  As explained within Study Three, this manipulation took place in order 
to establish if children formed word-to-referent mappings (in which case, they would be 
predicted to choose the target object for both the same and reversed position trials) or 




word-to-location mappings (in which case, they would be predicted to only choose the 
target object for the same position trials).     
In order to test the delay vs. deviance hypothesis, the children are split into low 
and high VMA subcategories.  Study Three found that children with ASD need a higher 
VMA than TD children to learn words from social cues, supporting past research (e.g. 
Akechi et al., 2011; Norbury et al., 2010), although past studies have suggested that 
children with ASD learn words from association (e.g. Hennon, 2003).  Therefore, both 
groups of children with ASD were predicted to learn words from the associative cues.  
However, as past research has found that children with ASD attend strongly to arrows 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Rombough & Iarocci, 2013; Vlamings et al, 2005), these 
children are predicted to form word-object mappings from the arrow to a stronger extent 
than the light.   
As TD children have previously been found to learn words from association from 
infancy (e.g. Hollich, 2000) and as this study does not include any conflicting social cues, 
both high and low VMA TD children were hypothesised to form word-object mappings 
from the arrow and light.  The surprisingly poor performance of the DD children for 
Study Three leaves open the possibility that DD children learn words from association, 
rather than referential intent, although this cannot be directly tested until Study Five, as 
this is the only paradigm within this thesis which directly pits social and associative cues 
together.  An alternative hypothesis is that the DD children have a global deficit in word 




learning, thus are impaired forming word-object mappings from any type of cue, whether 
it is social or associative.    
Evidence in support of the latter possibility comes from Evans, Saffran & Robe-
Torres (2009), who found that DD children have difficulty with processing and 
remembering statistical input, which might suggest a deficit learning words from 
association.  Participants with specific language impairment (SLI), who had a mean CA 
of nine listened to a new ‘language’ where transitional properties within words were 
higher than those between words.  Following this, children were then played ‘words’, 
with the same transitional properties and ‘non-words’, with different transitional 
properties from those previously heard.   
Relative to a control group of CA matched TD children, the participants with SLI 
had difficulties discriminating the transitional properties within and between words.  
However, note that this study only included DD children with SLI.  These children, by 
definition, have difficulties with language, which likely contributed to their poor 
performance on this task.  Evans et al., (2009) also had a different methodology to the 
present research, which investigates word learning from two specific associative cues in a 
more heterogeneous group of DD children.   
In addition to presenting the arrow and light cues separately, this study includes 
‘arrow vs. light’ (where an arrow occurs towards one object as the other object 
simultaneously lights up) and ‘arrow + light’ (where the arrow and light occur 
simultaneously towards the same object) trials.  The arrow vs. light cue was included as a 




baseline, in order to establish if children have a preference for one type of cue over 
another.  The TD and DD children were predicted to choose at chance for this trial type, 
as there is no ‘correct’ answer for this cue.  However, the children with ASD were 
predicted to choose the object suggested by the arrow, based on their relatively high 
levels of spatial ability (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2008; Jarrold et al., 2005; O’Riordan, Plaisted, 
Driver & Baron-Cohen, 2001; Reser, 2011) and the results of past studies (e.g. Baron-
Cohen et al., 1995; Pruet et al., 2011; Rombough & Iarocci, 2012; Senju et al., 2004; 
Vlamings et al., 2005).   
Just as Study Three included a gaze and pointing combined cue, this study 
includes an arrow and light combined cue, as providing the two cues together may 
facilitate children choosing the target object.  The low VMA children with ASD in Study 
Three, for example, chose the target object for the gaze and pointing combined cue, but 
not when the gaze or pointing occurred alone.  However, they were borderline above 
chance for pointing, suggesting that the cue on its own was not quite enough to facilitate 
word learning, but it was when combined with eye gaze.  This study also includes a 
‘combined’ cue, as it might have been the case that one or more groups of children do not 
learn words from the arrow and/or light when they were separately presented but they do 
when they are presented together.   
Consistent with Study Three, this study used same vs. reversed position trials, in 
order to establish if children were forming word-to-object or word-to-location mappings.  
Interestingly, for this study, the arrow itself provides a directional cue as to which object 




is being labelled as it occurs towards the artefact, while the light does not as it occurs 
directly on the artefact.  As the arrow alerts children to object location, it will be 
interesting to see if this relates at all to children’s performance for the same and reversed 
position trials.  For example, it might be the case that children who form word-object 
mappings from the arrow trials are more likely to score higher for the same and reversed 
position trials, as they are able to follow directional indicators.   
As Study Three found that children with ASD were delayed forming word-to-
object mappings, it is predicted that these results will be replicated; the low-VMA 
children with ASD were again predicted to learn words from the same but not the 
reversed position trials.  The TD children are predicted to form word-object mappings for 
both the same and reversed position trials, just as they learnt words from both type of trial 
in Study Three.  Unexpectedly, only the high VMA DD children formed word-object 
mappings from the same position trials and neither group of DD children formed word-
object mappings from the reversed position trials for Study Three.  This surprising finding 
is hypothesised to be replicated in this study.  
 If the DD children are unimpaired on the same and reversed position trials 
relative to Study Three, this suggests that there is something specific to word learning 
from social cues which causes the DD children’s deficit.  Perhaps they were finding it so 
hard to learn words from the social cues, particularly pointing, that this also affected their 
ability to remember the spatial location of the objects.  They might, for example, have 
experienced ‘information overload’ when the point coincided with the gaze and this might 




explain their paradoxically poorer performance.  However, if the DD children’s 
performance is also impaired for the same and reversed position trials in this study, this 
suggests that their difficulty is not specific to social cues and thus it is the task itself that 
they struggle with.  This might contribute towards understanding the nature of intellectual 
disabilities.  For example, these children might experience slower processing speed 
and/or spatial difficulties, which contribute to their poor performance on these kind of 




Children were recruited from the same establishments as in Study Three, with the 
same ethical permission granted from Lancaster University.  All children in the two 
clinical groups had been diagnosed with their disorder, as in Study Three.  Two 
participants (both ASD) were excluded from the study for non-compliance (N = 1) or 
refusal to complete the BPVS (N = 1), leaving a total of 85 children participating in the 
study (TD, N = 32: ASD, N = 31: DD, N = 22). Sixty-one participants were male (19 TD, 
27 ASD, 15 DD) and 24 were female (13 TD, 4 ASD, 7 DD).  The majority of children 
(N = 77) also took part in Study 5, with task order counterbalanced for these children.  
See Table 13 for the participant demographics.   
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5.3.3. Cognitive tests and CARS and SCQ scales 
The BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997) and Raven’s (Raven, 2003) were administered as in 
the previous studies.  For the majority of children, a parent or teacher completed the 
CARS (Schloper et al. 1988) (18 TD, 24 ASD, 16 DD) and the lifetime version of the 
SCQ (Rutter et al., 2003) (18 TD, 23 ASD, 17 DD) to confirm or rule out ASD.  As with 
Study Three, only one child (ASD) did not score according to their diagnosis on either 
questionnaire.  That child was not excluded from the study for the same reasons given in 
the previous three studies for keeping these children in the sample; removing this child 
from the analyses led to almost identical results and he had been officially diagnosed with 
ASD.   
 
5.3.4. Materials 
The materials used in this study were similar to the materials used in Study Three, 
although a different speaker and object were used.  The video (see Figure 12 for a sample 
arrow vs. light trial) was created which showed a speaker seated at a table covered with a 
white tablecloth.  The novel objects were later superimposed onto the video, using 
iMovie, with one novel object to the speaker’s left and one novel object to the speaker’s 
right.  A powerpoint presentation of the two objects side by side, with a white 
background, was then shown.  For half of the trials, the objects appeared in the same 
spatial location as shown on the previous video, while for the remaining half of the trials, 




the position of the objects had reversed.  The videos were edited and transfered onto a 
1090×1080 laptop computer.   
 




The video followed the same format as Study Three, although a different speaker 
and cues were used (see Figure 12 for an example trial).  After three seconds, the speaker 
uttered ‘There’s a kela (yok/bem/lif/mido/dofa/archo/lepid)’, at the same time as an 
associative cue was produced.   




For two trials, an arrow pointed towards the target object, for two trials a red hue 
lit up the target object, for two trials the arrow and light co-occured towards the same 
object and for two trials an arrow was positioned towards one object as the other object lit 
up.   
With the cue still visible, the speaker uttered, for instance, ‘it’s a kela!’  Following 
this, the cue disapeared.  As in Study Three, four different videos were created, for 
counterbalancing purposes.  Children then viewed the powerpoint presentation of the two 
objects, either in the same (half of the trials) or reversed (remaining half of the trials) 
spatial location.  Due to non-compliance, one child (ASD) did not complete two trials.   
 
5.4. Results 
As with Study Three, proportions were used instead of frequencies as one child 
(ASD) did not complete the arrow reversed position trial or arrow + light same position 
trial, due to non-compliance.  For all analyses, CA and NVMA (as measured by the 
Ravens) were included as continuous covariates in ANCOVAs, to control for age and 
spatial ability having an effect on the tasks.   
In order to test the delay vs. deviance hypothesis, the analyses were conducted for 
three (TD, ASD, DD) and six (TD-low VMA, TD-high VMA, ASD-low VMA, ASD-
high VMA, DD-low VMA, DD-high VMA) groups.  Results for all trials are depicted in 
Figure 13 (for three groups) and Table 14 (with the groups split by VMA) and verbally 
presented below. 





Figure 13: Mean proportion of times children chose the target object for three 
groups 


















































Mean proportion of times (SD) children chose the target object for six groups 
*p <.05 ** p <.01***p <.001 
 
5.4.1. Arrow vs. Light 
This baseline trial was included in order to establish if children rely on one type of 
associative cue more than the other for word learning.  The TD and DD children were 
hypothesised to perform at chance, while the children with ASD were hypothesised to 
choose the object suggested by the arrow, as previous paradigms have found that these 
children attend to arrows in goal inference and reflective orienting paradigms (e.g. Baron-
Cohen et al., 1995; Pruett, 2011; Rombough & Iarocci, 2012; Senju et al., 2004; 
Vlamings et al., 2005).  As there was no ‘correct’ answer for this cue, the proportion of 








































































times children chose the object suggested by the arrow was arbitrarily chosen to be 
compared against chance.  All three groups of children chose an object randomly both for 
the combined sample and when split by VMA (see Table 14).  A 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) 
Factorial ANCOVA found no effect of Group or VMA.   
 
5.4.2 Arrow 
One sample t-tests with a chance level of .50 were carried out, for both the 
combined and VMA-split groups.  As the means indicated (TD = .70, SD = .33: ASD = 
.82, SD = .28: DD = .80, SD = .25), all three groups of children chose the target object 
above chance levels9 (.50) (TD, t(31) = 3.46, p = .002, d = .61: ASD, t(30) = 6.52, p < 
                                                        
9 I acknowledge that the more stringent Bonferroni correction could have been applied for all analyses.  
Using this adjustment, the alpha value becomes .004 for the 3 group comparisons of trial type, .002 for the 
6 group comparisons of trial type, .02 for the same vs. reversed position trials for 3 groups and .01 for the 
same vs. reversed position trials for 6 groups.  This means that the DD children no longer chose the target 
object for the light and the DD low-VMA children no longer chose the target object for the arrow. The DD 
children no longer chose the same object for the reversed position trials, the TD low VMA children and DD 
high VMA children no longer chose the target object for the same position trials and the DD low VMA 
children no longer chose the target object for the reversed position trials.  However, I did not do this 
following recent criticism against correcting for multiple t-tests on the grounds that this procedure inflates 
the risk of type 11 errors (e.g. Nakagagawa, 2004; Rothman, 1990) or is simply not necessary (Perneger, 
1998).  Note also that, even applying this correction, the vast majority of the significant comparisons 




.001, d = 1.14: DD, t(21) = 5.51, p <.001, d =1.20).  When subdivided by VMA, the TD-
high VMA (t(13) = 4.37, p = .001, d = 1.16), ASD-high VMA (t(18) = 9.80, p <.001, d = 
2.21), DD-low VMA (t(9) = 3.67, p = .005, d = 1.15) and DD-high VMA (t(11) = 3.92, p 
= .002, d = 1.12) all chose the object indicated by the arrow (see Table 14).  A 3 (Group) 
× 2 (VMA) factorial ANCOVA found an interaction between Group and VMA (F(2) = 
5.20, p = .008, ηp2 = .13).  To unpack this interaction, three independent samples t-tests 
were carried out, which revealed that the high VMA TD children (t(30) = -2.50, p = .018, 
d = -0.90) and high VMA children with ASD (t(29) = -2.46, p = .026, d = -0.93) chose the 
object suggested by the arrow more than their low VMA counterparts.  However, there 
was no difference between the high and low VMA DD children. 
 
5.4.3. Light 
The one sample-t-tests showed that both the TD children (M = .73, SD = .36) and 
DD children (M = .66, SD = .36) chose the target object above a chance level (TD: t(31) = 
3.70, p <.001, d = .64.  DD: t(21) = 2.08, p = .050, d = .44), although the children with 
ASD chose randomly (see Table 14).  When subdivided according to VMA, only the TD-
high VMA children chose the target object (t(13) = 4.37, p = .001, d = 1.16) (see Table 
                                                                                                                                                                     
remain significant (6/7 for three groups and 6 groups, all comparisons for the 3 groups same position, 2/3 
for the 3 groups reversed position, 4/6 for 6 groups same position and 5/6 for 6 groups reversed position).   
 




14).  Neither Group nor VMA had an effect on choosing the target object for the 3 
(Group) × 2 (VMA) factorial ANCOVA.   
 
5.4.4. Arrow + Light 
One sample-t-tests showed that both TD children (M = .82, SD = .30, t(31) = 5.81, 
p <.001, d = 1.03) and children with ASD (M = .76, SD = .31, t(30) = 4.59, p <.001, d = 
.84) chose the target object for the arrow and light combined trials.  When split by VMA, 
the target object was chosen above chance for the low VMA TD children (TD low-VMA: 
t(17) =6.87, p <.001, d = 1.62) and borderline above chance for the TD-high VMA cohort 
(t(13) = 2.11, p = .055, d = .56).  The ASD-high VMA (t(18) = 4.61, p <.001, d = 1.07) 
children also chose the target object above chance for this cue (see Table 14).  There was 
an effect of Ravens on the 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) Factorial ANCOVA (F(1) = 7.46, p = 
.008, ηp2 = .10).  Observing the descriptive statistics indicated that children with a higher 
Raven’s score did better than those with a lower Raven’s score.  There was also an 
interaction between Group × VMA (F(2) = 4.79, p = .011, ηp2 = .12).  Independent 
samples t-tests revealed that the low VMA TD children were more likely to choose the 
target object than the high VMA TD children (t(30) = 2.35, p = .026, d =.82). 
 
5.4.5. Same position and reversed position trials 
As with Study Three, to establish whether children form word-to-referent or word-
to-spatial-location mappings, children’s responses for the same and reversed position 




trials were also examined.  As there was no ‘correct’ answer for the arrow vs. light trials, 
these were excluded from these analyses.  One sample t-tests revealed that all three 
groups chose the target object for both the same (TD: M = .75, SD = .26, t(31) = 5.46, p 
<.001, d = .96.  ASD: M = .79, SD = .22, t(30) = 7.25, p <.001, d = 1.32.  DD: M = .68, 
SD = .32, t(21) = 2.64, p = .015, d = .56) and reversed position (TD: M = .75, SD = .28, 
t(31) = 4.95, p <.001, d = .89.  ASD: M = .65, SD = .31, t(30) = 2.79, p = .009, d = .48.  
DD: M = .65, SD = .32, t(21) = 2.19, p = .040, d = .47) trials.   
When separated into six groups, all of the groups except for the DD-low VMA 
children chose the target object for the same position trials (TD-low VMA: t(17) = 2.87, p 
= .011, d = .67.  TD-high VMA: t(13) = 5.64, p <.001, d = 1.50.  ASD-low VMA: t(11) = 
3.37, p = .006, d = 1.00.  ASD-high VMA: t(18) = 6.78, p <.001, d = 1.52.  DD-high 
VMA: t(11) = 2.71, p = .020, d = .79).  For the reversed position trials, both TD groups 
(TD-low VMA:, t(17) = 3.21, p = .005, d = .75.  TD-high VMA: t(13) = 3.96, p = .002, d 
= 1.08), the ASD-high VMA children (t(18) = 4.27, p <.001, d = .96) and the DD-low 
VMA children (t(9) = 2.50, p = .034, d = .80) chose the target object, although the ASD 
low-VMA and DD-high VMA children did not (see Table 15).  
A 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) Factorial ANCOVA, with CA and NVMA entered as 
covariates, revealed no effects for the same position trials.  However, for the reversed 
position trials, there was an effect of Raven’s (F(1) = 6.91, p = .011, ηp2 = .091) and 
Group × VMA interaction (F(2) = 3.68, p = .030, ηp2 = .096).  Observing the descriptive 
statistics indicates that children with a higher Raven’s score were more likely to choose 




the target object than children with a lower Raven’s score.  Further, independent samples 
t-tests revealed that the high VMA children with ASD chose the target object more than 
the low VMA children with ASD (t(29) = -3.02, p = .005, d = -1.11) but there was no 
difference between the high and low VMA children in the other two groups. 
 
Table 15: 
Mean proportion of times (SD) children chose the target object for the same and reversed 
position trials for six groups 
 
 
*p <.05 ** p <.01***p <.001. 
 
5.4.6. Comparison of object position  
           A 2 (Object Position; Same vs. Reversed) × 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) Mixed 
ANCOVA with CA and NVMA entered as covariates revealed no significant main or 
interaction effects.  This suggests that children were not more likely to choose the target 
object in one type of trial compared with the other.  
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5.4.7. Correlations between object position, CA, VMA and NVMA  
In order to see if word learning from associative cues was related to children’s 
CA, VMA and NVMA, children were assigned a total proportion of correct responses for 
all trials combined, except for the arrow vs. light cue, as there were no ‘correct’ answers 
for these trials.  Consistent with Study Three, as children may have differed in terms of 
their responses to the same and reversed position trials, this analysis was carried out for 
the same and reversed position trials separately.  Thus, children were given a score out of 
3, which was converted into a proportion for separate correlations for same and reversed 
position trials.   
For the TD children, choosing the target object for the same position trials was 
positively correlated with CA (r(31) = .36, p = .050), VMA (r(32) = .41, p = .019) and 
Ravens (r(31) = .46, p = .010).  For the children with ASD, choosing the target object for 
the reversed position trials was positively correlated with VMA (r(31) = .43, p = .016).  
For the DD children, Raven’s score was positively correlated with the reversed position 
trials (r(19) = .61, p = .005).   
 
5.5. Discussion 
This study investigated whether TD children, children with ASD and DD children 
can use associative cues for word learning.  It was hypothesised that the TD children 
would learn words from both arrows and lights, although the arrow would be a stronger 
word learning cue than the light for the children with ASD.  As the DD children 




surprisingly had difficulties learning words from social cues in Study Three, it was 
anticipated that they might instead learn words from association.  Alternatively, this 
cohort’s problems with word learning may extend to associative cues, as well as social 
pragmatics.  The results for each group will be discussed separately, starting with the 
findings for the TD children.  I will then evaluate the effectiveness of each cue and 
provide some suggestions for future research. 
Low VMA TD children only learnt words from the arrow + light, failing to learn 
words from either cue when they were presented separately.  This finding suggests that 
providing the two cues simultaneously is a stronger indicator of which object is being 
named than showing each cue on its own.  Low VMA TD children may require a clear 
associative cue (two signals together) in order to link a speaker’s utterance to the 
association between the signifier and the signified.   
This finding does not replicate previous studies with young TD children, which 
has found evidence of learning from just one associative cue.  Specifically, Hollich 
(2000) found that children learnt words from an objects’ perceptual salience (which 
conflicted with the speaker’s eye gaze but did not conflict with any other associative 
indicator).  Axelsson et al., (2012) discovered that children show word learning and 
retention from object illumination.  Pellicano & Rhodes (2003) found that TD children 
attribute that a pictorial figure wants a sweet an arrow is positioned towards.  These 
differences might be explained by differences in terms of the methodology of this 




paradigm compared with earlier studies.  For example, Pellicano and Rhodes (2003) 
tested goal inference rather than word learning. 
Another explanation for the failure of the TD low-VMA children to learn words 
from the arrow and light is that they were confused by the lack of social information 
provided by the speaker, who simply stared directly ahead into the camera.  Unlike in 
Study Three, where the speaker actively gazed and/or pointed at the object, the speaker in 
this study did not provide any cues as to which of the two stimuli was being labelled. 
Young TD children might expect the speaker to be the one providing actions to suggest 
which object to choose.  They may have been confused by the speaker’s disconnection 
from the word learning situation and fixated on the speaker, expecting him to provide 
some cues as to which artefact was the target.  Therefore, they may have been distracted 
when the arrow and light indicators occurred and failed to properly process them.   
As expected, the high VMA TD children chose the target object when the arrow 
and light were presented separately.  This suggests that, contrary to past research (e.g. 
Axelsson et al., 2012; Hollich, 2000; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003), TD children actually 
need a higher VMA to learn words from associative cues.  Supporting this proposal, word 
learning from the same position trials for the TD children was positively correlated with 
CA, VMA and Raven’s score, suggesting that the more developed their cognitive 
abilities, the more likely they were to learn words from the arrow and light.  However, 
surprisingly, the proportion of times the high VMA TD children formed word-object 
mappings when the arrow and light were combined only reached borderline significance 




(p = .055).  This unexpected finding would need to be replicated before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn; it is possible that this effect is simply due to a statistical 
anomaly and the fact that the p value is so nearly above chance levels supports this 
proposal.   
Low VMA children with ASD did not learn words from any of the associative 
cues.  This is a similar finding to the Low VMA TD children, who only learnt words 
when the arrow and light were combined.  Taken together, these results suggest that 
children (both TD and ASD) needed a high VMA in order to learn words from 
association in this study.  As previously mentioned, this conflicts with past studies which 
have suggested that TD children attend to association from infancy (e.g. Axelsson, 2012; 
Hollich, 2000).  Perhaps this finding is due to high VMA children more frequently being 
exposed to arrows and lights as signs relative to low VMA children.  For example, arrows 
are commonly seen as directional indicators on computer keyboards at school (Pellicano 
& Rhodes, 2003).   
In Study Three, the children with ASD failed to learn words from the speaker’s 
eye gaze and (direct) pointing when presented alone.  This suggests that these children 
need a high VMA to learn words from any cue, social or associative.  Past studies which 
have found that children with ASD infer goals from arrows (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) 
and attend to arrows in reflective orienting paradigms (Senju et al., 2004) have tended to 
recruit older and more verbally able children with ASD as participants.  For example, the 
children with ASD in Senju et al.’s, (2004) first study had a mean CA of nearly 11 and 




the children in their second study had a mean CA of nine.  The children with ASD in 
Baron-Cohen et al., (1995) had a mean CA of eleven, a mean VMA of nearly five and a 
mean NVMA of seven.  This means that it is has previously been unclear how children 
with ASD who were chronologically younger or had a younger VMA would respond. 
Furthermore, previous studies have focused on goal inference and referential 
intent, rather than word learning from arrows.  This study extends this past research by 
finding that high VMA but not low VMA children with ASD learn words when an arrow 
highlights attention towards a referent.  It is possible that the low VMA children with 
ASD lacked the executive functioning skills needed to succeed at the task.  Having a high 
VMA likely corresponds to better concentration, attention and working memory, all of 
which may have facilitated performance.  For example, working memory affects 
children’s ability to remember whereabouts the arrow was positioned.  Future research 
within this area should carry out a measure of executive functioning abilities, in order to 
establish if this helps children with ASD succeed.  
Even the high VMA children with ASD failed to learn words from the light cue 
unless it was presented alongside the arrow.  As suggested by past research on TD 
children (Krehm et al., 2014; Woodward, 1998) this implies that some signs (arrows) are 
more influential than others (lights) for high VMA children with ASD.  Interestingly, 
however, this finding does not extend to the high VMA TD children, who learnt words 
from both the arrow and light cue when they were presented separately. 




One intriguing question is why it is that arrows but not lights facilitate word 
learning in high VMA children with ASD.  One possible explanation is that arrows are 
commonly used to signal directional information.  As previously discussed, children with 
ASD tend to be good at spatial navigation (Baron-Cohen, 2008; Jarrold et al., 2005; 
O’Riordan et al., 2001; Reser, 2011).  Perhaps this facilitates children with ASD learning 
words from the arrow.  Furthermore, it is possible that arrow signs might be more 
prevalent in special schools than mainstream schools, due to increased visual information 
and the use of interventions such as the Picture Exchange Communication System (PECS; 
Bondy & Frost, 2001).   
However, children with ASD did not choose the object suggested by the arrow as 
the referent when it was in direct conflict with the light indicator.  This is surprising, 
given that they formed word-object mappings from the arrow but not the light when 
presented alone.  It is possible that the combination of the two cues together caused the 
children with ASD to experience sensory overload, becoming confused at the conflicting 
information and so perform at chance.   
Both low and high VMA DD children learnt words from the arrow.  Recall that 
the DD participants had difficulty learning words from the social cues in Study Three; 
they were delayed learning words from the speaker’s eye gaze and neither group learnt 
words from the speaker’s direct pointing.  In contrast, this study shows that they learnt 
words earlier from the arrow in comparison to their TD and ASD counterparts, neither of 




whom learnt words from the arrow until they had a high VMA.  Perhaps DD children find 
association an easier cue to form word-object mappings from than social pragmatics.     
However, neither group of DD children learnt words from the light, suggesting 
that they do not form word-object mappings from all associative cues.  This suggests that, 
like the high VMA children with ASD, arrows are especially important for the language 
acquisition of DD children.  As previously mentioned, arrows have been found to help 
children with ASD learn words, possibly because they commonly provide directional 
information.  As the low VMA TD children learnt words from neither the arrow nor light, 
the high VMA TD children learnt words from the light as well as the arrow but both DD 
groups only learnt words from the arrow, these results suggest that the high VMA 
children with ASD may have a preference for arrows not due to their ASD per se, but 
simply as a result of having any developmental disability.   
Past studies regarding the effect of arrows on children with ASD have commonly 
failed to recruit a DD control group.  One exception (Ames & Jarrold, 2007) modelled on 
Baron-Cohen et al., (1995) found that a cohort of children with moderate learning 
difficulties (MLD) behaved much like the TD controls, using both arrows and gaze cues 
to infer a character’s desire.  The participants included within this study were relatively 
old, with the MLD group having a mean CA of 14 and a mean VMA of six.  This matches 
the mean VMA of the high VMA DD children within this research, who formed word-
object mappings from eye gaze in Study Three and the arrow within this study.  Future 
research should aim to include DD children in paradigms of this kind, particularly DD 




children with a low VMA, in order to more fully explore whether arrows have a special 
significance for word learning in this population.   
As noted within the introduction (section 5.2.), arrow signs are likely to have been 
frequently encountered and therefore highly familiar to the children.  In contrast, the 
patch of red light, which fully covered the object, was probably quite novel for the 
participants.  It is possible that children with ASD and children with DD perseverate and 
choose stimuli which they are accustomed to seeing, rather than stimuli they are 
unfamiliar with.  Children with ASD have been shown to possess a preference for 
‘sameness’ (e.g. Eisenmajer et al., 1998; Green et al., 2006; Kanner, 1943; Koegel & 
Koegel, 1995) and this characteristic might extend to DD children.   
The DD children did not form word-object mappings when the arrow and light co-
occurred.  As children with DD often have sensory processing difficulties (Engel-Yeger, 
Hardal-Nasser & Gal, 2011; John & Mervis, 2010; Kogan et al., 2004) and slow 
processing speed (e.g. Burden et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2001; Mulder et al, 2011; 
Silverman, 2007), it is possible that the combination of stimuli for the arrow and light co-
occurring trials was too much sensory information for the DD children to take in.  The 
DD high-VMA children also performed at chance for the Eye Gaze and Pointing trials in 
Study Three, suggesting that this cohort may have difficulty understanding co-occurring 
cues in general.   
Future research within this area could include measures of sensory processing and 
processing speed and establish if these are correlated with children’s performance on 




these kinds of tasks.  Further, the cues could be presented for longer than three seconds, 
giving the DD children more time to process them.  If their word-object mapping ability 
improves in this context, this would suggest that inferior sensory processing and 
processing speed contributes to their poor performance.    
Taken together, these findings suggest that TD children learn words from arrows 
and lights but children with ASD only learn words from arrows.  However, both groups 
need a high VMA in order to utilise these cues.  In contrast, both high and low VMA 
children with DD learn words from arrows but neither cohort learns words from lights.  
As well as investigating the four trial types (arrow vs. light, arrow, light, arrow + light), I 
explored the effect of spatial temporal positioning of the objects.  Both groups of TD 
children chose the target object for both the same and reversed position trials, suggesting 
that they form word-to-object rather than word-to-location mappings.  Both groups of 
children with ASD chose the target object for the same position trials, although only the 
ASD high-VMA children chose the target object for the reversed position trials, 
suggesting that children with ASD are delayed forming word-object mappings.   
The DD high-VMA children chose the target object for the same position but not 
the reversed position trials.  These results are all consistent with children’s performance 
for Study Three (see Section 4.6).  However, the DD-low VMA children did not choose 
the target object for the same position trials but did for the reversed position trials.  This 
finding is perplexing, thus further investigation with a larger sample size is needed in 




order to establish if this surprising finding is replicated or simply represents a 
confounding variable, such as simple guesswork.   
  Taken together, these results suggest that arrows facilitate children’s word- 
learning more than lights – 4/6 groups learnt words from the arrow but only 1/6 learnt 
words from the light.  Past research has tended to focus on the effect of arrows (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Rombough & Iarocci, 2013; Senju et al., 2004; Vlamings et al., 
2005).  This means that any effects found might not be generalisable to other cues.  
Therefore, it is possible that there is something special about arrows per se and other 
associative cues do not have the same impact.   
Alternatively, it is possible that the way the light cue was implemented in this 
study was a poor indicator of association for the children; this cue consisted of a patch of 
red light over the object, rather than the object itself lighting up.  Axelsson et al., (2012) 
also included a patch of light (rather than whole object illumination) as their object 
illumination condition, although in their study the patch of light only occurred on a panel 
underneath the object and was bright white.  In contrast, the light in this study was bright 
red and covered the entire object.  These small methodological changes may have 
contributed to the difference in findings between their study and the present research. 
Therefore, this study suggests that all high VMA groups and low VMA DD 
children learn words from when an arrow is positioned by the target object, which they 
interpret as a sign that the object is being labelled (Peirce, 1931; Saussure, 1983) (see 
Figure 11, within the introduction).  However, only the high VMA TD children learn 




words from the object lighting up.  The results for the low VMA TD children and 
children with ASD suggest that, contrary to past research, it is high not low VMA 
children who learn words from association.  Furthermore, arrows are a more effective 
word learning indicator for children with ASD and children with DD than lights.   
Saussure (1983) claimed that word learning is dyadic, between the signifier (e.g. 
an arrow) and signified (e.g. an object).  Peirce (1931) argued that the relationship is 
actually triadic, as it also includes the interpreter.  The interpreter within this study (i.e. 
the child) only picked out specific cues as being relevant, which sometimes differed 
between groups.  Most of the children (the two exceptions being the TD and ASD low 
VMA subgroups) learnt words from the arrow but only the high VMA TD children learnt 
words from the light.  Thus, this study shows that there is a triadic (not dyadic) 
relationship between the signifier, signified and, importantly, interpreter in order for 
word learning to take place from associative signs (see Figure 11).  For the arrow cue, 
four groups of children perceived this as relevant to word learning, although for the light 
cue only one group of children perceived this as relevant.     
As mentioned in the introduction (section 5.1), word learning from indicators such 
as arrows might not be purely associational; the children could have inferred that the cue 
must have been important for the speaker.  Although it is important to remember that 
there is a potential confound of children inferring social pragmatic information from the 
associative cues, the signs within this study were likely to have been considered more 
associative than those within Study Three.  Recall that in Study Three, the cues (eye gaze 




and or pointing) directly originated from the speaker himself, thus were probably 
considered more intentional than the cues within this study, which did not occur from the 
speaker.  Indeed, if social pragmatics were inferred from the indicators within this study, 
it would be expected that the TD low VMA children would have learnt words from the 
arrow and light.  Instead, as previously discussed, it is speculated that one reason why this 
cohort may not have learnt words is because they were preoccupied expecting the speaker 
to provide some social information. 
These findings partially support past studies (Krehm, 2014; Woodward, 1998) 
which suggest that children are more likely to attend to some cues than others.  The high 
VMA TD children learnt words from both the arrow and light, suggesting that they use 
these cues equally within their word learning -  but only once they reach a higher VMA - 
and thus refuting Krehm et al., (2014) and Woodward (1998).  However, the high VMA 
children with ASD and both DD groups only learnt words from the arrow, suggesting that 
they weigh these forms of associative cue differently within their word learning.  Thus, 
some ‘dumb associative cues’ are stronger than others, for children with ASD and DD.   
In summary, the results of this study suggest that arrows are more informative to 
the word learning of children with ASD and children with DD than lights.  Future 
research should consider the role of other types of associative signs, such as object 
motion, perceptual salience and different types of object illumination (e.g. patches of light 
vs. the whole object lighting up).  Furthermore, children with ASD and TD children do 
not learn words from association until they have a high VMA.  In contrast, the DD 




children learnt words from arrows earlier than they learnt words from social cues in 
Study Three.  This finding may have important implications for word learning 
interventions for DD children, suggesting that showing arrows might help them learn 
words at an earlier age than social cues.    
  




Chapter Six: Word learning from conflicting social (gaze and pointing) and 
associative (arrow and light) cues  
 






Figure 6.1: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object – environment interaction 
for word learning.  This chapter will focus on both the ‘speaker’ and the ‘environment’ 
aspects of the triad. 
 
The two previous studies have explored the influence of social cues (Study Three) 
and associative cues (Study Four) on children’s word-learning.  Although Studies Three 
and Four separately explored the effect of the speaker (Study Three) and the environment 
(Study Four) by presenting singular social (Study Three) and associative (Study Four) 
cues, they did not investigate whether children prioritise one type of cue (social or 








puts social cues and associative cues in direct competition with each other (i.e. the 
speaker’s eye gaze or pointing occurs towards one object as an arrow is positioned 
towards the other object or it lights up).   
Directly pitting social and associative cues together means that the mechanisms by 
which children learn words can be more clearly identified.  Choosing the object suggested 
by gaze or pointing would suggest that word learning is primarily social; choosing the 
object suggested by the arrow or light would suggest that word learning is primarily 
associative.  Performing at chance would either suggest that children learn words from 
both social and associative cues equally or that there was some failure with the paradigm.  
It is also possible that different effects are found between the high and low VMA 
children, between the three groups (TD, ASD, DD) and between the cues themselves.  As 
has been discussed within the previous chapter, children sometimes weigh different types 
of indicators differently for word learning.  For example, the high VMA children with 
ASD and both groups of DD children learnt words from the arrow but not the light.  
Therefore, it might be the case that children sometimes learn words from the social cue 
and sometimes learn words from the associative cue, which varies according to trial type.  
Although this study puts social and associative cues in competition with each 
other, the emergentist coalition model stresses that social pragmatics and association do 
sometimes interlink together.  A child might be more likely to pay attention to an object 
which is perceptually salient than an object which is perceptually boring, for example, 
and therefore more likely to notice if the speaker gazes at and points towards the 




perceptually salient object, giving it a novel label.  Or the speaker themselves might infer 
that the child is interested in a particular object and so name that object for the child as 
they gaze and/or point towards it.  Therefore, as previously discussed within Chapter One 
(General Introduction), children learn words from a wide variety of interconnected social, 
associative, cognitive and linguistic processes.    
However, these cues sometimes contrast with each other.  For example, the most 
perceptually salient object is not always the one that the speaker is gazing at or pointing 
towards, resulting in a conflict between association - or characteristics of the object 
(perceptual salience) - and social pragmatics - or characteristics of the speaker (gaze) (e.g. 
Hennon, 2003; Hollich et al., 2000; Parish-Morris et al., 2007).  Or the speaker and child 
might be focused upon different novel objects (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1995; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  If the speaker labels the object of their own focus, 
the child has to disengage from the object they themselves are fixated on in order to make 
the correct word-object mapping.  Another possibility is that a child hears a novel word 
while they are focused upon a novel object but it is uttered by a speaker who is 
disconnected from the word learning context, such as someone speaking on the telephone 
(Baldwin et al., 1996).  Therefore, the child has to recognise that the speaker is not 
involved in the word learning scenario, thus the new word does not refer to the new 
object.    
Past research (Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baldwin et al., 1996; Hennon, 2003; Hollich, 
2000; Parrish-Morris et al., 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005) has suggested that in cases 




where associative processes contrast with social pragmatic information very young TD 
infants and children with ASD rely more on association; forming word-object mappings 
according to perceptual salience or the object of their own interest.  However, older TD 
children (from about 18 months old) employ social pragmatics.  This involves forming 
word-object mappings to the object the speaker is gazing or pointing at, even if it is 
perceptually boring and/or they themselves are interested in another object.  TD children 
also fail to form word-object mappings if it is obvious that the speaker is uninvolved with 
the novel object, even if they say a novel word at the time that the child is looking at a 
novel object (Baldwin et al., 1996).      
However, much of the previous research investigating children’s word learning 
from conflicting social and associative information has only focused on one type of each 
cue.  With respect to ASD, Baron-Cohen et al., (1997) and Preissler & Carey (2005) 
found that two-year-old TD infants form word-object mappings towards an object that the 
speaker is focused upon, even if this differs from the object of their own focus (see also 
Baldwin, 1991).  However, VMA matched children with ASD learnt words for the object 
that they were fixated upon.  This suggests that although TD children understand the 
referential intent of the speaker within their word-learning, children with ASD do not.   
One disadvantage of these two studies (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & 
Carey, 2005) is that they only tested whether children use eye gaze (either in terms of 
social pragmatics, by forming word-object mappings towards the object of the speaker’s 
focus, or in terms of association, by forming word-object mappings towards the object of 




their own focus) rather than directly pitting different types of social and associative cues 
together.  Furthermore, as noted by Parrish-Morris et al., (2007), the earlier findings of 
Baron-Cohen et al., (1997) and Preissler and Carey (2005) might simply be due to 
children with ASD having a specific difficulty understanding eye gaze and might not 
extend to other cues.  Parrish-Morris et al., (2007) investigated word learning for 
perceptually salient (e.g. a plastic wand filled with liquid and sparkly moons and stars) vs. 
perceptually boring (e.g. a white plastic bottle opener) objects, in a study modelled on 
Hollich’s (2000) paradigm with TD children.  Unlike TD children, children with ASD 
(who had a mean CA of 5 and mean VMA of 21-months-old) formed word-object 
mappings to the interesting object, even when the experimenter pointed or touched the 
boring object.   
Similarly, Hennon (2003) contrasted an object’s perceptual salience with a 
speaker’s eye gaze cue.  When a speaker gazed at and labelled a perceptually interesting 
object, three-year-old children with ASD formed word-object mappings to this artefact, 
rather than a plain-looking distractor.  This is expected as, in this scenario, social 
pragmatics and association co-occur.  However, when the speaker gazed at and labelled 
the ‘boring’ object, the children with ASD, like TD one-year-olds but not older TD 
children, still formed word-object mappings to the interesting artefact.  This provides 
further support for children with ASD learning words from association, rather than 
referential intent, although whether children with ASD with more advanced receptive 
vocabulary would show the same pattern of performance is unclear.   




Furthermore, although Parrish-Morris et al., (2007) and Hennon (2003) extended 
past research by directly pitting associative and social pragmatic indicators together, both 
studies only explored contrasting one type of associative cue (perceptual salience in both 
cases) with one type of social cue (pointing, touching or eye gaze).  Therefore, it is 
unknown if children with ASD prioritise other forms of association within their word 
learning, when these conflict with social pragmatics.  These include environmental cues 
such as arrows and lights, which occur towards the object, whereas perceptual salience is 
a characteristic of the object.  Although past research within the ASD literature has 
explored the effect of arrows vs. eye gaze, this had tended to be in goal inference (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) or reflective orienting (e.g. Senju et al., 2004), rather than word 
learning paradigms.   
Reflective orienting paradigms typically involve children watching a cue (such as 
an arrow or gaze) occurring towards a specific part of a computer screen.  This cue 
usually either predicts the location of a target (congruent) or the location of the target 
occurs in the opposite direction (incongruent).  Length of time taken to orientate in the 
direction of the cue and how often children orientate in the direction of the cue is 
recorded.  Goal inference paradigms typically involve showing children an image of a 
face with a cue (such as an arrow or gaze) positioned towards one of several objects (such 
as sweets) and asking children which one (e.g. sweet) the character wants or desires.  
Many of these have pitted arrows against a conflicting social cue, usually gaze, and have 
tended to find a preference for arrows in ASD and gaze in TD children (e.g.  Baron-




Cohen et al., 1995; Rombough & Iarocci, 2013; Senju et al., 2004, although see Pellicano 
& Rhodes, 2003, who found that TD children interpret a character’s goals according to 
arrows, as well as gaze).   
In reflective orienting paradigms, TD adults (e.g. Senju & Hasegawa, 2001) and 
infants (e.g. Hood, Willen & Driver, 1998) have been found to look towards a target 
faster if it is preceded by a gaze cue, looking towards the direction of the gaze even if the 
target occurs in a different location.  Most studies suggest that this shows an 
understanding of joint attention, as the same effect is not found, or not found as strongly, 
when other cues, such as arrows, are used (Friesen, Ristic & Kingstone, 2004; Kawai, 
2011; Quadflieg, Mason & Macrae, 2004; Ristic, Wright & Kingstone, 2007; Senju et al., 
2004; Vlamings et al., 2005, although see Eimer, 1997; Tipples, 2002).  However, 
individuals with ASD have been found to orientate to both eye gaze and arrow stimuli 
(e.g. Senju et al., 2004; Sweetenham et al., 2003; Vlamings et al., 2005).  This suggests 
that, for TD children, the social significance of gaze is important for their reflective 
orienting, implying that this is controlled by a process of referential intent.  In contrast, 
children with ASD may not discriminate between gaze and other cues, suggesting that 
any perceptually salient indicator would have the same effect.  
This study builds on past research by investigating conflicting eye gaze vs. arrows 
in the context of a word learning experiment and also including pointing and object 
illumination as contrasting indicators, in order to assess the influence of different types of 
speaker or environmental cues.  It might be, for example, that if TD children learn words 




from gaze and children with ASD learn words from arrows when these conflict, as has 
been found in past studies, this effect is specific to these particular cues and does not 
occur with other indicators.  Consistent with this possibility, the high VMA children with 
ASD learnt words from arrows but not lights in Study Four. This suggests that they 
differentially weight these two cues and thus emphasises the importance of the interpreter 
in using indicators for word learning (see Study Four for a more detailed explanation of 
the signifier, signified and interpreter).  Alternatively, if TD children also learn words 
from pointing and children with ASD learn words from arrows, this provides stronger 
support that TD children’s language acquisition is facilitated by social pragmatics but the 
word learning of children with ASD is facilitated by association. 
 
6.2. Description of the present study 
This study investigates word learning when social and associative cues conflict 
with each other; i.e. a social cue occurs towards one object at the same time as an 
associative cue occurs towards the other.  The social and associative cues within this 
study were consistent with Studies Three and Study Four.  As previously discussed within 
Study Four, the pointing and arrow are perceptually quite similar.  Thus, children might 
be more likely to respond at chance for the pointing vs. arrow trials, compared with the 
other cue combinations, due to their similar appearance.   
As with Studies Three and Four, children are shown a video of a speaker and two 
objects, with the speaker uttering a novel word to refer to one of the objects (e.g. ‘there’s 




a jeeter’).  In this video, for two trials the speaker gazes at one object as the same time as 
an arrow is positioned towards the other (gazing vs. arrow), for two trials the speaker 
gazes at one object at the same time as the other object lights up (gazing vs. light), for two 
trials, the speaker points at one object at the same time as an arrow is positioned towards 
the other (pointing vs. arrow) and for two trials the speaker points at one object at the 
same time as the other object lights up (pointing vs. light).   
Replicating the earlier studies within this thesis, the children were divided into 
high and low VMA groups to test the delay vs. deviance hypothesis.  For example, the 
low VMA children with ASD might be more likely to perform at chance than the high 
VMA children with ASD for all cues, as they previously chose randomly when the eye 
gaze and direct pointing (Study Three) and arrow and light (Study Four) were presented 
alone.  Splitting the sample into high and low VMA subcategories also helps test the 
delay vs. deviance hypothesis for the same vs. reversed position trials, which were once 
again implemented in order to investigate the effect of spatio-temporal position on 
children’s word learning. The low VMA children with ASD chose the target object 
randomly for the eye gaze and pointing in Study Three and the arrow and light in Study 
Four, which suggests that they do not show a preference for either social or associative 
information.  Thus, it was predicted that they would form word-object mappings at 
chance for all trials, including same and reversed position.   
The high VMA children with ASD learnt words from the social cues in Study 
Three but did not learn words from the light in Study Four, thus were hypothesised to 




learn words from the eye gaze and pointing when this conflicted with object illumination.  
However, due to their well-documented attention to arrows (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1997; 
Rombough & Iarocci, 2013; Senju et al., 2004; Vlamings et al., 2005), they were 
expected to form word-object mappings from the arrow when this was pitted against eye 
gaze and pointing.  As this group of children formed word-object mappings from both the 
same and reversed position trials in Studies Three and Four, they were predicted to 
perform consistently for the same and reversed position trials in this study.   
Both TD groups were hypothesised to choose the object suggested by the social 
cue as they both learnt words from the eye gaze and pointing in Study Three.  Although 
the high VMA TD children also learnt words from the arrow and light in Study Four, the 
fact that the TD children learnt words from the social cues at an earlier age suggests that 
these cues probably facilitate their word learning more than associative ones.  
Furthermore, past research suggests that they form word-object mappings from social 
pragmatics when this conflicts with associative information (e.g. Hollich, 2000; Houston-
Price et al., 2006; Moore et al., 1999).  Consistent with Studies Three and Four, both TD 
groups were hypothesised to form word-object mappings from both the same and 
reversed position trials.   
Two different hypotheses are made for the DD children.  As the high VMA DD 
children chose randomly for the eye gaze and pointing in Study Three and both groups 
chose randomly for the arrow + light in Study Four, DD children might have difficulty 
processing too many cues at once.  Therefore, one prediction is that they may choose at 




chance for all trial types.  Alternatively, both groups of DD children learnt words from 
the arrow in Study Four at an earlier age than the TD children and DD children.  This 
suggests that the arrow could be a particularly salient cue for them.  They might therefore 
be predicted to learn words from the arrow when this conflicts with eye gaze and 
pointing.     
The low VMA DD children are predicted to choose at chance for the other two 
types of trial, as they did not learn words from the light in Study Four or the eye gaze and 
pointing in Study Three (note that this outcome is the same as for the first hypothesis, that 
the DD children would choose at chance for all trials and both the same and reversed 
position trials).  As the high VMA DD children chose the object suggested by the eye 
gaze above chance, they were hypothesised to form word-object mappings from eye gaze 
when this conflicted with the light.  They did not form word-object mappings from either 
the light or pointing.  Therefore, like the TD children, they were predicted to perform at 




Children were recruited from the same establishments as in the previous studies, 
with the same ethical permission granted.  All children in the two clinical groups had 
been previously diagnosed with their disorder, as in studies Three and Four.  Ninety 
children were recruited for this study, although one child was excluded for non-




compliance.  Thus, a total of 89 children took part in the study (TD, N = 33: ASD, N = 
33: DD, N = 23).  Sixty-two participants were male (19 TD, 28 ASD, 15 DD) and 27 were 
female (14 TD, 5 ASD, 8 DD) (see Table 16 for the participant demographic details). 
 
Table 16: 
 Participant demographic details 
 
 TD ASD DD 
 Low  
VMA 
N = 18 
10  males 
High 
VMA 
















N = 10 
6 males 
































































The vast majority of participants took part in more than one of the video studies, 
with 64 children completing all three studies and a further 21 children completing two.  
Task order was counterbalanced.  For each study, children were assigned a total score 
according to how many times they formed the correct word-object mapping.  Which study 
children completed first was also recorded.   
As there were three total scores (one for Study Three, one for Study Four and one 
for Study Five), three 3 (Group; TD, ASD, DD) × 3 (Order; Study 1, 2 or 3 first) between 
subjects ANOVA’s were carried out, which found no order effects for any of the three 
groups for any of the three studies.   
 
6.3.2. Design 
A 3 (Group; TD, ASD, DD) × 4 (Trial Type; Eye Gaze vs. Arrow, Eye Gaze vs. 
Light, Pointing vs. Arrow, Pointing vs. Light) × 2 (Object Position; Same vs. Reversed) 
Mixed Factorial design was employed.  
 
6.3.3. Cognitive tests and CARS and SCQ scales 
The BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997) and Ravens (Raven, 2003) were administered as in 
the previous studies.  For the majority of children, a parent or teacher completed the 
CARS (Schloper et al., 1988) (19 TD, 26 ASD, 15 DD) and the lifetime version of the 
SCQ (Rutter et al., 2003) (19 TD, 24 ASD, 17 DD) to confirm or rule out ASD.   




Almost all of the children scored according to their diagnostic category on at least 
one of the questionnaires, with only one child (ASD) not scoring according to their 
diagnosis on either scale.  However, as removing this child from the analyses led to 
almost identical results, and they had been officially diagnosed with ASD, this child was 
not excluded from the final sample. 
 
6.3.4. Materials 
This study used similar materials to those in Studies Three and Four, although a 
different speaker and objects appeared on the video.  The scene (see Figure 14 for a 
sample eye gaze vs. arrow trial) showed a speaker seated at a table covered with a white 
tablecloth.  The novel objects were later superimposed onto the video, using iMovie, with 
one novel object to the speaker’s left and one novel object to the speaker’s right.  
A powerpoint presentation of the two objects side by side, with a white 
background, was then shown.  For half of the trials, the objects appeared in the same 
spatial location as shown on the previous video, while for the remaining half of the trials, 
the position of the objects had reversed.  The videos were edited and transfered onto a 
1090×1080 laptop computer.   
 
6.3.5. Procedure 
The video (see Figure 14) followed the same format as that shown in Studies 
Three and Four.  After three seconds, the speaker uttered ‘There’s a jeeter (mandoh, nez, 




pifo, teega, sas, koba, lorse)’, at the same time as a social cue occured towards one object 
and an associative cue occured towards the other.   
For two trials, the speaker directed his eye gaze towards one object as an arrow 
was positioned towards the other, for two trials the speaker directed his eye gaze towards 
one object as the other object lit up, for two trials the speaker pointed towards one object 
as an arrow was positioned towards the other and for two trials the speaker pointed 
towards one object as the other object lit up.  With the cues still present, the speaker 
uttered ‘it’s a jeeter!’   
Following this, the cues disappeared.  As in studies Three and Four, four different 
videos were created, for counterbalancing purposes.  Children then viewed the still image 
of the two objects, either in the same (half of the trials) or reversed (remaining half of the 
trials) spatial location and were asked to identify the target object (e.g ‘show me a 
jeeter’).  Due to technical issues or non-compliance, four children (2 TD, 1 ASD, 1 DD) 
failed to complete one trial and one child (DD) failed to complete two trials. 
 





Figure 14: Example image of an eye gaze vs. arrow trial 
6.4. Results 
For all analyses, each group was subdivided into ‘high’ and ‘low’ VMA to test the 
delay vs. deviance hypothesis.  Children’s CA and non-verbal mental age (NVMA; as 
measured by the Ravens) were entered as continuous covariates in all of the ANCOVA 
analyses in case these affected children’s responses.  Results for all four trial types are 
depicted in Figure 15 (combined; TD, ASD and DD) and Table 17 (VMA-split).  As well 
as being depicted in Figure 15 and Table 17, the children’s performance is presented one 
cue at a time within the text.  No significant results were found for the same vs. reversed 
position trials and comparison of object position trials.  This is likely due to performance 
being largely at chance for all four cues for all three groups of children.  Therefore, these 
factors were not considered further.   





Figure 15: Mean proportion of times children chose the target object (suggested by social 
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Mean proportion of times (SD) children chose the target object (suggested by social cue) 
for six groups 
*p <.05  
 
6.4.1 Eye Gaze vs. Arrow 
In order to explore any potential effects of VMA, one sample-t-tests with a chance 
level of .50 were conducted for both three groups (TD, ASD, DD) and when split by 
VMA (TD-low VMA, TD-high VMA, ASD-low VMA, ASD-high VMA, DD-low VMA, 
DD-high VMA).  Although the TD (M = .47, SD = .37) and DD (M = .50, SD = .43) 
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groups choose the target object at chance, the children with ASD chose the object 
indicated by the speaker’s eye gaze (M = .33, SD = .35) less than chance (i.e. they chose 
the object suggested by the arrow), (t(32) = -2.77, p = .009, d = -.49).  When 
subcategorised into six groups, the high-VMA children with ASD were below chance 
choosing the object suggested by the speaker’s eye gaze (M = .33, SD = .37; t(19) = -2.10, 
p = .049, d = -.46).  All other groups chose at chance between the two objects (see Table 
17).  A 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) ANCOVA showed that there were no main effects or 
interactions.   
 
6.4.2 Eye Gaze vs. Light 
As suggested by the means for three groups (TD: M = .55, SD = .34.  ASD: M = 
.44, SD = .37.  DD: M = .57, SD = .35) and six groups (see Table 17), children chose 
randomly between the object suggested by the eye gaze and the object suggested by the 
light.  A 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) ANCOVA confirmed that there was no effect of Group or 
VMA or the covariates.   
 
6.4.3. Pointing vs. Arrow  
As the means for three groups (TD: M = .53, SD = .39.  ASD: M = .48, SD = .38.  
DD: M = .46, SD = .40) and six groups (see Table 17) indicated, the TD, ASD and DD 
children all chose the object at chance.  A 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) ANCOVA revealed no 
effect of group or VMA or the covariates.  




6.4.4. Pointing vs. Light 
Again, all three groups of children performed at chance (TD: M = .55, SD = .36.  
ASD: M = .58, SD = .40.  DD: M = .61, SD = .30), with no group differences.  When 
subdivided into six groups, the TD-high VMA participants chose the object suggested by 
the speaker’s pointing borderline more often than the object suggested by the light (M = 
.67, SD = .31, t(14) = 2.09, p = .055, d = .55), although all other groups showed chance 
performance (see Table 17).  A 3 (Group) × 2 (VMA) ANCOVA showed no effect of 
Group, VMA or the covariates.   
 
6.4.5. Correlations between object position, CA, VMA and NVMA 
As with Studies Three and Four, children were assigned a total proportion of 
correct responses for all trials combined.  Unlike Study Three (where the pointing 
incidental cue was omitted) and Study Four (where the arrow vs. light cue was omitted), 
all trials were included.  As with the previous two studies, separate analyses were carried 
out for the same and reversed position trials, as children may have differed in their 
responses to these.  Children were therefore given a score out of four, which was 
converted into a proportion for separate correlations for same and reversed position trials.  
The only significant correlation occurred for the low VMA children with ASD, where the 
proportion of times they chose the target object for the reversed position trials was 
positively correlated with VMA (r(13) = .66, p = .014).  All other correlations were non- 
significant, probably due to the high rates of chance responding.   




6.5. Discussion  
This experimental paradigm extended the findings of Studies Three and Four by 
directly pitting social and associative cues against each other to explore if children weigh 
one type of cue more than the other for word learning.  All three groups of children 
choose the target object at chance for all trials with two exceptions; the children with 
ASD (both as a whole group and the high-VMA cohort) choose the object suggested by 
the arrow when this conflicted with the speaker’s eye gaze and the high-VMA TD 
children showed a trend towards choosing the object suggested by the speaker’s pointing 
when this conflicted with the light.  Although these significant differences were in the 
expected direction; i.e. choosing the object suggested by the social cue for the TD 
children and the object suggested by the arrow for the children with ASD, this provides 
weak evidence in support of the hypothesis as the findings only occurred for two out of 
the eight trial types.   
Taken together with studies Three and Four, these findings suggest that children 
with ASD have delayed language acquisition in general, but eventually learn words from 
some social and associative indicators, as they were able to learn words from eye gaze 
(Study Three) and arrow (Study Four) cues.  However, when social and associative cues 
conflict, children with ASD are generally unsure which cue to choose as the referent, 
hence perform at chance.  The only exception to this occurred for the eye gaze vs. arrow 
trials, where the object suggested by the arrow was chosen more often than the object 
suggested by the eye gaze for both the high VMA children with ASD and when the whole 




ASD cohort was included.  This supports Baron-Cohen et al., (1995), who suggested that 
children with ASD ascertain information from arrows rather than eye gaze when these are 
pitted together.   
As previously discussed within Study Four, arrows commonly provide directional 
information and children with ASD tend to be good at navigation (Baron-Cohen, 2008; 
Jarrold et al., 2005; O’Riordan et al., 2001; Reser, 2011).  Although this fails to explain 
why the arrow was only chosen when it conflicted with eye gaze and not when it 
conflicted with pointing, children with ASD have been suggested to have particular 
difficulties using eye gaze to help them infer words (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 
Preissler & Carey, 2005).  They have also been found to possess a particular interest in 
following arrows (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Rombough & Iarocci, 2013).  Thus, the 
combination of these two cues together – arrows being easy for the high VMA children 
with ASD to ascertain information from and eye gaze being difficult – was the likely 
reason why the children with ASD only formed word-object mappings for this particular 
trial type.   
Surprisingly, the TD children performed at chance for all trial types.  However, 
for the TD high VMA participants, responses for the pointing vs. light trials showed a 
trend towards significance in favour of pointing.  It is possible that the pointing cue was a 
particularly strong word learning indicator for the TD children (although this does not 
explain why they did not also choose the target object for the pointing vs. arrow cue).  For 
instance, evidence (Lee et al., 1998; Paulus & Fikkert, 2012) suggests that pointing is a 




stronger social signal for TD children than eye gaze.  TD children are able to infer a 
character’s desire from pointing earlier than eye gaze (Lee et al., 1998) and 24-month-old 
infants and adults form word-object mappings from a character’s pointing, rather than eye 
gaze, when these conflict (Paulus & Fikkert, 2012).  This might have facilitated the TD 
high VMA children’s trend towards forming word-object mappings from pointing but not 
for the eye gaze trials.   
Other than this one exception, the random responding of the TD children for this 
study suggests one of two possibilities; it might be the case that TD children learn words 
from both social (Study Three) and associative (Study Four) cues equally and become 
confused about which indicator provides the relevant information when these cues are 
pitted against each other.  Alternatively, perhaps there was something about this particular 
paradigm which caused or contributed to their random responding.  Supporting this 
proposal, the results of this study conflict with much past research, which have found that 
TD children prioritise social pragmatics over association when the two conflict (e.g. 
Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; 1997; Hollich et al., 2000; Houston-Price 
et al., 2006; Moore et al., 1999; Parrish-Morris et al., 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005).   
Possible reasons for these conflicting findings include differences within the 
methodology of this study compared with past research.  Firstly, as previously mentioned 
within the introduction to this study, some previous paradigms have focused on different 
types of cues to those presented in this study, particularly the associative indicators.  For 
example, Baldwin (1991; 1993), Baron-Cohen et al., (1997) and Preissler and Carey 




(2005) investigated whether children form word-object mappings according to the 
speaker’s eye gaze, even when they themselves are focused upon a different object.  
Hence, this only explores how children use one type of cue (eye gaze) for word learning.  
Extending these studies, Hollich et al, (2000) contrasted the speaker’s eye gaze with an 
object’s perceptual salience and both Houston Price et al., (2006) and Moore et al., (1999) 
compared eye gaze with moving objects.  These types of cues could be viewed as 
encompassing characteristics of the object itself.  In contrast, the arrow and light were 
classed as environmental indicators as they occurred towards the object, rather than being 
a component of it.        
Nevertheless, it is puzzling that the TD children did not form word-object 
mappings to the object suggested by the eye gaze, particularly when it contrasted with the 
arrow cue.  However, some past studies have suggested that, contrary to other research, 
TD children orientate to arrows as well as eye gaze (e.g. Eimer, 1997; Ristic et al., 2002; 
Tipples, 2002) and use arrows to infer a character’s desire and intention (Ames & Jarrold, 
2007; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003).  Although contrasting pointing with an object lighting 
up has, to my knowledge, not been studied before, it has been found that two-year-old TD 
children form word-object mappings from both pointing and object illumination when the 
cues are presented separately but only maintained word-object mappings over time from 
object illumination (Axelsson et al., 2012).   
The DD children did not show a preference for either the social or associative cues 
for any of the cue types and performed at chance for every trial.  Although this could be 




interpreted as these children weighting social and associative cues equally during word 
learning, the DD children showed a deficit in word learning from many of the cues for 
Studies Three and Four and had difficulty forming word-object mappings for trial types 
where two cues were combined.  Specifically, the high VMA DD group failed to learn 
words from the eye gaze and pointing cue in Study Three and neither DD group learnt 
words from the arrow + light cue in Study Four.  Therefore, unlike the TD children and 
children with ASD, the chance performance of the DD children for all cues within this 
study could be explained not by a confusion about which cue is most important for word 
learning but, instead, by a general confusion with the task demands, finding it difficult to 
process two cues simultaneously. 
If this is the case, then DD children struggle to form word-object mappings when 
any cues conflict; whether these be social, associative or both.  As previously discussed 
within Studies Three and Four, this could perhaps be due to factors such as slow 
processing speed.  It might have been more demanding for the DD children to process 
two cues together rather than just one within the timeframe of the videos.  DD children 
have difficulty perceiving an abundance of sensory information (e.g. Burden et al., 2005; 
Engel et al., 2011; John & Mervis, 2010; Kogan et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2001; Mulder et 
al., 2011; Silverman, 2007), finding it harder to ‘take in’ two perceptually salient cues 
than just one.   
Thus, the findings of this study suggest that, with only one clear exception and a 
further result which shows a trend towards significance, TD children, children with ASD 




and DD children do not discriminate between social and associative cues for word 
learning.  Taken together with their earlier performance on Studies Three and Four, these 
findings suggest that DD children might find it difficult to choose between any two cues 
presented together, due to sensory processing impairments.  In contrast, TD children and 
children with ASD may weigh social pragmatics and association as equally important for 
word learning.  This supports the theory that social pragmatics and association, along 
with other factors such as cognitive and linguistic processes interlink to facilitate 
children’s language acquisition (e.g. Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 2006).   
However, the setting of this study was quite artificial, with participants viewing 
the speaker, objects and cues upon a computer screen.  Indeed, participants have been 
found to perform differently when the experimenter conflicts the social and associative 
cues in ‘real time’, with TD children learning words from social cues (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 
1993; Hollich, 2000; Houston-Price et al., 2006; Moore et al., 1999) and children with 
ASD learning words from association (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Hennon, 2003; Parrish-
Morris et al., 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  Future work should aim to explore 
contrasting social and associative cues in a more ‘real world setting’, such as the 
experimenter him/herself looking at one object as another object simultaneously lights up.  
However, this criticism (the artificial setting) might also be made of Studies Three and 
Four, which used a similar methodology.  Furthermore, there are some benefits of 
conducting the experiment in this way, such as ensuring that the scenario was 




standardised across participants.  It might also be quite difficult in practice to conduct an 
experiment of this kind in ‘real time’.   
Taken together, Studies Three to Five have extended the literature about the 
ability of TD children, children with ASD and DD children to learn words from social 
cues and the role of the speaker and the environment in children’s word learning.  
Relative to TD children, children with ASD are delayed learning words from social cues 
but learn words from arrows at the same developmental time point as their TD peers.  
Unexpectedly, the DD children also show word learning impairments, being delayed 
learning words from eye gaze and deviant learning words from direct pointing.  However, 
they learn words from arrows earlier than TD children and children with ASD.   
Importantly, these three studies suggest that not all cues are treated equally within 
children’s word learning, including the ‘same type’ of cue.  DD children are delayed 
learning words from eye gaze but deviant learning words from direct pointing; high VMA 
children with ASD learn words from arrows but not lights; TD children show a trend 
towards significance for choosing the object suggesting by pointing when this conflicts 
with the light but not when this conflicts with arrows or for either of the trial types 
involving eye gaze.  The next and final chapter is the General Discussion, which will 
summarise the results of all five studies within the thesis in relation to the speaker, object 
and environment triad and the emergentist coalition model.     
  




Chapter Seven: General Discussion 
 
 
7.1. General Findings 
This thesis has investigated how TD children, children with ASD and children 
with DD learn words for novel objects.  The five studies within this thesis test two main 
predictions which I draw loosely from the emergentist coalition model (e.g. Hirsh-Pasek 
& Golinkoff, 2006; Hollich, 2000) and extend these to include children with ASD; 1. A 
wide variety of cues interlink to facilitate children’s language acquisition and 2. Children 
initially learn words from association, before later also using social pragmatics.  The role 
of the object (shape bias and function bias), speaker (eye gaze and pointing) and 
environment (positioning an arrow towards an object and the object lighting up) in 
facilitating children’s word learning were all explored.  Furthermore, the word learning of 
children with both high and low VMA’s from social cues (Study Three), associative cues 
(Study Four) and conflicting social and associative cues (Study Five) were examined.     
Each study also identified the effect that children’s receptive vocabulary skills 
have on their word learning, by subdividing the sample into ‘low’ and ‘high’ groups 
based on VMA.  This allowed exploration of why children with ASD do not show the 
word learning abilities of their VMA matched TD and DD peers.  They may eventually 
learn to show these skills (hence they are delayed) or might never acquire them (hence 
they are deviant).  Furthermore, all five studies included both a TD and DD control group 
and the merits of doing so are discussed.  Unexpectedly, the DD children showed word 
learning deficits; in some cases they were outperformed by the children with ASD.  Some 




explanations for this surprising finding are given.  This chapter will thus explore five key 
themes that run through the studies; word learning from the shape bias and function bias, 
word learning from social pragmatics vs. association, the delay vs. deviance hypothesis, 
use of control groups and the performance of the DD children.  After exploration of these 
five themes, this chapter will conclude with the strengths and limitations of the thesis, 
suggestions for future research and final comments. 
 








Figure 7.1: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object – environment interaction 
for word learning.  This section will summarise the findings of Studies One and Two, 











Studies One and Two investigated how salient object characteristics influence the 
word learning of TD children, children with ASD and DD children, contrasting the 
perceptual characteristic of object shape (Study One) with the more conceptual 
characteristic of object function (Study Two).  Replicating Tek et al., (2008), Study One 
investigated the shape bias in both a name (‘can you give me the other dax?’) and no 
name (‘can you give me the other one?’) condition.  Due to their difficulties with 
referential intent, testing whether children with ASD select the shape match both when 
the object was explicitly labelled and when it was simply described allowed teasing apart 
the two hypotheses of whether the heuristic is controlled by the ALA (the shape bias is 
specific to naming) or the SAC account (the shape bias extends to non-naming scenarios).   
This also helped investigate the controversy within the TD literature about 
whether the shape bias is specific to naming (e.g. Imai et al., 1994; Landau et al., 1988; 
Smith et al., 1996) or extends to non-naming contexts (e.g. Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; 
Graham & Diesendruck, 2010).  The TD children showed a shape bias, in both the name 
and no name condition.  However, the children with ASD had a shape bias delay.   
Furthermore, the high VMA children with ASD and both groups of DD children only 
showed the heuristic in a naming context.  These findings suggest that the shape bias is 
controlled by the SAC account for TD children but the ALA for both children with ASD 
and DD.  Therefore, different processes might underlie shape bias understanding in 
typically and atypically developing children.  Future research should aim to include a 
measure of referential intent, in order to establish if inferior referential intent skills 




contributed to the two clinical groups not showing the shape bias in the no-name 
condition. 
 Although an object’s perceptual shape is generally a useful cue to help children 
rapidly generalise word-object mappings, there are occasions where same-shaped objects 
have different names (e.g. a violin and the container it’s stored in) and where differently 
shaped objects have the same name (e.g. a beanbag chair and an armchair).  Therefore, it 
is assumed that TD children use conceptual characteristics of objects, such as the function 
an artefact fulfils to help with naming (e.g. Diesendruck et al., 2003).   
Within typical development, the shape bias develops earlier than the function bias, 
at around two-years-old (e.g. Landau et al., 1988).  Unlike the shape of an object, the 
function it carries out is more conceptual and cannot be easily established from perceptual 
surface characteristics.  Thus, the function bias develops later in TD children than the 
shape bias.   
However, the literature provides conflicting evidence regarding the exact age the 
function bias emerges within typical development, with some studies claiming three-
years-old (e.g. Diesendruck et al., 2003) and other studies claiming six (Merriman et al., 
1992).  Study Two within this thesis investigated whether the three groups of children 
prioritise shape or function as a cue for word learning when the two heuristics conflicted.  
As the three low VMA groups had a mean VMA of three-years-old and the three high 
VMA groups had a mean VMA of six-years-old, with the TD children having a similar 
CA, this study allowed a deeper exploration of whether the function bias develops at three 




or six in typical development.  Study Two was also, to my knowledge, the first to 
investigate the function bias in children with ASD, and DD.  
 Unexpectedly, the children with ASD actually showed a function bias earlier 
than the TD children; possessing the heuristic with a low VMA.  Equally surprisingly, 
they did not then maintain this skill over time as the high VMA group chose at chance 
between the shape and function match test object.  The low VMA TD children selected 
the test object randomly, although the high VMA TD children showed a function bias.  
This refutes the findings of Diesendruck et al., (2003), on whom this study was based, 
that three-year-old children show a function bias, instead supporting Merriman et al., 
(1992).  Neither the high nor low DD children showed a function bias.   
Taken together, the results of Studies One and Two suggest that, while TD 
children focus on perceptual information within their early word learning (such as shape), 
children with ASD focus instead on conceptual information (such as function).  Showing 
a shape bias followed by a function bias might be viewed as more adaptive for children’s 
word learning than the other way around.  Object shape is a more simplistic and easily 
obvious cue than its function; the shape of an object is immediately apparent to anyone 
with normal vision.  As the same kinds of objects frequently possess the same shape, the 
shape bias is therefore a helpful and relatively simple heuristic for young children to 
show, which facilitates their early word learning.  
In contrast, an object’s function might not be immediately apparent.  Children 
ascertain what an object is used for by three main mechanisms.  Firstly, someone might 




explicitly describe the function of an object to a child.  This was the procedure of Study 
Two, where the children were given a very detailed description and demonstration of the 
novel object, shape match and function match.  However, in children’s everyday life it is 
rare that the roles of objects are described in such depth.   It seems a bit strange, for 
example, to explicitly explain ‘this is a chair and its function is to allow me to sit down’, 
while sitting down on an armchair.   
Of course, a child who is curious to know what an object does might simply ask 
someone else what its function is, just as they might ask for its name.  However, this 
requires the child him or herself to have relatively advanced linguistic and cognitive 
ability, being able to ask for the function of this object (‘what does this do?’) and then 
remember that this is the same function as other objects (‘chairs also involve someone 
sitting down upon them.  This must be a chair’).    
Finally, the child may repeatedly observe someone using a specific object for a 
specific role and then, over time, remember this role in relation to other objects of the 
same kind (for example, after constantly having seen people sitting down on chairs, 
viewing someone sitting down upon a beanbag chair and realising it must be a chair even 
though it’s a different shape to other chairs they’ve seen, as it serves the same function).  
However, this is arguably more complex and time consuming than showing a shape bias.  
It also might be more likely to lead to word-object mapping errors, as objects are 
sometimes not used for the function they were originally intended for.  A large book 




might be used as a doorstop; a bottle might be used to store objects; a cup might be used 
to catch a large spider.   
 Thus, initially showing a shape bias facilitates children’s early language learning.  
Later on in development, showing a shape bias by default but an increased awareness of 
object function allows children to further generalise object labels which do not share the 
same shape.  This also prevents word-object mapping errors on the occasions where shape 
does not provide a good cue as to an object’s name.  This is exactly the pattern of 
performance that TD children show.   
In contrast, showing a function bias early on in development could lead to 
confusion as the function of an object is rarely explicitly described and young children 
might not have the necessary vocabulary to ask what role an artefact fulfils.  Not showing 
the shape bias until later means that young children fail to notice that objects with the 
same form have the same name and so many early word learning opportunities are 
missed.  This is exactly the pattern of performance that children with ASD show. 
 Therefore, Studies One and Two investigated children’s word learning from 
object characteristics.  However, children also form word-object mappings according to 
numerous other cues, including social pragmatics, association, linguistic and cognitive 
processes.  The first two of these – social pragmatics and association – and how these 
interlink were investigated in Studies Three to Five.  These will be described within the 
next section.   
 












Figure 7.2: Visual interpretation of the speaker – object – environment interaction 
for word learning.  This section will summarise the findings of Studies Three to Five, 
which investigated the ‘speaker’ (Study Three) and ‘environment’ (Study Four) aspect of 
the triad, as well as what happens when these conflict (Study Five). 
 
As mentioned within the literature review, there has been much debate within both 
the TD and ASD child development literature regarding the processes underlying word 
learning.  Some claim these processes are social (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baldwin & 
Moses, 1996; Bloom, 2000; Briganti & Cohen, 2011; Gliga & Csibra, 2009; Moore et al.,  
2009; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Akhtar, 1995; Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski, 
2007).  Others argue they are associative  (e.g. Monaghan & Mattock, 2012; Saffron, 










& Yu, 2008; Suanda, Mugwanya & Namy, 2014; Yu & Smith, 2007).  Another group 
claims that both social and associative mechanisms facilitate word learning (see the 
emergentist coalition model, e.g. Golinkoff & Hirsh-Pasek, 2006; Hollich, 2000).     
It was hoped that studying participants with ASD, who have difficulties with 
social pragmatics, would be helpful in order to fully tease apart whether social 
pragmatics, association or both underpin children’s language acquisition.  As briefly 
mentioned by Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek (2006) and discussed within the literature 
review, children with ASD experience the ‘dampening’ of one form of word-learning cue; 
social pragmatics.  However, as discussed within Study Five, they are able to learn words 
from other types of linguistic, cognitive and associative information (e.g. Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997; Hennon, 2003; Parrish-Morris et al., 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005).   
However, as discussed within Study Five, previous studies have tended  
to investigate a limited variety of cues.  These include whether children form word-object 
mappings according to their own or another’s eye gaze (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005) or just contrasting one social cue (e.g. eye 
gaze or pointing) with one associative cue (e.g. perceptual salience or object movement) 
(e.g. Hollich, 2000; Hennon, 2003; Parrish-Morris et al., 2007; Moore et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, past research has sometimes recruited a narrow age range of participants 
(e.g. Hennon, 2003) and failed to recruit a DD control group.   
Taken together Studies Three, Four and Five suggest that children with ASD are 
delayed (not deviant) forming word-object mappings from social cues.  Although they 




originally experience a ‘dampening’ of social pragmatics, they eventually learn to use 
these cues, with a higher VMA than is usual.  Concordant with past research (e.g. Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Senju et al., 2004) high VMA children with ASD also learn words 
from directive cues (i.e. arrows), including when this contrasts with eye gaze.  However, 
they do not learn words from the less directive cue of a patch of light illuminating the 
target object.  This suggests that some cues are more important than others for word 
learning; they are not all weighted equally.   
This also stresses the role of the interpreter (child) within word-learning 
(Saussure, 1983).  Forming word-object mappings is not a passive, dyadic process 
between signifier (cue) and signified (object) but also includes whether the perceiver 
thinks the cue is relevant to word learning.  Within Studies Three to Five, the relative 
influences of these factors varied according to a subtle interplay between the cue itself 
and the group that the child was a member of.  For example, the high VMA children with 
ASD learnt words from arrows but not lights, suggesting that arrows are more relevant for 
the word learning of this group.  Their low VMA counterparts learnt words from neither 
arrows nor lights, suggesting that they do not interpret either indicator as important for 
word learning.  The high VMA TD children learnt words from arrows and lights, 
suggesting that they weighed the cues equally within word learning.  Therefore, it is not 
only simply the cue itself that is important for word learning, but the child’s interpretation 
of it.         




Studies Three and Four suggest that only high VMA children with ASD learn 
words from social and associative cues.  In Study Five, both groups of children with ASD 
primarily chose at chance when the social and associative cues conflicted (the only 
exception being that the high VMA children with ASD chose the object suggested by the 
arrow for the arrow and light conflicting trials).  The low VMA children with ASD did 
not show a baseline preference to begin with and the high VMA children with ASD 
seemingly did not know whether to prioritise social pragmatics or association when they 
contrasted with each other.  The children with ASD were not alone; the TD and DD 
children also chose at chance for the conflicting cues trials. 
At first glance, this high level of chance performance might seem to suggest that 
children use various different cues to facilitate language acquisition and that these 
interconnect with each other, as predicted by the emergentist coalition model (e.g. 
Golinkoff & Hirsh-Pasek, 2006).  Random responding when social and associative cues 
conflict with each other may imply that children weigh these cues as equally important 
for word learning.  However, the emergentist coalition model – and previous research – 
has also stated that TD children prioritise social cues over associative cues for word 
learning from as young as 24-months-old (e.g. Baldwin, 1991; 1993; Hollich, 2000; 
Moore et al., 2009).  In contrast, children with ASD have formed word-object mappings 
from association rather than social cues (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Hennon, 2003; 
Parrish-Morris et al., 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005).           




These differences might be attributed to differences in terms of the paradigm used.  
It is a novel setting for the child to view a speaker and objects on a computer screen.  
Although all three groups of children primarily performed at chance for Study Five both 
the children with ASD and the DD children showed differences in their word learning 
relative to the TD children for Studies Three and Four.  Specifically, the children with 
ASD were delayed learning words from eye gaze and pointing and failed to learn words 
from the light.  The DD children were delayed learning words from eye gaze and deviant 
learning words from pointing.  The concept of delay vs. deviance regarding word learning 
in children with ASD will be explored within the next section. 
 
7.4. Delay vs. deviance hypotheses 
The studies within this thesis all recruited participants with a broad range of 
receptive vocabulary skills.  This wide variation in language ability was very useful in 
terms of investigating whether the word learning of children with ASD is delayed or 
deviant.  Past research has tended to assume that children with ASD either succeed at a 
task or have a task deficit without considering that younger or older children might 
perform differently.  For example, Baron-Cohen et al., (1997) only investigated word 
learning from the speaker’s eye gaze in children with ASD with a VMA of two before 
concluding that children with ASD form word-object mappings to the object of their own 
interest, rather than the speaker’s.  It is possible that older children with ASD would react 
differently.   




The five studies encompassed within this thesis support past research suggesting 
that some areas of language are delayed in ASD (e.g. Bartolucci et al., 1976; Eigsti & 
Bennetto, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2006) and other areas are deviant (e.g. Menyuk, 1978; 
Van Meter et al., 1997).  Studies One and Three provide support for word learning delays 
in ASD; showing the shape bias in a naming context and word learning from social cues 
were all only mastered by children with a higher VMA10.  Study One also provides 
support for word learning deviance in ASD, as these children did not show a shape bias in 
a non-naming context.  Note, however, that it is possible that children with ASD 
eventually do so, with an even higher VMA, such as nine-years-old (see also footnote 1).  
Study Two found that children with ASD showed the function bias earlier than TD 
children, but then appeared to lose their functional understanding with a higher VMA.   
The results of the ASD low VMA subgroup for Study Two were unexpected, and 
may well represent a deviance, just not in the predicted direction.  Specifically, it was 
originally hypothesised that if children with ASD were deviant in one or more of the 
                                                        
10 Although it was also only the high VMA children with ASD who formed word-object mappings from the 
arrow in Study Four, note that the TD children did not form word-object mappings from the arrow either 
until they also had a high VMA.  Therefore, this does not represent a delay compared with the TD children.  
Furthermore, as only the high VMA TD children chose the target object for the light, it cannot be 
determined whether this was delayed in ASD (children with an even higher VMA, such as nine-years-old, 
learn words from the light) or deviant (children with ASD fail to learn words from this cue, regardless of 
VMA). 




paradigms this would mean that they failed to possess the skill, even with a higher VMA 
than TD children.  However, ‘deviant’ does not necessarily mean never acquiring an 
ability, but could simply refer to differences in terms of the developmental trajectory of 
this ability in children with ASD relative to TD children (Van Meter et al., 1997).  
Therefore, the results of Study Two suggest that children with ASD might actually show 
advanced function bias understanding relative to TD children.  
Although sparse, there is some past research suggesting that children with ASD 
show some superiority in language relative to their TD (Norbury et al., 2010) and DD 
(Franken et al., 2010) peers.  Specifically, Norbury et al., (2010) found that children with 
ASD are better than TD children at mapping phonological forms to novel referents and 
Franken et al., (2010) found that children with ASD learnt words within an ostensive 
context better than children with moderate learning difficulties.  Indeed, it has been 
suggested that children with ASD may show ‘islets of ability’ (Kanner, 1944), excelling 
in certain areas, while having profound deficits in others.  It is also  the case that if 
individuals with ASD are found to have strengths within some areas, those working with 
these children can make use of these strengths to help children with ASD overcome their 
language weaknesses (Lin, 2014).   
However, the function bias was not universal among children with ASD; the high-
VMA individuals in this cohort appeared to have ‘lost’ the heuristic.  Therefore, caution 
must be made before assuming that the function bias is a strength in children with ASD.  
As previously mentioned in Section 7.2, there are adaptive advantages for possessing a 




shape bias first and then possessing a function bias, as the TD children did.  In addition to 
the high VMA children with ASD not possessing a function bias, the ASD cohort as a 
whole showed differences within their word learning (both delays and deviance) across 
the five studies within this thesis. 
Therefore, taken together, these five studies suggest that children with ASD 
display word learning difficulties, primarily delays, in a wide range of contexts.  There 
are various interpretations of this finding.  Firstly, it might be the case that children with 
ASD need repeated trials and repetition to help them learn words, relative to TD children.  
Indeed, the participants with ASD in Tek et al., (2008), who did select the shape match 
test object in a name and no name condition, may have done so after repeated exposure to 
the objects (See Section 2.6).  The shape bias has also been found to be present in TD 
infants as young as 17-months after repeated training (Ware & Booth, 2010).   
Therefore, it may be the case that regularly repeating and emphasising words and 
making this explicitly obvious to children with ASD facilitates their word learning.  
Indeed, interventions targeted at children with ASD, such as applied behavioural analysis, 
or ABA (Lovaas, 1987) often do involve regular repetition.  Another, not necessarily 
conflicting, hypothesis is that children with ASD are only able to learn words with a 
higher overall cognitive ability than TD children.  As well as possessing a higher VMA, 
the high VMA children with ASD were likely to have also had greater resources at hand 
such as better concentration skills.   




Finally, the high VMA children with ASD may have also had (although not in all 
cases) a higher CA than the low VMA cohort.  More life experience and/or years of 
interventions (such as ABA and Picture Exchange Communication System, or PECS) 
might have facilitated word learning in the high VMA children with ASD relative to the 
low VMA participants.  Future research should aim to investigate these factors in order to 
tease apart the reasons that children with ASD exhibit word learning delays and 
deviances.   
 Interestingly, it was not only the children with ASD who showed word learning 
delay and deviance with these tasks.  Like the children with ASD, the DD children were 
delayed in word learning from eye gaze in Study Three.  They were also deviant in many 
aspects of word learning relative to the TD children, specifically, showing the shape bias 
in a no name context, possessing a function bias and word learning from direct pointing.  
In some cases, they were even later to acquire these skills than the children with ASD.  
For example, the high VMA children with ASD formed word-object mappings from the 
speaker’s direct pointing (suggesting a delay), although the high VMA DD children did 
not (suggesting a deviance or, at best, a severe delay).   
This supports some past research, which has found that children with DD also 
struggle to learn words from social cues (Arens et al., 2005; Laing et al., 2002).  It is 
possible that current research and interventions focus on children with ASD to the 
expense of children with other DD’s, who are missing out on interventions that could help 
them with their word learning.  Furthermore, as previously discussed within the study 




chapters, children with DD often have impaired cognitive processes (Burden et al., 2005; 
Engel et al., 2011; John & Mervis, 2010; Kogan et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2001; Mulder et 
al., 2011; Silverman, 2007), which may have affected their performance on the tasks.  
These results suggest that future research should focus on word learning in this 
population as well as children with ASD.  This is further explored within the next section, 
which investigates the use of control groups in the ASD literature.    
 
7.5. Use of control groups 
Unlike the majority of studies within the ASD word learning literature (e.g. 
Akechi et al., 2011; 2013; Aldaqre et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2011; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; Hartley & Allen, 2014; Luyster & Lord, 2009; Mayo & Eigsti, 2012; Norbury et 
al., 2010; Preissler & Carey, 2005; Tek et al., 2008), all five studies within this thesis 
used both TD and DD individuals as control groups.  Past studies have often made 
inferences about children with ASD which might not actually be specific to the disorder 
as they were only compared against TD children.  Even only comparing children with 
ASD with a DD control group (e.g. Franken et al., 2010) fails to identify whether TD 
children would, for some reason, act differently from DD children.  Therefore, it is 
important to compare the three groups; the TD children to test normalcy and the DD 
children to test distinctiveness (Burack et al., 2004).  
 Several of the paradigms within this thesis had never or only rarely been 
investigated in DD children.  The shape bias (Study One) had only been studied in 




children with language difficulties (Collison et al., 2014; Jones, 2003).   Perhaps 
unsurprisingly given their speech impairments, these individuals failed to show the 
heuristic but it was unknown how children with other conditions would perform.  To my 
knowledge, the function bias had never been explored before in either children with ASD 
or children with DD.  There have been few studies on how DD children understand social 
pragmatics (exceptions include Arens et al., 2005; John & Mervis, 2010; Laing et al., 
2002; Landry & Loveland, 1988; Loveland & Landry, 1986;) and even fewer on how they 
learn from association. 
However, studying DD children can help explore whether any differences 
observed in children with ASD are truly specific to the disorder or also occur in children 
with other conditions, perhaps due to factors such as difficulties concentrating, slow 
processing speed or even different life experiences relative to TD children affecting 
language acquisition.  Interestingly, across all of the five studies within this thesis, the 
only main results that can be attributed specifically to ASD were their delay in showing a 
shape bias in the name condition and the low VMA children with ASD showing a function 
bias.  Therefore, the vast majority of results were not specific to ASD and, in some cases, 
the DD children actually performed worse than the children with ASD (see the following 
section).  Therefore, this research highlights the importance of including a DD control 
group within ASD studies.  Any results cannot be attributed to ASD per se unless they are 
compared with both TD and DD children.     




One potential criticism of the DD participants within this thesis is there was a lot 
of heterogeneity within this group.  This means that no conclusions can be made about 
how children with specific disorders would perform on the studies.  Future work should 
aim to recruit whole cohorts of children with specific conditions, such as a group of 
children with Down Syndrome or a group of children with learning difficulties in order to 
establish if these effects are still found.  It might be, for example, that high VMA children 
with Down Syndrome are able to show a function bias but high VMA children with 
learning difficulties like specific language impairment are not.  This would then allow 
exploration of the factors that are likely to contribute to a function bias deficit; perhaps it 
is due to the extent of dialogue being too difficult for the cognitive abilities of children 
with learning difficulties but not for the children with Down Syndrome, VMA matched 
with the TD children.  
 
7.6. Performance of the DD children 
Unexpectedly, the children with ASD were not the only ones to exhibit word- 
learning difficulties; the DD children did too, in some cases even performing poorer than 
the children with ASD.  Studies One, Two and Three in particular suggest word learning 
differences in DD children compared with TD children.  Unlike TD children, both groups 
of DD children only showed the shape bias when the object was named.  Neither group of 
DD children possessed the function bias.  Only the high VMA DD children learnt words 
from the speaker’s eye gaze and neither group learnt words from the speaker’s pointing.  




Study Four, however, found that DD children formed word-object mappings from the 
arrow earlier than their TD and ASD counterparts, although they failed to learn words 
from the light cue.  The DD children also experienced difficulties with the same and 
reversed position trials in Studies Three and Four.   
These findings are both unexpected and intriguing.  It is well known that both 
children with ASD and children with DD have impairments with executive functioning 
skills (e.g. Danielsson, Henry, Messer & Ronnberg, 2012; Mackinlay, Charman & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Pennington & Ozonoff, 
1996; Semrud-Clikeman, Walkowiak, Wilkinson & Butcher, 2010; Vries & Geurts, 
2012).  This could have contributed to their poor performance.  Regrettably this thesis did 
not include a measure of executive functioning, making it difficult to test this claim.  This 
is something that could be implemented in further research. 
Secondly, as mentioned within Chapter One, it might also be the case that the 
upbringing of both children with ASD and children with DD is very different from the 
upbringing of their TD peers (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).  TD children might be given 
more independence and more freedom to make language acquisition errors, for example, 
and in doing so this might actually help them learn more about the process of language 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).  Caregivers and teachers might be quicker to correct the 
language errors of children with ASD and DD for fear of them falling behind.  However, 
by not being given the chance to make these common childhood word learning mistakes, 




the language acquisition of children with ASD and DD might actually become impaired 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).   
Similarly, with an increased concern for their children’s safety, caregivers might 
not allow children with ASD and DD to explore the environment and objects as freely as 
TD children (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith, 2001), which 
might lead to a lack of understanding of object properties.  The vast majority of 
participants with ASD and DD who took part in these paradigms attended specialist 
schools, where they may have been treated differently from the TD children who attended 
mainstream schools and day nurseries.  Therefore, environmental influences might hinder 
word learning ability in both TD children and children with ASD and this should be 
factored into future research.  Specifically, studies could establish if there are any 
potential differences between atypically developing children attending specialist and 
mainstream schools.  One potential difficulty with doing this is that children attending 
mainstream schools might be, in general, less severely affected than those attending 
specialist schools.  Therefore, baseline measures of ability would need to be taken into 
account and, if possible, equated.  
Even given these explanations, it is puzzling that the DD participants performed 
poorer than the children with ASD for Studies Two and Three.  It is possible that DD 
children are being overlooked in comparison to children with ASD, as numerous 
interventions are targeted at the latter population.  These programs are specifically 
tailored to the unique needs of children with ASD but DD children may not receive such 




specialist support with word learning and socialisation skills, thus fall behind.  
Furthermore, the learning difficulties experienced by the DD sample may have hindered 
their abilities at the tasks.  
 
7.7 Strengths of the thesis 
This thesis has numerous strengths.  As previously mentioned, the inclusion of 
both a TD and DD control group in every study allowed exploration of word learning in 
these two populations and being able to discern which effects were truly due to ASD per 
se.  Furthermore, a large number of participants were recruited (a total of 214 children 
took part across the five studies), of varying CA and VMA.  This allowed full exploration 
of the delay vs. deviance hypothesis, as it enabled the sample to be split into high and low 
VMA subcategories, with adequate numbers of participants in each group.  Furthermore, 
children were recruited from a wide variety of settings; five mainstream schools, fourteen 
specialist schools, six mainstream day nurseries, two parental support groups and word of 
mouth across numerous locations within the North West of England.  The large number 
of places where the children were tested means that the sample represents children from a 
wide variety of social classes and socioeconomic status.   
The studies also included a relatively large number of female participants. 
Although the three groups were not matched for gender for any of the studies within this 
thesis, following Hartley and Allen (2014), two additional analyses were carried out for 
each of the paradigms, which established that gender did not affect participants’ response 




for any study.  Firstly, five ANOVA’s of Gender by Responses found that children’s 
Gender had no influence on the object they picked as the referent for any of the studies.  
Secondly, all analyses were rerun including only the male TD participants, which found 
no or minimal differences in the results.   
 To my knowledge, this thesis was the first to be loosely based upon the 
emergentist coalition model in relation to ASD.  Focusing on the speaker, object and 
environment triad allowed exploration of the three main elements in children’s word 
learning.  As has been previously stated, the function bias had never been explored before 
in atypically developing populations.  Unlike most of the past literature, Studies Three to 
Five encompassed same vs. reversed position trials, which helped tease apart whether 
children were forming word-to-object or word-to-location mappings. 
 It has often been assumed that if children choose the target object for word 
learning studies then this means that they have fully learnt the name of this object.  In 
fact, it could be the case that they have simply mapped the word to a particular location in 
space.  However, few previous studies have investigated the effect of spatio-temporal 
position on children’s word learning.  The low VMA children with ASD appeared to form 
word-to-location mappings, as only the high VMA children learnt words from the 
reversed position trials, although both groups learnt words from the same position trials.  
In contrast, both groups of TD children formed word-to-object mappings for both the 
same and reversed position trials.   




This suggests that, unlike TD children, participants with ASD originally only map 
the name of objects to specific spatial locations.  This could have major implications for 
the understanding of language acquisition in children with ASD.  If they associate the 
word ‘brush’ only with the object they see upon their caregiver’s bedside table, this 
means that they then do not know this word when the brush moves to onto the bed.  At 
the other extreme, when a cup moves to their caregiver’s bedside table, children with 
ASD risk mis-mapping this as a ‘brush’.  Of course, over repeated occurences of seeing 
the brush and cup they will eventually learn these labels, but the process then becomes 
harder than for TD children.  Previous research has neglected to explore this important 
issue.  
 
7.8. Limitations of the thesis 
 Of course any thesis or series of studies has limitations.  While the sample size is 
large for all studies within this research, including female participants and encompassing 
children of varied socioeconomic status, all of the participants obviously had to possess 
adequate receptive vocabulary understanding (two-years and over, as measured on the 
BPVS) and behaviour (the ability to sit and concentrate fully on the tasks) in order to 
participate in the study.  Specifically, children had to be able to remember instructions 
and physically point towards or pick up objects.  Indeed 53 children in total were 
excluded from the studies, some for the very reason that they lacked these skills, either 
due to inadequate cognitive abilities or behavioural difficulties.  However, this means that 




the characteristics of the sample may not reflect the entire population of children with 
ASD and DD, some of whom are non-verbal below the two-year-age level, have more 
limited linguistic and/or cognitive abilities than could be tested here and/or or have severe 
behavioural problems, which impair their ability to concentrate on the task.     
 Splitting the sample according to the median VMA as measured by the BPVS 
allowed for an exploration of the delay vs. deviance hypothesis.  However, the use of 
median splits has been criticised (e.g. MacCallum, 2002; McClelland et al., 2015), due to 
analysing continuous scores with a somewhat arbitrary cut off point, as though they were 
categorical.  Whilst I acknowledge this criticism, subdividing the sample according to the 
median VMA replicates numerous past studies within the child development and ASD 
literature, which have split groups by the median VMA (e.g. Leekam et al., 1998; 
Slaughter, Dennis & Pritchard, 2002) or other types of median split (Charman, Ruffman 
& Clements, 2002; Fiore & Schooler, 2002; Lam, Bodfish & Piven, 2008).   
For Study One, the median VMA split was further justified by looking at the 
correlations.  The low VMA children did not show a shape bias in the name condition but 
the high VMA children did; as expected, there was a positive correlation between VMA 
and shape bias responses for the children with ASD in the name condition.  For Study 
Two, although the correlational data was not consistent with the median split analysis, I  




also carried out a robust linear regression and scatterplots for this study, which confirmed 
the findings of the VMA split.11 
A further potential weakness of the studies is that the CARS and SCQ scales did 
not always distinguish the children according to their clinical diagnoses, with 7 children 
with ASD in total not scoring within the ASD range on either scale and 2 children with 
DD scoring in the ASD range on both scales.  For each of the five studies, a minority of 
children (Study 1 N = 9, Study 2 N = 4, Studies 3 – 5 N = 1) did not score according to 
their clinical diagnosis.  A decision was made to keep these children in the sample based 
on their specialist diagnoses and to simply use the CARS and SCQ for additional 
information.  The analyses for each study were also carried out excluding children who 
did not score according to their official diagnosis on both questionnaires, which found 
that this made little or minimal difference to the results.   
Although measures like the CARS and SCQ can be helpful, they are subjective 
and ASD should only be diagnosed after a thorough clinical assessment and not simply on 
the basis of scores on a questionnaire (Gillberg 1990).  Both of the scales are quite old 
(the CARS has been used since 1988 and the SCQ since 2003), therefore possibly 
outdated.  Some of the children’s parents and teachers did express concern with some of 
                                                        
11 Note that for Studies Three, Four and Five, the correlations were carried out using the total proportion of 
correct responses across all four trials, due to the low possible range of scores per cue (i.e. children could 
only score 0, .50 or 1).  Therefore, it cannot be determined whether there were correlations between the 
cues which would be expected to correlate.   




the language the questionnaires contained, such as the use of the word ‘retarded’ in the 
CARS.  There is also some controversy regarding the current cut off scores for ASD on 
the CARS, with some claiming that children should be classed as on the autistic spectrum 
if they score 25 or 25.5 rather than 30 (Dickerson Mayers et al., 2012; Tachimori, Osada 
& Kurita, 2003) and others stating that the cut off point for ASD should be 27 for adults 
and adolescents (Mesibov, Schloper & Michal, 1989).   
In the main, the children scored according to their diagnosis on the CARS and 
SCQ scales.  Even in cases where they did not, as has been discussed, an observer’s 
ratings of a child’s behaviour on a questionnaire does not always provide an accurate 
indicator of their diagnosis.  The fact that the analyses were conducted without including 
these children and found the same or similar results suggests that it was acceptable to 
keep them in the final sample.   
In terms of the paradigms themselves, there were a few weaknesses within the 
stimuli shown to the children, particularly for Studies Two and Four.  As mentioned 
within Study Two (the function bias study) some of the objects were more familiar to the 
children than others.  Although this replicates Diesendruck et al., (2003) on whom the 
study was modelled and although the familiarity of the object set did not affect children’s 
function bias responses, it would perhaps have been better to have made all objects novel.  
Furthermore, as previously discussed both within this Chapter and Study Four (the arrow 
and light study), the light cue might have been perceived as slightly odd as it consisted of 
a red patch over the object, rather than the actual object itself lighting up.  Future research 




might want to investigate if children with ASD and DD still choose the target object at 
chance with different methodology, such as the whole object lighting up.  As previously 
mentioned within Study 5, the setting for Studies Three – Five (watching a video) was 
also somewhat artificial, thus future research might want to explore children’s word 
learning in more ‘real world’ contexts.    
  
7.9. Suggestions for future research 
One suggestion for future research would be to include measures of intention 
reading and executive functioning (especially memory and processing speed) for each 
study.  Including a measure of intention reading for each study would allow one to see if 
each area of word learning is related to referential intent and if this differs for each group 
of children.  For example, the shape bias would be expected to be related to a referential 
intent measure for the TD children (SAC account) but not the children with ASD or DD 
(ALA account).  Including a processing speed scale would help identify if slow 
processing speed was affecting the performance of the DD children for the video studies.   
 For the three video studies, eye tracking could be used, to explore where the 
children are actually looking whilst watching the videos.  This could provide helpful 
information, particularly for the eye gaze and pointing video.  For example, for the gaze 
cue, eye tracking would help determine whether the low VMA children with ASD and 
DD fixate on the speaker’s gaze towards the object but fail to form the correct word-
object mapping or simply fail to notice the eye gaze at all.   




For the pointing inconsistent cue, whether children actually look towards the 
speaker’s face (looking off into the distance) and then towards the pointing at the object 
or look simply at the pointing towards the object could help disentangle children’s mental 
processes as they are faced with this cue.  This would explain whether children realise the 
speaker is looking elsewhere and are confused by this but then decide to choose the object 
suggested by the pointing or whether they simply fail to process that the speaker is 
looking elsewhere.  Eye tracking would also help investigate any potential differences in 
looking patterns between the TD children and the children with ASD.  For example, 
previous studies using a similar methodology have found that TD children look more 
towards the speaker’s face while individuals with ASD look more at the background, 
objects and other non social stimuli (e.g. Jones, Carr & Klin, 2008; Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, 
Ramsey & Jones, 2009; Klin et al., 2002; Norbury et al., 2009; Riby & Hancock, 2009). 
Future research could investigate whether children respond in the same way if the 
wording of the test question is changed, particularly for the shape bias study.  Past 
research within the TD literature suggests that the way children are asked the test question 
in non-naming conditions of shape bias experiments can have an effect on the response 
they give.  As mentioned in Chapter Two (Shape Bias), children are more likely to choose 
a shape match test object when it is emphasised that the objects are of the same kind, such 
as when they are asked to ‘pick another object like this’, than when asked ‘pick the object 
that goes together with this’ (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003).   




As stated within Chapter Three (Function Bias), following Diesendruck et al., 
(2003), the function bias paradigm contained a lot of dialogue, which may have caused 
children to lose concentration on the task.  This was important in order to replicate 
Diesendruck et al., (2003) – had the wording been changed it could have been claimed 
that any differences between this paradigm in relation to Diesendruck et al., (2003) was 
due to this.  However, future research should cut down on the extent of words the 
experimenter uses during the study, in order to see if this influences children’s 
performance on the task. 
It would also be a good idea to explore how children learn words in a more 
naturalistic environment than the laboratory studies here.  While the methodology of the 
research is consistent with most similar studies of this kind with both TD children (e.g. 
Axelsson et al., 2012; Baldwin, 1991; Diesendruck et al., 2003; Doherty, Anderson & 
Howieson, 2009; Gliga & Csibra, 2009; Houston-Price et al., 2006; Lee et al., 1998; 
Merriman et al., 2003; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003) and children with ASD (e.g. Baron-
Cohen et al., 1995; 1997; Hartley & Allen, 2014; Hennon, 2003; Parish-Morris et al., 
2007; Tek et al., 2008) it is important to remember that it is also useful to study how 
children acquire language in a more real world context.  Future studies might like to make 
use of information from The Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES) 
(MacWhinney & Snow, 1985), which contains transcripts of children’s language, which 
can be analysed.      
 




7.10. Final Comments 
In summary, this thesis investigated the language acquisition of TD children, 
children with ASD and DD children from word learning biases (specifically the shape 
bias and function bias), social cues (eye gaze and pointing) and associative cues (arrow 
and light).  It therefore allowed an exploration of the emergentist coalition model, the 
delay vs. deviance account of ASD and the influence of the speaker, object and 
environment within word learning.  A large number of children were recruited from each 
of the three groups and this thesis was the first to explore the function bias in children 
with ASD and other DD’s.   
Children with ASD are delayed showing a shape bias and word learning from eye 
gaze and deviant showing a function bias.  Although, as expected, TD children show 
intact word learning from the shape bias and social cues, they need a VMA of six, rather 
than three, to show a function bias.  Unexpectedly, the DD children exhibited word 
learning deficits, especially from social cues.  Contrary to the assumption that TD 
children learn words from association and then utilise social cues (e.g. Hollich, 2000), 
both the high and low VMA TD children learnt words from social cues but only the high 
VMA TD children learn words from association.  They also do not prioritise association 
when this conflicts with social cues.   
Taken together, the five studies within this thesis show that language acquisition 
is impaired in both children with ASD and children with DD.  This thesis highlights the 
importance of testing children with ASD who have a wide range of receptive vocabulary 




understanding.  It also stresses the necessity of DD comparison groups within ASD 
research and the role of the object, speaker and environment in children’s word learning.  
These findings suggest that children use various cues to facilitate their language 
acquisition and that atypically developing children (not just children with ASD) differ in 
the developmental time point at which word learning cues emerge in relation to TD 
children.  Importantly, these studies reflect the need for research on children with ASD 
and DD to take on a developmental perspective.  This is clearly shown between the subtle 
interaction between the dependent variables (facets of the stimuli and aspects of the cues 
shown to the child), the VMA of the child (as a proxy for developmental level) and group 
membership.  
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